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Chapter 1
The controversy over employment statistics 
should be seen in the context of the fact 
there is now a fully established politics 
of unemployment in India. This is a new 
development that needs to be understood.
The Employment Question in India - 
Politics, Economics, and the Way Forward
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1 / The Employment Question 
in India- Politics, Economics, 
and the Way Forward
Amit Basole and Arjun Jayadev
Centre for Sustainable Employment, Azim Premji University, Bangalore
We thank Rammanohar Reddy and Abhishek Shaw for comments.
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as an article on The India Forum. See 
https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/employment-question-india
1.1 / Introduction
State of Working India 2019 is being published close 
on the heels of the 2018 report. The principal reason 
for this is that this year’s report aims to intervene in 
the debate over employment generation in time for 
the general elections to be conducted in April and May 
2019. In this report we present an update on the jobs 
situation for the period between 2016 and 2018, and 
also present some ideas for employment generation.
The first few months of 2019 have been unusually 
eventful for labour economists and statisticians in India. 
The ongoing controversy over job creation received a 
fresh impetus early in the new year with Somesh Jha’s 
Business Standard exposé of a new National Sample 
Survey Office (NSSO) report on employment. Jha 
reported the ‘leaked’ findings of the newly instituted 
Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), which showed that 
unemployment rates had risen to an all-time high of 6.1 
per cent in 2017-2018.1 The leaked PLFS report came on 
the heels of considerable uncertainty about the state of 
labour statistics in the country.2
A two-part article by Amitabh Kant, CEO of NITI Aayog, 
in the Business Standard sought to discredit the 
PLFS based on arguments of a small sample size and 
incorrectly estimated absolute numbers.3 The rebuttal 
by former National Statistical Commission members 
offered a detailed response to the allegations made.4 
Somesh Jha has continued to write a series of articles 
on various aspects of the leaked PLFS report, including 
labour force participation rates, unemployment among 
the educated and among various demographic groups, 
levels of formal work, and working hours.5
The government’s response to the leaked findings was 
to delay the release of the PLFS report indefinitely and 
commission a study of employment generation under 
the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency 
(MUDRA) scheme.6 Subsequently it has been reported 
that that the MUDRA study will also not be released 
before the elections.7 Since the PLFS is supposed to be 
the new flagship labour force survey of the NSSO, it is 
not clear what this means for its future or indeed the 
future of labour statistics in India.
In the meantime, the only source of household level 
employment data is the Consumer Pyramids Survey of 
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE-
CPHS). A module for identifying labour force status was 
added to this survey in 2016. We discuss the findings 
from this survey in Chapter Two, What Do Household 
Surveys Reveal About Employment In India Since 
2016?
At one level, the reaction of the government is quite 
puzzling to those who follow labour statistics. An open 
unemployment rate of 6.1 per cent is neither startling 
nor unexpected. As we have discussed in State of 
Working India 2018, the Indian economy has for some 
period of time been underperforming in terms of 
providing a sufficient number of good, desirable jobs, 
and open unemployment rates have been rising over 
the last decade according to most credible sources. 
The figures in the government report might be seen 
as confirming a medium-term trend that labour 
economists have remarked upon for years.
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At another level though, the panic may be justified. 
The controversy over employment statistics should 
be seen in the context of the fact there is now a fully 
established politics of unemployment in India. This 
is a new development that needs to be understood. 
The politics of unemployment is typically a feature of 
middle-to-high income countries, not low-to-middle 
income countries. Traditionally, the principal economic 
issue of broad spectrum political significance in India 
has been poverty, not unemployment. And there 
are still many who say that India’s problem is low 
wages and low earnings, not unemployment.8 This is 
a variant of the line ‘there are jobs, but they are not 
remunerative enough’. Such a statement is trivially true: 
as Economics 101 graphs so favoured by economists 
would show, at very low wages the demand for labour 
will exceed its supply. But precisely because it is trivial, 
one should ask the question: Why is it that workers are 
no longer willing to accept low wages? This is where 
India’s changing labour market comes into the picture.
There have been some new developments, which 
when juxtaposed with older structural and cultural 
factors, can account for why this is happening in India, 
a lower middle income country with a per capita GDP 
one third that of China and half that of Indonesia. 
The ‘precocious’ part of the Indian labour market that 
resembles higher income countries, that has always 
been there to a limited extent, is now substantial and 
rapidly rising, and more to the point, it has spread 
throughout the country, including the rural areas. 
This has laid the material basis for a widespread
politics of unemployment.
1.2 / Key demand and 
supply side factors
Without any claim to being a complete list, we discuss 
seven key factors on the supply side of the labour 
market and two crucial demand side factors.
a. High growth rates and aspirations: Sharply 
increased growth rates since around 2000 and the 
attendant creation of a culturally ascendant middle 
class have created an aspirational lifestyle. This means 
that for an increasing number of Indians, traditional 
occupations as well as petty informal work are less and 
less acceptable.
b. The youth bulge: Much has been written about 
India’s ‘demographic dividend’ over the years and it 
is not necessary to dwell on this point here. We only 
note that India is a very young country, the median 
age being only around 28, compared even to China 
(37 years), leave alone western Europe (45 years). The 
connection between youth and aspirations is obvious.
c. The education wave: Youth today are much better 
educated than their parents. According to the 2015 
Employment-Unemployment Survey of the Labour 
Bureau, workers with no formal education at all are 
now a mere 12 per cent of the labour force. The 
enrolment rate for secondary education reached 
90 per cent in 2015. The enrolment rate for higher 
education (for those in the 18-23 age group) rose 
from 11 per cent in 2006 to 26 per cent in 2016. As a 
result, while graduates constituted only 6 per cent of 
the labour force in 2004, this was up to 15 per cent in 
2015. In absolute terms that means nearly 70 million 
people. Further, these educated youth are no longer 
concentrated in the large cities (as was the case in the 
pre-1991 period). Rather they are spread across smaller 
towns and villages. They constitute a small but vocal 
and politically visible minority everywhere.
d. The dominance of ‘general’ degrees: College 
enrolment is reaching all-time highs, but the All India 
Survey of Higher Education indicates that of the 8 
million students who graduate every year, only around 
1 million receive professional degrees. The rest are 
graduates in the Arts, Science, or Commerce streams, 
whose education often does not prepare them for work 
in the modern economy.
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e. Sub-standard degrees: Further, there is a well-
known problem of quality of education in both general 
and professional streams, creating what is sometimes 
called an ‘employability crisis’. While adequate official 
or national-level statistics are hard to come by, several 
private surveys have pointed to the fact that fresh 
graduates in India, even from the engineering and 
management programmes, need significant amounts of 
further training to become ‘job-ready’.9 Companies are 
increasingly setting up training centres to bridge the 
gap between college and job requirements. We need 
to understand better how costs of training are being 
re-distributed between households, employers, and the 
government.
f. Caste: Caste has two major effects in this context, 
it creates powerful incentives on part of lower 
castes to move away from traditional occupations 
to ensure dignity and respect in society. At the same 
time it prevents upper castes from considering any 
occupations that have a manual component. This 
results in a huge supply of labour to white-collar and 
desk-oriented jobs ensuring that only those who do not 
have this option are left to work in other occupations 
and trades.
g. Gender: Gender norms, to the extent that they 
prevent women from working in paid employment, 
actually reduce unemployment numbers because 
these women remain out of the labour market. 
However, with increasing education levels, the number 
of women, who are not employed and not seeking 
employment but would work if work was available, 
is also increasing. And since gender norms impose 
structural constraints on their mobility, the type of 
work that they can undertake is restricted. This also 
contributes to higher unemployment among women 
than men. Indeed, recent household survey data from 
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) as 
well as the Periodic Labour Force Survey indicate that 
unemployment rates are the highest among young, 
educated, women.
h. Collapse of public sector employment: The above 
supply-side factors, some of which are relatively new 
developments and others which are long-standing 
features of the Indian labour market, have interacted 
with two crucial demand side changes. First, the public 
sector has been a large employer in India when it 
comes to formal or regular salaried jobs. Further, it is 
also a large employer of general purpose graduates. 
The slowdown in recruitment and systematic reduction 
in public sector employment has come at the same 
time that the supply of educated youth has increased. 
The intense hunger for government jobs is visible in the 
vast over-subscription to even the lowest paid forms 
of public employment, as well as in the large protests 
all over the country over extending the benefits of 
job reservations to communities such as the Gujjars, 
Marathas, Patels, Jats, and so on, that have been left 
out of the system till now. The culmination of this 
process is the 10 per cent job quota for all households 
whose income is less than  D8 lakhs per year, covering 
the vast majority of Indian households.
i. Automation and AI: Second, the same processes of 
integration into the global economy that have delivered 
high growth rates, have also ensured that Indian firms 
have much less room to manoeuvre with respect to 
adoption of the latest techniques, many of which are 
capital-intensive and labour-displacing. The ability of 
the private sector to generate employment has been 
steadily falling across the globe, due to rapid and self-
propelling advances in automation. This is particularly 
true of the manufacturing sector. As we showed in 
State of Working India 2018, in the early 1980s, one 
crore rupees of investment (in 2015 rupees) created 
around 80 jobs in the organised manufacturing sector. 
By 2015 this had fallen to less than 10 jobs. Sector-
specific studies in IT and other service industries also 
indicate that many jobs are in danger of disappearing 
due to automation. While there is a lot of speculation 
and hype around AI and its job-displacing potential, 
it cannot be denied that this will be a crucial factor in 
determining the future of work in India and elsewhere.
The foregoing factors are clear to all observers of the 
Indian economy. The question is, of course, what can 
be done? It is clear that economic growth of the type 
we have experienced in the past two decades will not 
absorb surplus labour in adequate time to prevent 
social dislocation. At the same time, some of the older 
models of aiding structural transformation seem to 
have little political purchase. What are needed are 
several long-term and short-term measures which face 
these structural conditions as they exist currently. We 
discuss a few of these here. Public action and spending 
are strong elements of all these measures.
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a. Public works: Building, maintenance and 
upgradation of civic infrastructure like roads, footpaths, 
cycling paths, bridges, public housing, monuments, 
laying of cables, and other construction work.
b. Green jobs: Creation, restoration, and maintenance 
of urban commons, green spaces and parks, forested 
or woody areas, rejuvenation of degraded or waste 
land, cleaning of water bodies (tanks, rivers, nullahs, 
lakes). Works that can be undertaken here include 
water conservation and harvesting, flood control, 
micro-irrigation, enhancing urban greenery, preventing 
coastal and hillside erosion, disaster management, 
enabling urban agriculture for subsistence and so on.
c. Monitoring and surveying jobs: Gathering, 
classifying, and storage of information on 
environmental quality and other aspects of quality of 
public goods. This will require easy to use equipment 
for data collection and programmes for data entry. 
This can provide both temporary employment as well 
as valuable skilling and work experience for educated 
youth. Accordingly, these positions can be for a 
continuous period of 150 days in a year, and with a 
different set of people hired each year. The information 
from these monitoring and data collection could feed 
into prioritising the kind of works that need to be done.
d. Administrative assistance: Assisting municipal 
offices, local public schools, health centres etc. in 
administration or other ancillary functions, thereby 
freeing up the teaching or medical staff for core 
functions. These jobs can again be geared towards 
higher educated workers, who can avail of this 
opportunity to build administrative, managerial and 
record-keeping skills. These positions may also be for a 
continuous period of 150 days in a year.
e. Care work: Assisting regular public employees 
working in balwadis or creches, providing child-minding 
services for parents working longer hours, assisted care 
for the elderly and various services for differently abled, 
such as reading to the visually challenged , assisting 
those with hearing or mobility impairment to manage 
various activities, etc. The motivation here is that the 
urban poor with such needs often fend for themselves.
1.3 / Policy measures to 
address the crisis
1.3.1 / A national urban 
employment guarantee
At the same time as our towns and cities are facing 
a crisis of quantity as well as quality of jobs, there is 
also a crisis of the quality of life in urban areas due to 
ecological stress and lack of adequate public services. 
Water-bodies are rapidly being degraded, green spaces 
are disappearing, the quality of air is deteriorating, and 
common spaces are shrinking. Creating jobs, improving 
the capacity of urban local governance and supplying 
quality public goods and services requires serious 
public investment. But such investment also has the 
potential to pay for itself many times over.
India has been a leader in implementation of 
employment guarantee programmes via the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA). It is time to think about extending this 
to urban areas also. Such an urban employment 
guarantee scheme will provide employment within 
town or city limits to all those who ask for it and 
thereby provide services to all residents, build our civic 
infrastructure, and restore the urban commons.This 
is an idea whose time has come judging from the fact 
that an urban jobs programme has been mentioned as 
part of a possible common minimum programme of 
opposition parties for the 2019 General Election, and 
the new Madhya Pradesh government has announced 
a 100-day urban job scheme, Yuva Swabhiman Yojana, 
after coming to power.10
In Chapter Three, Strengthening Towns through 
Sustainable Employment: A Job Guarantee 
Programme for Urban India, we propose a detailed 
programme that calls for providing 100 days of 
guaranteed work at D500 a day for a variety of works. It 
also provides for 150 contiguous days of training-and-
apprenticeship at a stipend of D13,000 per month for 
educated youth. Here we give a brief idea of the types 
of works that can be undertaken.
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As can be seen, the programme would allow for the 
undertaking of a variety of works thereby providing 
jobs for people with a range of skills and education 
levels, as well as addressing a wide diversity of urban 
needs.
1.3.2 / Universal basic services
Tradable services such as information technology 
enabled services (ITES) or business process outsourcing 
have received a lot of attention in India’s growth story. 
However, the non-tradable service sector, in particular 
the social segments, consisting of education, health, 
transportation and other public services, as well as 
hospitality, have significant potential for job creation 
as well as the capacity to deliver equitable and green 
growth. A ‘universal basic services’ (UBS) approach 
can be imagined that delivers human capital advances 
alongside job growth.
Over the years, India has underinvested in basic social 
services. Even for our current level of per capita GDP, 
public spending on these services is average at best and 
often below average. As a result Indians spend much 
more out-of-pocket on these services than citizens of 
other comparable countries. A bold public commitment 
to UBS will have the dual effect of supplying quality 
services while creating good jobs. A key condition for 
this is an investment in improved and increased public 
provision of healthcare, education, housing, security, 
transport, and utilities. This includes filling existing 
vacancies in the system, expansion of capacity, as well 
as regularising various forms of contract and ‘volunteer’ 
workers (such as ASHA and anganwadi workers). This 
will have multiple positive effects. Most importantly, 
the services would ensure a basic minimum quality of 
life for everybody regardless of their social or economic 
location. 
In Chapter Four, Creating Good Jobs through a 
Universal Basic Services Programme, we argue that 
a well-executed UBS would go a long way in restoring 
public goods to their rightful place in society, creating 
decent work in the process.
1.3.3 / Rethinking industrial policy
India’s experience with industrial policy (licensing, 
reservations, permits, subsidies and so on) during the 
planning years was mixed at best. The neoliberal period 
has seen outright hostility to industrial policy measures 
across the globe, barring a few such as tax breaks or 
the creation of special economic zones. The notable 
exception, of course, is China, which has continued 
the East Asian model of heavy state intervention in the 
economy.
As the work of Alica Amsden, Robert Wade, Ha-Joon 
Chang and others has shown, strategic industrial policy 
has played a key role in all the successful examples of 
industrialisation across the world, from the first wave 
industrialisers such as England to second-wave ones 
such as Germany and Russia, to laters ones such as 
South Korea and Taiwan. More recently, Dani Rodrik 
has argued strongly in in favour of industrial policy as 
a way out of the trap of premature deindustrialisation. 
These issues are discussed in Chapter Five, How to 
Revive Indian Manufacturing: On the Need for 
Industrial Policy, by Jayan Jose Thomas.
1.3.4 / Employment-oriented 
fiscal policy
Any suggestion of expanding public engagement is 
likely to be met with the question of fiscal sustainability. 
The Indian obsession with being seen as ‘serious’ and 
garnering a favourable credit rating from international 
ratings agencies comes often at the direct cost of 
employment policies and other valuable public 
expenditure.
There is precious little to suggest that Indian public 
debt is at very high levels, thereby necessitating public 
austerity. In the last 30 years, India’s debt-to-GDP ratio 
reached a low of 66 per cent, a high of 85 per cent and 
is now near the low at 68 per cent.11 In addition, the 
debt dynamics are particularly favourable at the current 
juncture. With the nominal growth rate exceeding the 
nominal interest rate and expected to do so for some 
time, debt-to-GDP ratios will erode purely from this 
effect. Central government primary deficits have almost 
disappeared.
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Furthermore, as inflation becomes less of a concern 
(indeed the concern now appears to be missing the 
inflation target on the downside), one might expect that 
interest rates will decline further, increasing the speed 
with which the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall. Nor is there 
any reason to believe that current debt ratios are likely 
to retard growth (which is one of the reasons given in 
the NK Singh committee report to reduce the deficit 
further). As Arvind Subramanian, one of the members, 
pointed out, the period of the best growth in India 
(2003-2008) was also that with high public debt-to-GDP 
ratios. Finally, the last ten years have seen substantial 
corporate leverage increases and in the ongoing 
deleveraging, government expansion is perhaps the 
most fruitful way of accommodating private balance 
sheet contraction. All of these facts suggest ample 
space for fiscal expansion. This point is argued in detail 
by Srinivas Thiruvadanthai in Chapter Six, Using 
Fiscal Policy to Alleviate the Job Crisis.
India is at a crucial juncture in its economic 
development where timely public investment and 
public policy can reap huge rewards. At the same time, 
being in denial about the current realities and missing 
this window of opportunity can have large negative 
consequences in social and economic terms. Let us act 
together to ensure that it is the first eventuality that 
comes to pass.
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html
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5. https://www.business-standard.com/author/search/
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Chapter 2
In addition to rising open unemployment 
among the higher educated, the less 
educated (and likely informal) workers 
have also seen job losses and reduced
 work opportunities since 2016.
What do Household Surveys Reveal about 
Employment in India since 2016?
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Executive Summary
1. India’s labour statistics system is in transition. 
The five-yearly employment-unemployment surveys 
conducted by the National Sample Survey Office 
(NSS-EUS), the last of which was in 2011-12, have been 
discontinued. The annual surveys conducted by the 
Labour Bureau (LB-EUS) have also been discontinued. 
The last available survey in this series is from 2015. 
2. The government has not released the results of 
the new high frequency Periodic Labour Force Survey 
(PLFS) conducted by the NSSO.
3. In the absence of official survey data, we use data 
from the Consumer Pyramids Survey of the Centre 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE-CPHS) to 
understand the employment situation between 2016 
and 2018.  
4. CMIE-CPHS is a nationally representative survey 
that covers about 160,000 households and 522,000 
individuals and is conducted in three ‘waves’, each 
spanning four months, beginning from January of every 
year. An employment-unemployment module was 
added to this survey in 2016.
5. We find that the CMIE-CPHS estimates of the labour 
force participation rate (LFPR) and the workforce 
participation rate (WPR) for men are comparable to 
those from the LB-EUS survey, as well as the NSS-EUS.  
For women, these rates differ substantially 
across surveys. 
6. Our analysis of CMIE-CPHS reveals that:
a. Five million men lost their jobs between 2016 and 
2018, the beginning of the decline in jobs coinciding 
with demonetisation in November 2016, although no 
direct causal relationship can be established based only 
on these trends.
b. Unemployment, in general, has risen steadily post 
2011. Both the PLFS and the CMIE-CPHS report the 
overall unemployment rate to be around 6 per cent in 
2018, double of what it was in the decade from 2000 
to 2011.
c. India’s unemployed are mostly the higher educated 
and the young. Among urban women, graduates are 10 
per cent of the working age population but 34 per cent 
of the unemployed. The age group 20-24 years is hugely 
over-represented among the unemployed. Among 
urban men, for example, this age group accounts for 
13.5 per cent of the working age population but 60 per 
cent of the unemployed.
d. In addition to rising open unemployment among the 
higher educated, the less educated (and likely, informal) 
workers have also seen job losses and reduced work 
opportunities since 2016.
e. In general, women are much worse affected than 
men. They have higher unemployment rates as well as 
lower labour force participation rates.
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2.1 / Introduction
India’s labour statistics system has been under a cloud 
of uncertainty as it transitions from the quinquennial 
Employment-Unemployment Surveys (EUS) conducted 
by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 
(the last of which was in 2011-12) to higher frequency, 
quarterly and annual Periodic Labour Force Surveys 
(PLFS). The move has been in the works since 2010. 
A pilot PLFS was conducted in 2012-13. The first full 
survey was carried out in 2017-18. In the meantime, 
the Labour Bureau (an entity under the Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, and distinct from the NSSO) 
conducted annual household surveys from 2009-10 
to 2016-17. The most recent published results of the 
Labour Bureau Employment Unemployment Survey 
(LB-EUS) are for 2015-16.
The current government has not released the results 
of the last Labour Bureau survey (2016-17), nor the 
results of the PLFS, both of which have been cleared 
by the concerned authorities for public release. Thus 
we do not have official employment numbers based 
on nationally representative household surveys after 
2015-16. The State of Working India 2018 also reports 
numbers only till that year. 
Ordinarily, a two-year gap in such statistics would 
not matter much. After all, until 2011 these numbers 
were available only every five years.1 But this time, 
there has been a tremendous amount of media 
attention given to this issue. What has changed? We 
have argued elsewhere that the Indian labour market 
has been undergoing rapid changes2 over the last 
decade. This, together with major policy changes such 
as demonetisation and the introduction of the Goods 
and Services Tax (GST), have greatly increased the 
importance of jobs numbers for the 2016-2018 period. 
Instead of releasing household level data on 
employment, the government has resorted to 
various other sector-specific sources of data such 
as the Employee Provident Fund Organisation 
(EPFO) database and the MUDRA database. Such 
administrative databases have the advantage of being 
high frequency and free from respondent/surveyor 
bias (if recorded accurately). However, their biggest 
disadvantage is that they do not cover the entire 
labour force. The EPFO database, for example, only 
has a stock of around 65 million workers, while the 
entire workforce is an estimated 450 million. Thus, 
increases in jobs numbers as per these databases 
may be overwhelmed by decreases elsewhere. For an 
economy like India, which still employs the majority 
of its workers via informal contracts, the net picture 
may be completely different from what is visible in the 
administrative data.
In the absence of official numbers from the PLFS, 
the only other household survey available for us to 
take stock of the employment situation going into 
the 2019 general election, is the Consumer Pyramids 
Survey of the Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE-CPHS). This survey is an ongoing 
nationally representative panel survey of around 
160,000 households, conducted every four months. 
An employment-unemployment module was added 
to this survey in 2016. We use this survey to present 
some recent trends in employment. Since the CMIE-
CPHS survey questionnaire is different from NSS/LB/
PLFS surveys we also examine the comparability of 
the numbers obtained from CMIE to the government 
surveys.
Table 2.1: A comparison of labour market estimates from the three surveys
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46.8
49.8
43.9
42.9
LFPR LFPR 
MALE
LFPR
FEMALE
WPR
FEMALE
WPR WPR
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UR
FEMALE
UR UR
MALE
2016-17 LB
2016 CMIE 
2017-18 PLFS
2017 CMIE
2018 CMIE
76.8
74.8
75.8
72.6
71.8
26.9
15.6
23.3
11.9
11
50.7
43
46.8
41.9
40.4
74.3
70.7
-
70.1
68.3
25.3
12.1
-
10.6
9.4
3.9
8.2
6.1
4.4
6
3.3
5.5
5.8/7.1*
3.5
4.9
6.1
22.4
-
10.9
14.2
Sources and notes: LFPR – Labour Force Participation Rate, WPR – Work-
force Participation Rate, UR – Unemployment Rate. Figures for 2016-17 
LB and 2017-18 PLFS compiled from news articles by Somesh Jha (in 
Business Standard) based on leaked reports.
 2016 CMIE figures authors’ own calculations based on CMIE-CPHS
* Rural and urban rates given separately since a combined rate is not 
available. From news article by Jay Mazoomdaar (in The Indian Express) 
based on leaked 2017-18 PLFS report.
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Table 1 presents the key ratios, the labour force 
participation rate (LFPR, percentage of working age 
people working or looking for work), the workforce 
participation rate (WPR, percentage of working age 
people working), and the unemployment rate (UR, 
percentage of those in the labour force who are looking 
for work) in the past two years as observed in the 
different surveys. Three points are worth noting:
1. Although the levels of WPR, LFPR and UR differ 
quite a bit between surveys, the trends are similar.
2. The levels match much better across surveys for 
men than for women.
3.  LFPR and WPR are broadly similar across surveys, 
while there is greater variation in UR reported 
across surveys. 
The principal point, that is robust to the choice of 
survey, is that there is a decline in the size of the labour 
force as well as the workforce, and a concomitant 
increase in the rate of unemployment, between 2016 
and 2018. This is a matter of concern.
In the remainder of the article we ask three key 
questions:
1. How comparable are the CMIE numbers to the 
government numbers?
2. What have been the trends in employment and 
unemployment between 2016 and 2018?
3. Who are the unemployed in terms of demographic 
characters such as age, gender, education,  
and so on?
2.2 / How well do the three 
labour force surveys 
compare to each other?
The CMIE-CPHS covers about 160,000 households 
and 522,000 individuals. The survey is conducted in 
three ‘waves’ with each wave spanning four months, 
beginning from January. Each individual is surveyed in 
every wave, so that for every year, the employment and 
unemployment status is available for three points in the 
year for every individual. To generate a annual sample, 
we randomly select one of the three observations for 
each individual.  
We have conducted a detailed study of the 
comparability of the CMIE-CPHS survey with the LB-EUS 
and the NSS-EUS. Here we report the main conclusions. 
The interested reader is referred to the working paper   
for further information (See box).  
LB-EUS and NSS-EUS are similar to each other in the 
definitions of employment used. But the two surveys 
differ in important respects from the CMIE-CPHS. The 
CMIE-CPHS identifies an individual as employed if he/
she ‘is engaged in any economic activity either on the 
day of the survey or on the day preceding the survey or 
is generally regularly engaged in an economic activity’. 
Individuals who were in some form of employment, 
but were not at work on that particular day of the 
survey due to various reasons such as illness, leave or 
holidays were still considered as employed when there 
was a reasonable surety of them going back to work. 
On the other hand the LB-EUS reports two definitions 
of employment. A person is identified as ‘employed’ 
under the Usual Principal Activity status if he/she spent 
a relatively long time either working or looking for work 
during the 365 days preceding the survey. If a person 
is not employed or looking for work for the majority of 
the year, but working for at least a month in the 365 
day reference period (i.e. subsidiary status), then he/
she is identified as employed as per Usual Principal 
and Subsidiary Activity status. The NSS-EUS adds to 
these, two more definitions known as the Current 
Weekly Status and the Current Daily Status. We do not 
discuss these here. See box (facing page) for details on 
differences in definitions of employment used across 
surveys.
Another, minor source of difference is that CMIE-CPHS 
begins in January 2016, while the last LB-EUS for which 
data are publicly available was conducted between 
April 2015 to December 2015. Thus, there is no overlap 
between the two surveys, but they are sufficiently close 
to each other to warrant comparison of the numbers. 
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The NSS-EUS schedule uses four different 
reference periods to arrive at four possible activity 
statuses - one year, one month, one week, and 
each day of the reference week. A person is 
identified as ‘employed’ under the Usual Principal 
Activity status if he/she spent a relatively long 
time either working or looking for work during the 
365 days preceding the survey. If a person is not 
employed or looking for work for the majority of 
the year, but working for at least a month in the 
365 day reference period (i.e. subsidiary status), 
then he/she is identified as employed as per Usual 
Principal and Subsidiary Activity status. Under 
Current Weekly Status, a person is identified 
as working if he/she worked for at least an hour 
during the 7 days preceding the survey.  A person’s 
activity status on each day of the reference way 
determines the Current Daily Status, where he 
is considered as working a full day if engaged for 
4 hours or more, or a half day if less than 4 hours.  
However, unlike the other definitions, the CDS 
definitions demarcates a particular day as being 
‘working’ or ‘not working’, not an individual. Hence 
CDS measures person days of employment rather 
than persons. 
The Labour Bureau collects information on only 
two activity statuses - Usual Principal Activity 
Status and Usual Principal Subsidiary Status.  The 
NSS-EUS or LB-EUS therefore, broadly identifies a 
person as either (i) employed, or (ii) unemployed 
i.e.  did not work but was seeking and/or available 
for work, or (iii) not in the labour force -  did not 
work and not looking for work. 
The CMIE-CPHS identifies an individual as 
employed if he/she “is engaged in any economic 
activity either on the day of the survey or on the 
day preceding the survey or is generally regularly 
engaged in an economic activity”. Individuals who 
were in some form of employment, but were not 
at work on that particular day of the survey due to 
How do the CMIE, NSS and LB differ in their methods 
in elucidating employment information? 
various reasons such as illness, leave or holidays 
were still considered as employed when there was 
a reasonable surety of them going back to work. 
 
At first glance, the CMIE-CPHS approach may 
seem closest to the NSS current daily status. 
But as mentioned earlier, under CDS, the unit of 
observation is a day, rather than an individual. 
The CMIE-CPHS measure, on the other hand, uses 
the individual as the unit of measurement, rather 
than the day. At the same time, by allowing for 
individuals who are ‘generally regularly employed’ 
to also be identified as employed, the CMIE-CPHS 
definition is similar to the NSS-EUS  UPS/UPSS 
approach. 
Therefore, there is no definition of employment 
across NSS-EUS and LB-EUS that are perfectly 
comparable. Given this, we wanted to see if and 
how these definitional differences in identifying 
employment translate into differences in the 
measurement of employment. We first estimate 
a model using CMIE-CPHS that predicts an 
individual’s employment status. Our hypothesis 
is that if the CMIE and NSS/LB-EUS definitions of 
employment are similar, then this model built 
using CMIE-CPHS should also (more or less) 
correctly predict the employment status in the 
NSS/LB data.  
To begin with, an individual’s economic activity 
status is typically dependent on their gender, age, 
educational level, the number of young children in 
the house and location (rural or urban). Within the 
CMIE-CPHS data, we estimate a model predicting 
an individual’s economic status conditional on the 
above factors. Using this model, we then predict 
the activity status of an individual in the LB-EUS 
data. For any given individual, the model will 
estimate the probability that that individual is (i) 
employed, (ii) unemployed, or (iii) not in the labour 
force. We take that probability which is the highest 
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as the predicted activity status of that individual. 
Then, we match this predicted activity with his 
actual activity status (as per LB). An observation 
may be Matched, Employment Overpredicted, 
Employment Underpredicted, LFP overpredicted, 
or LFP underpredicted. 
An observation is identified as ‘Matched’ if the 
predicted employment status using the CMIE 
model is the same as the actual employment 
status in LB-EUS. It is identified as ‘Employment 
Overpredicted’ if LB identifies an individual as 
unemployed, but the CMIE model identifies him 
as Employed. An observation is ‘Employment 
Underpredicted’ if in the LB-EUS data he/she is 
employed, but the CMIE model categorises him/
her into Unemployed. An observation is “LFP 
Overpredicted” if the individual is categorised as 
being in the labour force as per the model, while in 
the actual data he/she is out of the labour force. A 
similar reasoning follows for the category 
“LFP Underpredicted”. 
The distribution of observations against these 
measures gives us an understanding as to 
what extent the predictions of the CMIE model 
overlap with actual observations, and where the 
source of differences lie – i.e., under-prediction 
or over-prediction. If the share of matched 
observations are high, this implies that similar 
factors determine activity status similarly, across 
LB and CMIE. This implies that definitional 
differences may not have a major impact on how 
an individual’s employment status is identified.  
Further details on if and how the results differ 
when (i) alternative definitions of employment are 
used, (ii) when additional variables are included in 
the regression estimations, or (iii) when a model is 
estimated on LB and then run on CMIE-CPHS are 
available in Shrivastava and Abraham (2019) .
A person’s employment status depends on their 
demographic characteristics such as age, 
gender, education, and rural or urban location. We 
would like to know the probability that a person with 
a certain set of characteristics, identified as employed 
or unemployed in CMIE-CPHS, would be similarly 
classified in the LB-EUS (even though that person does 
not exist in the latter). This is one way to find out how 
comparable the different surveys are. If the predicted 
employment status using parameters derived from 
CMIE-CPHS data is the same as the actual employment 
status in LB-EUS, we consider this a ‘match’. The higher 
the percentage of matches, the greater our confidence 
that the two surveys are attributing an employment 
status to an individual similarly (See Box for further 
details of methodology).
For 80 per cent of individuals in the LB-EUS data, 
their surveyed employment status is identical to 
that predicted on the basis of CMIE- CPHS derived 
parameters. Strikingly, this number is the same as 
using CMIE-CPHS derived parameters on itself. Further, 
this success rate does not change if we use a different 
definition of employment (such as principal and 
subsidiary status instead of principal status).
However, the results are different for men versus 
women. When we look those 20 per cent of individuals 
whose status does not match across surveys, women 
are over-represented. In particular, the CMIE-CPHS 
model tends to underpredict women’s labour force 
participation, i.e. it predicts women to be out of the 
labour force, when, in reality, they are either working 
or unemployed.  Thus the model of labour supply does 
not work as well for women and both surveys miss 
some important factors that determine women’s labour 
force or workforce participation.
Another way to approach the question of comparability 
across surveys is to compare the state level estimates 
of various measures (LFPR, WPR), as obtained from the 
different surveys. We compare between CMIE-CPHS 
2016 and LB-EUS 2015-16. We find that the LFPR and 
WPR estimates for men, from CMIE-CPHS and from LB-
EUS matched pretty closely, but there were significant 
variations in the case of women’s WPR and LFPR.
Sources: Shrivastava, A. and Abraham, R. 2019. How Comparable 
are India’s Labour Force Surveys:  An Analysis of NSS, Labour 
Bureau and CMIE Estimates. CSE Working Paper No 2019-03, 
Azim Premji University, Bengaluru. 
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Figure 2.1: 
State-level 
comparisons 
of LFPR and 
WPR: CMIE-
CPHS and LB-
EUS estimates
2.1a / Overall 
LFPR
2.1b / Overall 
WPR
2.1c / Male 
LFPR
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2.1d / Male 
WPR
2.1e / Female 
LFPR
2.1f / Female 
WPR
Sources and notes: Author’s calculations using unit-level data from CMIE-CPHS 2016, LB-EUS 2015. 
See Appendix for list of State codes 
CG
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As can be seen in Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, the overall 
LFPR and WPR measured in the two surveys are 
correlated with each other, but there are some 
significant outliers as well. Further, in general the 
LFPR as measured by LB-EUS is around 6 percentage 
points higher than that measured by CMIE-CPHS. The 
corresponding figure for the WPR is 10 percentage 
points. This is seen in the line-of-best-fit being displaced 
upwards compared to the 45 degree line.
When we examine the two ratio separately for men and 
women, we find that the agreement between the two 
surveys is much better for the former. Figures 2.1c and 
2.1d show the state-level variation for male LFPR and 
WPR respectively. Note that the scale is much narrower 
indicating smaller variation across states in this ratio. 
Also, significantly, the line of best fit and the 45 degree 
line lie on top of each other for male LFPR, and they 
are very close in the case of WPR (LB-EUS estimates 
are higher by about 0.9 percentage points). This shows 
that the two surveys are very close to each other in 
estimating these ratios for men.
The picture looks very different for women. Figures 
2.1e and 2.1f show the state-level variation for female 
LFPR and WPR respectively. First, note the difference in 
scale compared to the earlier graphs. Second, it is clear 
that the scatter is much larger, with the two surveys 
differing from each other by as much as 25 percentage 
points on average in the case of the LFPR and 44 
percentage points in case of the WPR.
Taken together, both the econometric analysis and 
analysis of state-level variations indicate that 
measures of women’s participation in the labour force 
are particularly sensitive to the way questions are asked 
in surveys, and predictions of women’s LFPR based on 
standard labour supply variables are much less reliable 
than those for men. 
One last point to be noted is that, even though the LB-
EUS, NSS-EUS, and CMIE-CPHS surveys are reasonably 
matched at the individual level (at least for men), 
and the trends in key parameters are similar (Table 
2.1), they differ greatly when it comes to the absolute 
level of the unemployment rate. This is because the 
variations in the LFPR and the WPR are compounded in 
the calculation of the unemployment rate. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, here we focus on male 
LFPR and WPR numbers estimated in  CMIE-CPHS.
2.3 / What has happened 
to employment since 2016?
Being the only comprehensive household-level labour 
survey since 2015-16, a central question that can be 
answered with the help of the CMIE-CPHS data is how 
the employment situation has changed since early 
2016. We now present the trends in the male labour 
force and workforce participation rates in rural and 
urban areas (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: 
Trends in the 
labourforce 
and work force 
participation 
rates in rural 
and urban 
areas since 
2016 , for men.
2.2a / WPR
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2.2b / LFPR
Sources and notes: Author’s calculations using unit-level data from CMIE-CPHS, various waves  
In Figure 2.2a we see the trends in LFPR and WPR for 
men over a period of three years starting from the 
first wave of 2016 (Jan to Apr 2016). The nine time 
periods on the horizontal axis correspond to the nine 
waves - three in each year. It shows that the labour 
force participation started to decline suddenly from the 
third wave of 2016 (September to December 2016) for 
both urban and rural men. The rate of decline slowed 
down by the second wave of 2017, but the general 
trend has continued and there has been no recovery. 
The timing of the start of the decline coincides with 
the demonetisation of high value currency notes in 
November 2016, although we cannot ascribe any causal 
link based only on these trends. The WPR follows a 
similar trend, though the rate of decline is not as sharp 
as for LFPR. 
Between the third wave of 2016 and the third wave 
of 2018, the urban male workforce participation rate 
(WPR) fell by 3.6 percentage points from 69.1 per cent 
to 65.5 per cent. For the same period, the rural male 
WPR fell by 3.2 percentage points from 71.8 per cent to 
68.6 per cent. All India (rural and urban) male WPR fell 
by 3.3 percentage points in this period.
What does a 3.3 percentage point decline in the 
WPR mean in terms of jobs lost? We can answer this 
question by drawing on the population estimates 
provided by the UN Department of Economics and 
Social Affairs.3 As per these data, the male working age 
population in India increased by 16.1 million between 
2016 and 2018. Accounting for the increase in working 
age population, the decline in the WPR amounts to a 
net loss of 5 million jobs during this period. Recall that 
this analysis applies to men only. When we take women 
into account, the number of jobs lost will be higher. 
Broadly, these trends can be interpreted as saying 
that the proportion of working age men who are in 
employment continues to go down. This is the opposite 
of what one would expect with the ‘demographic 
dividend’ where the ratio of the working age group 
to the rest of the population increases, thus spurring 
higher growth. Whether or not this decline was caused 
by demonetisation, it is definitely a cause for concern 
and calls for urgent policy intervention.
Finally, we note that the recent decline in LFPR and 
WPR has affected men with different educational 
backgrounds differently. In Figures 2.3a and 2.3b, we 
show the disaggregated trends by education levels. 
While detailed data on the education level of surveyed 
individuals is available, here we group them into two 
broad categories for simplicity. The ‘high education’ 
group consists of men with a diploma or degree 
beyond Class 12.
The graphs show that the decline in LFPR and WPR 
is largely driven by men with lower education levels, 
for both rural and urban areas. For example, at the 
beginning of the period under analysis, the WPR for 
both groups of men in urban areas was similar at 
around 68 per cent. By the end, the WPR for higher 
educated men had increased to 71.9 per cent while that 
for less educated men had fallen to 63.7 per cent.
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Figure 2.3: 
Men’s LFPR and 
WPR by level of 
education
2.3a / LFPR and 
WPR for men 
with low and 
high education 
in rural areas
Sources and notes: Author’s calculations using unit-level data from CMIE-CPHS, varios waves
2.3b /  LFPR 
and WPR for 
men with 
low and high 
education in 
urban areas
Clearly, there is a large differential impact by level of 
education. This is consistent with the idea that the 
informal sector, where we can expect the share of 
less educated men to be higher, was hit hardest by 
demonetisation as well as the introduction of GST. 
One question that may arise is, how can informal 
workers afford to remain out of the labour force? The 
answer may lie in the fact that a lower WPR does not 
necessarily mean a given person is fully out of work. 
Rather, it can be a result of the fact that work has 
become less regularly available, leading to a lower 
probability that the individual will be counted as part of 
the workforce in a survey.
As far as the educated are concerned, we can see that 
the gap between the LFPR and WPR is much higher 
for them than for the less educated. This indicates, as 
expected, that the levels of open unemployment are 
higher for this section of the population. We analyse 
the composition of the openly unemployed in the next 
section. But the foregoing analysis shows that, in the 
current scenario, joblessness is not only a problem 
limited to the educated sections of the labour force. 
While open unemployment may still be low among 
the less educated, there has been a marked tendency 
to drop out of the labour force for this section, 
presumably due to loss of work opportunities. Any 
policy intervention that addressed the employment 
issue must address the needs of this less educated 
section of the labour force. 
The point bears repeating: much of the current debate 
over jobs has focused on unemployment among the 
higher educated. While this is indeed a problem, we 
must also be aware of the fact that the last two years 
have not been good for the less educated sections of 
the labour force as well. And in absolute terms, this is a 
much larger number of people in the more vulnerable 
sections of society.
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2.4 / Who are the 
unemployed? 
The recently leaked PLFS data as well as several 
other anecdotal pieces of evidence suggest that open 
unemployment has been increasing in India. This is 
particularly true of the educated youth. Table 2.2 shows 
the long-run trend in the unemployment rate since 
1999-00 for the entire labour force as well as for the 
higher educated. 
Table 2.2: Unemployment rate, overall and among 
highly educated for the past two decades
After remaining at around 2-3 per cent for the first 
decade, the unemployment rate has steadily increased 
to around 5 per cent in 2015 and then just over 6 per 
cent in 2018. Both the PLFS and the CMIE-CPHS report 
the overall unemployment rate to be around 6 per cent 
in 2018, double of what it was in the decade from 2000 
to 2011. 
The overall unemployment is likely to be driven by what 
is happening to the educated section of the labour 
force. This is because it is this section which tends 
to aspire to a regular, formal sector job and who can 
‘afford’ the luxury of being unemployed.Therefore, they 
are more likely to report as unemployed and looking 
for work rather than working at any available job in the 
informal sector. This is made clear in Table 2.2. During 
the entire time that the overall unemployment rate was 
around 3 per cent, the unemployment rate among the 
educated was 10 per cent. It has increased since 2011 
to around 15-16 per cent.
Another important point to note is that both overall 
unemployment as well as unemployment among 
the educated tends to be much higher for women 
compared to men. This is true across all surveys (NSS-
EUS, LB-EUS, PLFS, and CMIE-CPHS) and hence is likely 
to be a stable feature of the labour market, not driven 
by choice of survey questions or method.
We would like to know the demographic composition 
of the pool of unemployed workers,  in particular, 
with respect to education and age. The rate of 
unemployment, as we noted earlier, is subject to a 
compounding of errors especially in the case of women, 
leading to large variations and loss of comparability 
across surveys. Instead of using the unemployment 
rate, we analyse the share of various demographic 
groups in the total pool of unemployed workers in 
2018. For the purposes of this analysis, those who 
report being willing to work and are looking for work, 
are counted as being unemployed.4
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 depict the share of various groups 
of workers disaggregated by education level and age 
in the pool of the unemployed relative to their share 
in the working age population. The ratio of these 
two shares (which we call the Representation Index) 
gives us a measure of over- or under-representation 
of that group in the unemployed. We do the analysis 
separately for rural and urban, male and 
female workers.
Overall 
Male
Female 
6.0 
4.9 
14.2
2.7 
2.9
2.4
3.1
2.7 
4.2
2.7
2.4
3.7
3.8 
2.9 
6.9
5.0 
2.9 
8.7
8.2 
5.5 
22.4
Overall Unemployment Rate
CMIE
2018
NSS 
55th
NSS 
61st
NSS 
68th
LB LB CMIE
1999-
2000
2004
-05
2011
-12
2011
-12
2015
-16
2016
Unemployment Rate among Educated 
(Degree/Diploma beyond Class 12)
Overall 
Male
Female 
12.7 
9.7 
34.0
10.3 
8.4
21.1
10.7
7.5 
24.3
10.3
8.4
21.3 
9.0 
5.9  
25.8
15.2 
11.4
30.6
16.2 
12.1 
40.1
Sources and notes: Author’s calculation based on NSS EUS various 
rounds, LB-EUS various rounds, CMIE-CPHS. Unemployment Rate for 
Educated Unemployed for LB 2011 is for Graduates only since unit-level 
data is not available.
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Figure 2.4: 
Share of various 
education 
groups in the 
unemployed vis-
a-vis their share 
in the working 
age population, 
2018
2.4a / Rural Men
2.4b / Urban 
Men
2.4c / Rural 
Women
2.4d / Urban
Women
Sources and notes: Author’s calculations using CMIE-CPHS 2018 unit level data.
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Across all four slices (rural-urban, men-women), 
those who are educated beyond Class 10, and 
graduates in particular, are over-represented among 
the unemployed (Figure 2.4a to 2.4d). For example, 
among rural men, graduates are around 7 per cent 
of the working age population but over 20 per cent 
of the unemployed, giving a representation index of 
3.3. Among urban women, graduates are 10 per cent 
of the working age population but 34 per cent of the 
unemployed, giving a representation index of 3.4. 
Among rural women, graduates form only a small 3.2 
per cent of the working age population, but they make 
up 24 per cent of the unemployed (representation 
index = 7.4).
Similarly, across age groups, the age group 20-24 years 
is hugely over-represented (Figure 2.5a to 2.5d). Among 
urban men, for example, this age group accounts for 
13.5 per cent of the working age population but a 
whopping 60 per cent of the unemployed. In fact the 
representation index for this group exceeds 4 for all 
the slices (rural and urban, men and women). Beyond 
this age group, particularly for women, the 25-34 years 
group is also over-represented among the unemployed.
Thus broadly speaking, open unemployment in India 
today is largely a concern for those under 35 years of 
age and those who are educated beyond Class 10, and 
particularly beyond Class 12.
Figure 2.5: Share 
of various age 
groups in the 
unemployed vis-
a-vis their share 
in the working 
age population, 
2018
2.5a / Rural Men
2.5b / Urban 
Men
2.5c / Rural 
Women
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2.5d. Urban
Women
Sources and notes: Author’s calculations using CMIE-CPHS 2018 unit level data.
2.5 / Conclusion
The last three years have been one of great turmoil in 
the Indian labour market as well as in the system of 
labour statistics. While we await the official data from 
the 2017-18 PLFS, the CMIE-CPHS remains the only 
source of household employment data for this period. 
Here we have used this data to present a picture of the 
employment situation in India. Four big lessons stand 
out:
1. Unemployment, in general, has risen steadily post 
2011, whichever household survey we examine 
(LB-EUS, PLFS, or CMIE-CPHS).
2. The higher educated and the young are vastly over-
represented among the unemployed.
3. In addition to open unemployment among 
the educated, the less educated (and likely 
informal) have seen job losses and reduced work 
opportunities over this time period.
4. Women are worse off than men with respect to 
levels of unemployment as well as reduced labour 
force participation.
The numbers clearly demonstrate why unemployment 
has emerged as the primary economic issue in the 
general election of 2019.
Endnotes
1. The NSSO did release annual numbers from the 
“thin” rounds which had a sample size of around 30,000 
households (as opposed to over 100,000 for “thick” 
rounds). But these were not used very frequently.
2. https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/employ-
ment-question-india
3. India’s working age population (15+ years) increased 
from 950.8 million in 2016 to 983.1 million in 2018. 
Assuming a 50:50 male to female ratio in the working 
age population, we can arrive at estimated number of 
working age men. Applying the WPR to this number 
gives the size of the workforce for a given year.
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World 
Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data 
acquired via website.
4. The NSS/LB survey identifies those who ‘did not 
work but was seeking and/or available for work’ as the 
unemployed. The CMIE, on the other hand, have two 
types of unemployed workers. There are those who are 
unemployed, willing and looking for a job,  and those 
who were unemployed, willing but not looking for a job.
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Appendix - State codes
AP  Andhra Pradesh
AR  Arunachal Pradesh
AS  Assam
BR  Bihar
CG  Chhattisgarh
CH  Chandigarh
DL  Delhi
GA  Goa
GJ  Gujarat
HP  Himachal Pradesh
HR  Haryana
JH  Jharkhand
JK  Jammu and Kashmir
KA  Karnataka
KL  Kerala
MH  Maharashtra
ML  Meghalaya
MN  Manipur
MP  Madhya Pradesh
MZ  Mizoram
NL  Nagaland
OR  Odisha
PB  Punjab
PY  Puducherry
RJ  Rajasthan
SK  Sikkim
TL  Telangana
TN  Tamil Nadu
TR  Tripura
UK  Uttarakhand
UP  Uttar Pradesh
WB   West Bengal
37
Chapter 3
An urban job guarantee programme can 
promote sustainable development of 
Indian cities, build urban infrastructure and 
services, create local demand, spur local 
entrepreneurship, restore urban commons, 
build skills, address open unemployment 
and raise wages.
Strengthening Towns through Sustainable
Employment : A Job Guarantee Programme 
for Urban India
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Executive Summary
1. We propose the creation of a National Urban 
Employment Guarantee Programme that strengthens 
small and medium-sized towns in India by providing 
urban residents a legal right to employment, improving 
the quality of urban infrastructure and services, 
restoring urban commons and ecology, skilling youth, 
and increasing the financial and human capacity of 
Urban Local Bodies.
2. The proposed programme seeks to address the 
following key problems:
• Underemployment and low wages in the informal 
urban workforce
• Migration to large cities from small and medium 
towns
• Poor quality of urban infrastructure and services
• Ecological degradation of urban spaces
• Shortage of human and financial capacities of 
Urban Local Bodies
• Unemployment and lack of skills in the educated 
labour force
3. Groups and organisations working on urban issues 
across India have many years of valuable experience 
solving these problems. We hope they find this 
proposal of interest and invite them to respond to it. 
4. This programme should have a strong legal basis in 
the form of a National Urban Employment Guarantee 
Act which provides a statutory right to employment 
at specified wage rates and number of days. While 
it draws on some principles of the rights-based 
framework of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 2005,  the 
programme has a broader scope as it deals with 
varied forms of employment. We emphasise that the 
programme would not be at the cost of MGNREGA but 
rather the two would go hand-in-hand.
5. The programme should be applicable for all cities 
and towns with a population less than 1 Million (10 
lakhs). It covers about 4000 Urban Local Bodies 
accounting for about 50 per cent of the urban 
population as per the 2011 census. 
6. The proposal calls for providing 100 days of 
guaranteed work at D500 a day. It also provides 150 
contiguous days of training and apprenticeship at a 
stipend of D13,000 per month for educated youth. 
The programme thus creates opportunities for urban 
informal workers as well as for educated youth, giving 
the latter a chance to acquire work experience as well 
as skills while enabling them to address needs of their 
communities.
7. A large variety of works that require a range of 
education and skills may be undertaken through 
this programme. These include public works such 
as building and maintenance of roads, footpaths, 
and bridges; creation, rejuvenation, and monitoring 
of urban commons like water bodies, forest land, 
wetlands, and parks; monitoring, evaluation, and 
surveying of environmental quality, apprenticeship in 
municipal offices, public schools, and health centres; 
and provisioning of care for children and the elderly.
8. The relevant Urban Local Body (ULB), such as the 
Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council, or Municipal 
Corporation, shall be the principal authority responsible 
for administering this programme. It shall identify 
projects, prepare annual works plans and implement 
the programme in a participatory manner by 
involving the ward committees and ward sabhas. The 
programme shall be administered by a set of dedicated 
staff starting from the level of the Ward.
9. To make it truly demand-driven, we propose that 
the annual estimated pool of Central government 
funds be transferred to the states at the beginning of 
each financial year. The state governments, in turn, 
would transfer the Central and the state share of the 
budget to the ULB so that funds are locally available. To 
ensure timely payment of wages, the wages would be 
disbursed in a decentralised manner at the local ULB.
10. We propose proactive transparency and 
accountability structures such as mandatory periodic 
social audits and public hearing through a designated 
independent unit, as well as a mandatory grievance 
redressal architecture. The programme includes a ‘right 
to timely grievance redressal’ which ensures that the 
grievances of workers are addressed through Grievance 
Redressal Councils at the Centre and state levels, and 
dedicated Grievance Redress Officers at the ULB.
11. The total estimated programme budget would 
range from 1.7 to 2.7 per cent of GDP depending on 
whether employment is guaranteed to one adult from 
every household or every adult resident. We estimate 
that between 30 to 50 million workers in India’s small 
towns will be eligible for employment through this 
programme. 
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3.1 / Why an urban 
employment guarantee 
programme
3.1.1 / Rationale and benefits
India is facing a crisis of both quantity and quality 
of employment. Despite lack of recent official 
statistics, it seems clear, both from private data 
sources such as the Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE) as well as the leaked Periodic 
Labour Force Survey (PLFS) report of the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), that the rate 
of open unemployment has steadily risen over the 
past few years1. As per the PLFS 2017-2018, open 
unemployment stands at a historic high of 6.1 per 
cent, and unemployment among educated youth has 
reached 20 per cent. Unemployment in urban areas at 
7.8 per cent is higher than the unemployment rate in 
rural areas (5.3 per cent) (Jha 2019a). In addition to this, 
Indian towns and cities continue to be plagued by the 
prevalence of low-wage, poor quality, informal work. 
PLFS data show that despite a rise in the prevalence  
of regular-salaried work, just over 50 per cent of the 
urban workforce remains either self-employed or in 
casual wage work (Jha 2019b).
At the same time that our towns and cities are facing a 
crisis of jobs, there is also a crisis of the quality of life 
due to ecological stress and lack of adequate public 
services. As malls, motorcycles, and mobiles proliferate, 
our streets are in disrepair, water-bodies are rapidly 
being degraded, green spaces are disappearing, the 
quality of air is deteriorating, and common spaces 
are shrinking (Mundoli, Unnikrishnan, and Nagendra 
2017; Narain and Vij 2016). Thus, we see a dramatic 
divergence between the quality of private and public 
goods. 
Centrally funded programmes like the Smart Cities 
Mission and Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission (JNNURM) have disproportionately focused 
on development of bigger towns and cities (Zérah and 
Dennis 2017). Hence, it is important to re-focus our 
attention to improving the livelihoods and ecology of 
urban areas beyond India’s major cities.
However, Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), which are largely 
responsible for developing and administering our 
towns and cities, find themselves unable to carry out 
their core tasks adequately due to lack of financial 
as well as human resources. Most ULBs in India are 
severely understaffed and are unable to hire more 
workers since they are financially restrained (ASICS 
2017). A centrally funded programme that covers the 
wages of different kinds of workers will allow the ULBs 
to fulfil tasks they are mandated to perform but are 
failing to, because of a shortage of financial and human 
capacity. Further, the present staff of most ULBs are 
not fully suitable for performing the tasks related to 
the renewal of urban commons and monitoring urban 
environment. This programme can generate a new set 
of ‘green jobs’ that can strengthen the capacity of ULBs 
as well as promote sustainable urban development.
Creating jobs, improving the capacity of urban local 
governance, and supplying quality public goods and 
services requires serious public investment. But if 
made to an adequate extent, such investment has the 
potential to pay for itself many times over. Not only 
does it directly improve welfare by raising incomes and 
creating assets, there are many positive spillover effects 
too, such as: 
• It increases demand by raising incomes directly, 
and indirectly in the informal sector, by improving 
the fallback position of workers 
• It provides a better trained workforce to the 
private sector by allowing educated young workers 
to acquire skills and improve their employability 
• The work undertaken will create assets that 
improve the town’s ecology and quality of public 
services, which have a direct impact on productivity 
and quality of life 
• It creates a shared sense of public goods in which 
every resident has a stake. 
While cities and towns do not yet have an equivalent 
of MGNREGA, India has a history of urban employment 
schemes. One of the most prominent central 
programmes in this regard was the Swarna Jayanti 
Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) launched in 1997 
which provided employment to the unemployed and 
underemployed urban poor through self-employment 
and wage employment.2 The Urban Wage Employment 
Programme component of SJSRY covered those living 
below the poverty line in ULBs with less than 5 lakh 
population. The SJSRY was replaced by the National 
Urban Livelihoods Mission (NULM) in 2013.3 This 
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programme, and its subsequent version, laid more 
emphasis on self-employment and entrepreneurship 
than on wage employment. However, unlike MGNREGA, 
India’s past urban employment schemes were not 
demand-driven and only a set of identified beneficiaries 
could avail their benefits.
More recently, the idea of an urban job guarantee 
has been gaining prominence in political and policy 
debates in India. According to news reports, an 
employment guarantee programme for urban areas 
has emerged as a core element of a possible Common 
Minimum Programme from the opposition parties 
for the 2019 General Election (Joy 2019). Further, the 
newly elected government in Madhya Pradesh recently 
announced a 100-day urban job guarantee scheme, 
the Yuva Swabhiman Yojana, which provides urban 
youth with varying educational qualifications with a 
wide set of jobs (Sirothia 2019). Since 2010, Kerala has 
also been running a programme called the Ayyankali 
Urban Employment Guarantee Scheme (AUEGS) which 
guarantees 100 days of wage-employment to an urban 
household for manual work.4
We are also witnessing a growing popularity of 
employment guarantee programmes across the 
world. For example, in the United States of America, 
employment guarantee is a core component of 
the ‘Green New Deal’, a set of policy proposals for 
addressing climate change and economic inequality, 
supported by several presidential candidates.5 It 
provides for a ‘Green Job Guarantee’ which enshrines ‘a 
legal right that obligates the federal government 
to provide a job for anyone who asks for one and to 
pay them a liveable wage’. The Green New Deal 
proposes public expenditure of up to 8-10 per cent 
of GDP reflecting the scale of concerns as well as 
boldness of vision.
Further, an employment guarantee programme also 
strengthens the ‘Right to Life’ enshrined under Article 
21 of the Constitution of India. As the Supreme Court 
of India has held in multiple cases, the ‘Right to Life’ is 
not restricted to mere existence but also includes the 
‘right to livelihood’ 6 and the ‘right to live with human 
dignity.’ 7 In the last two decades several rights-based 
legislations have been introduced to further these 
constitutional ideals. In particular, the MGNREGA is 
a legislative realisation of the ‘Right to Life’ through a 
‘Right to Work’. A legally enforceable ‘Right to Work’ in 
urban areas appears to be a natural extension.
Finally, we note that the idea of a minimum or basic 
guaranteed income has gained traction in policy 
circles across developing and developed countries. 
The specifics differ from proposal to proposal but the 
key aspect is an unconditional cash transfer to some 
identified group of beneficiaries. While modalities of an 
income guarantee are worth debating, we believe that 
an employment guarantee has three key advantages 
over the former:
1. Employment guarantee schemes are generally self-
targeting and demand-driven. In a country like India 
with scarce income data, an employment guarantee 
programme circumvents the complicated process of 
identifying beneficiaries.
2. Employment guarantee, such as the one proposed 
here, enables people to contribute productively to the 
creation of useful public goods and services.
3. An employment guarantee has the potential to foster 
active citizenry. It enhances engagement in democratic 
decision-making through public meetings and public 
hearings. On the one hand, it would increase people’s 
political capacities in community building and on the 
other it strengthens local accountability.
3.1.2 / Lessons from MGNREGA
India has been a leader in the implementation 
of employment guarantee programmes with the 
MGNREGA that guarantees 100 days of work to any 
rural household that chooses to avail of it.
Critics of the programme argue that it is a waste of 
resources (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2014). However, 
there is evidence to suggest otherwise. In spite of the 
programme functioning at half its 100-day guarantee 
(average number of days worked per household 
has been around 45 days for the last five years) and 
despite the implementation challenges, it has had a 
far-reaching impact. Four broad positive aspects can 
be identified: an increase in rural incomes, gender 
and caste effects, community empowerment, and 
quality asset creation (Basole and Jayadev 2018). The 
popularity of the programme is also evident in the fact 
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that growing rural areas sometimes prefer to remain 
rural, rather than be re-classified as ‘urban’ in part to 
avail of MGNREGA benefits .8
MGNREGA has served as a lifeline for the poorest with 
one out of every three rural households having worked 
in the programme. In 2017-18, close to 80 million (8 
crore) people worked under MGNREGA. Data from the 
Employment-Unemployment Survey of the NSS show 
an eightfold increase in participation in public works 
in 2009–10 over 2004–05, confirming the impact of 
MGNREGA and other public employment programmes.
Based on a large-scale randomised experiment in 
Andhra Pradesh, Muralidharan et al (2018) show that 
the incomes of MGNREGA workers increased by 13 per 
cent and that overall poverty fell by 17 per cent. The 
authors  mention that these findings are in synchrony 
with the SECC data of 2011. Moreover, 90 per cent 
of the income gains, according to their study, can be 
attributed to an increase in market earnings due to 
a spill-over effect of a well-functioning MGNREGA. 
Klonner and Oldiges (2014) showed that the Act has 
increased consumption among SC/ST households 
during the agricultural lean season by as much as 30 
per cent and reduced poverty by about 50 per cent. 
Using a different methodology, an NCAER Report (Desai 
et al 2015), shows that 32 per cent of  poverty 
reduction for  participants is due to MGNREGA 
employment. And that more than 14 million 
households would have become poor without 
MGNREGA’. Himanshu and Kundu (2016) and several 
references therein, demonstrate that after stagnating 
for at least three decades, the growth in real rural 
wages (especially agriculture) picked up in 2007–08 
following MGNREGA’s inception.
Being the first programme to ensure wage parity 
for both men and women, MGNREGA has played a 
significant role in improving women’s participation 
in the labour force and increasing financial inclusion 
among them. According to the NCAER report cited 
above, about 45 per cent female MGNREGA workers 
were either not working or worked only on a family 
farm in 2004–05. MGNREGA was thus the first 
opportunity for women to be part of a paid workforce. 
In fact, in the last five years, more than 50 per cent of 
the MGNREGA works were done by women. 
Azam (2012) shows that the daily wages for casual work 
for women increased by 8 per cent due to MGNREGA.
The planning of works for MGNREGA happens through 
a participation of the resident communities at the 
Gram Sabha (village councils). This, in turn, has given 
a platform and opportunity for the poorer and more 
vulnerable communities to engage in democratic 
participation. Veeraraghavan (2017) (and some 
references therein) shows the immense positive impact 
of MGNREGA both in terms of community participation 
among Adivasis and in terms of improved bargaining 
power of Dalits. The study goes on to repose faith that 
the State and society can collaborate and produce 
positive outcomes. According to the 2011 Government 
of India census, SC/ST households form about 30 per 
cent of the rural population and largely constitute the 
poorest sections in the society. Around 40 per cent of 
the total households employed under MGNREGA every 
year belong to SC and ST Households.
Over the years, there has been a significant increase 
in the list of admissible works to include vermiculture, 
fodder production for livestock, horticulture, poultry 
and cattle sheds, and others through convergence with 
several departments. More than 20 million different 
assets have been completed under MGNREGA. 
Assets studied by Tewari et al (2011) and Esteves et al 
(2013) show that they have reduced the vulnerability 
of agricultural production, water resources, and 
livelihoods to uncertain rainfall, water scarcity and 
poor soil fertility. In a survey of over 4100 assets and 
over 4800 users across Maharashtra, Narayanan et al 
(2014), show that farmers viewed water conservation 
and harvesting works through MGNREGA as enablers 
of crop production and expanding area under 
cultivation. There are numerous other academic papers 
corroborating the immense improvement in rural lives 
due to good quality asset production. For example, 
for an economic evaluation of assets, one can refer to 
Aggarwal et al (2012) and Bhaskar and Yadav (2015).
Thus, MGNREGA has had  far reaching consequences 
for rural livelihoods, incomes, gender and caste 
upliftment, participatory democracy and agriculture. 
Such learnings from MGNREGA can be positively 
leveraged for an urban programme. They 
also strengthen the case for guaranteeing 
urban employment.
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Lessons can also be drawn for an urban programme 
from problems observed in MGNREGA implementation. 
Low daily wages and lack of political will have led to 
severe subversion of the rights of MGNREGA workers. 
The implementation has faced several related 
challenges including inadequate funds (Narayanan 
and Pothula 2018), delayed payments (Narayanan et 
al. 2017), and leakages (Vivek et al. 2018). For example, 
the payment processes in MGNREGA have become 
highly technical and excessively centralised, leading 
to issues such as diverted payments (one person’s 
payments going to somebody else’s accounts), rejected 
payments, and locked payments. A centralised payment 
architecture has adversely affected workers’ democratic 
rights (Aggarwal 2017; Dhorajiwala 2018; Dréze 2018; 
and Nandy 2019).  More recently, Munjuluri et al (2019) 
analysed over 10 million Aadhaar Payments Bridge 
System transactions for MGNREGA wages in Jharkhand 
and found that in about 39 per cent of the cases the 
wages are redirected to a completely different account. 
Thus there are sufficient reasons from move away from 
such a centralised payments architecture. Moreover, a 
lack of adequate funds has meant that the programme 
has become supply-driven, in contravention of the 
demand-driven nature of the Act.  
In Section 3.3.4, we propose simpler alternative 
payments process and offer an idea on how to make 
the urban employment programme a genuinely 
demand-driven one.
3.2 / How will an urban 
employment guarantee 
programme work?
We now elaborate on the key aspects of the proposed 
programme. We emphasise that this is only one 
possible manifestation and we invite a public discussion 
on the various proposed aspects. 
3.2.1 / Which areas will be 
covered?
This programme will cover Urban Local Bodies with 
a population less than 1 Million (10 lakhs) as per 
the latest census. Previous national-level urban 
programmes like the Smart Cities Mission, Atal 
Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation 
(AMRUT) and Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission 
(JNNURM) have been relatively more focused on bigger 
towns and cities. This programme is primarily intended 
for about 4000 small and medium towns with less 
than 1 million residents and thus keeps all the major 
metropolitan cities as well as most state capitals out 
of its purview.
As per the 2011 census, 377.1 million people lived 
in urban areas, which is 31 per cent of India’s total 
population. Of these 323 million (27 per cent) lived 
in areas under an Urban Local Body (called Statutory 
Towns) and 54 million (4.5 per cent) lived in areas 
considered urban by the Census but administered 
by panchayats (called Census Towns). Census Towns 
would not come under the purview of the present 
programme since MGNREGA already covers all areas 
which do not have an Urban Local Body (ULB). In 2011, 
cities with a population of less than 1 million accounted 
for 162.3 million people, or about 50 per cent of the 
urban population (and 13.5 per cent of India’s total 
population).9
The programme will cover three kinds of towns:
Type 1 Towns - These are small towns with a 
population up to 50,000. They are mostly areas 
transitioning from rural to urban and are often 
governed by Nagar Panchayats.
Type 2 Towns - These are medium-sized towns with a 
population between 50,000 and 300,000. In most states, 
these are governed by Municipal Councils.
Type 3 Towns - These are cities with a population 
between 300,000 and 1,000,000, having a Municipal 
Corporation.
For illustrative purposes, we provide a list of 
different towns and cities under the three categories 
in Appendix A.
3.2.2 / What types of work will be 
undertaken?
We propose that the programme will provide 
employment in a variety of works for people with a 
range of skills and education levels. Such works can 
address a wide range of issues in a variety of urban 
spaces such as streets, footpaths, bridges, tunnels, 
water-bodies (ponds, tanks, lakes), wells, wetlands, 
storm-water drains, canals, coasts and beaches, 
riversides, hill slopes and valleys, parks, protected 
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areas, forest land and wooded groves, government 
managed areas of worship, historical monuments and 
heritage structures, playgrounds and open spaces, 
areas along roads and railway lines, below high 
tension wires and flyovers, slums, government schools, 
anganwadis, colleges, hospitals, housing projects, and 
other unoccupied public lands.
Here is an indicative list of works. Appendix B provides 
a larger list of tasks and works that can be undertaken 
to promote urban ecological sustainability.
a. Public works: Building, maintenance and 
upgradation of civic infrastructure like roads, footpaths, 
cycling paths, bridges, public housing, monuments, 
laying of cables, and other construction work. These 
are already being carried out by ULBs but it can be 
expanded with more funds under the new programme.
b. Green jobs: Creation, restoration, and maintenance 
of urban common spaces, green spaces and parks, 
forested or woody areas, rejuvenation of degraded 
or waste land, cleaning of water bodies (tanks, 
rivers, nullahs, lakes). Work that can be undertaken 
here includes water conservation and harvesting, 
flood control, micro-irrigation, enhancing urban 
greenery, preventing coastal and hillside erosion, 
disaster management, enabling urban agriculture 
for subsistence and so on. These works will not only 
create jobs but will also improve the livelihoods of 
communities that are dependent on urban commons.
c. Monitoring and Surveying jobs: Gathering, 
classifying, and storage of information on 
environmental quality and other aspects of quality of 
public goods. This will require easy to use equipment 
for data collection and software for data entry. This 
can provide both temporary employment as well as 
valuable skilling and work experience for educated 
youth. Accordingly, these positions can be for a 
continuous period of 150 days in a year (5 months), 
and with a different set of people hired each year. The 
information from the monitoring and data collection 
could feed into prioritising the kind of works that need 
to be done. 
d. Administrative assistance: Assisting municipal 
offices, local public schools, health centres and so 
on in administration or other ancillary functions, 
thereby freeing up the teaching or medical staff 
for core functions. These jobs can again be geared 
towards more educated workers, who can avail of this 
opportunity to build administrative, managerial and 
record-keeping skills. These positions may also be for a 
continuous period of 150 days in a year. 
e. Care work: Assisting regular public employees 
working in balwadis/aanganwadis or creches, providing 
child-minding services for parents working longer 
hours, assisted care for the elderly and various services 
for the differently-abled, such as reading to the visually 
challenged , assisting those with hearing or mobility 
impairment to manage various activities and so on. This 
addresses the problem of the urban poor with such 
needs often having to fend for themselves. Lessons 
could be drawn from the Kerala model of community-
based part-time volunteers for palliative care. Such jobs 
will also lead to much-needed skilling for care services, 
which are going to become much more important in 
the future. 
As can be seen, the programme would allow for the 
undertaking of a variety of works thereby providing 
jobs for people with a range of skills and education 
levels, as well as addressing a wide diversity of urban 
needs. Programme funds cannot be used to hire 
workers for manual cleaning of sewers and other such 
legally prohibited tasks. Further, all work undertaken 
via the programme must ensure basic standards of 
equal pay for men and women, availability of child-care, 
proper worksite facilities such as availability of potable 
drinking water, first-aid services, shade facilities, toilets 
and so on.
3.2.3 / Who can get work?
A potential problem with an employment guarantee 
programme for urban areas is that it may increase 
migration from rural areas. If the aim of the 
programme is to create employment for urban 
residents, one way to ensure this is to restrict eligibility 
to those who can demonstrate domicile or resident 
status within the jurisdiction of the ULB via ration cards 
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or other official documents. Since towns and cities are 
likely to have long-term residents whose families may 
reside elsewhere, the programme may allow for such 
residents who can prove domicile status as per state 
laws, to apply. 
We propose two possible variations of the scheme. In 
Scheme 1, one adult member from every household 
would be eligible to apply. In Scheme 2, every adult 
resident of the town would be eligible. The budgetary 
implications of each are discussed in Section 3.3.
A job card will be required to be eligible for this 
programme. The job card will also document any skills/
education a worker may have, for example, mason, 
plumber, electrician, Bachelor of Arts in Psychology 
and so on. The job card would contain the following 
details about a worker - name, address, educational 
qualification, and specialised skills from a roster of 
possible skills. Once the job card details are entered in 
the programme implementation software, depending 
on the skill levels of the applicant, a set of possible job 
openings in the ULB would be available. Each time a 
person completes some work through this process, 
the job card would be updated along with the work 
details. The job card itself will act as the CV of the 
person for future work and skill building. There would 
be a provision that a job card holder must be able 
to get work within a stipulated time failing which an 
unemployment allowance would have to be paid.
Two broad types of workers can be identified.
Category 1: These are workers with varying levels of 
formal education up to Class 12 and informal skills, 
who currently work as construction labour and in 
other types of daily wage work, trades of various 
kinds such as masonry, painting, carpentry, plumbing, 
electrical works, gardening, child-care, elderly care, 
and so on. This is a considerable fraction of the urban 
and peri-urban workforce. The programme will raise 
their earnings as well as improve their conditions 
of work. Under Category 1 employment, the types 
of work undertaken can include standard public 
works as well as restoration of urban commons, and 
public provisioning of care. 100 days of work will be 
guaranteed.
Category 2: These are workers with a formal diploma 
or degree beyond the higher secondary certificate. 
These would include industrial training diplomas, 
various certificate courses in computing, English 
and so on, as well as Bachelors/ Masters degrees. 
Category 2 work may be envisioned in the form of 
an apprenticeship for a contiguous period of five 
months (150 days) in which the worker assists in the 
administrative tasks at Municipal Offices, Government 
Schools, Public Health Centres and so on, or is part of 
monitoring, evaluation, survey, or data-entry teams. 
The core idea for Category 2 work is to integrate a 
skilling programme within an employment guarantee 
programme. This will enable higher educated 
unemployed youth to gain work experience, acquire 
useful skills, and in the process earn some income. 
To reiterate, Category 1 work is primarily aimed 
at addressing the issue of underemployment and 
low-wage informal work by providing additional 
employment opportunities with adequate wages and 
regulated working conditions. Work under Category 
2 is primarily for providing some work experience, 
internship opportunities, and training to unemployed, 
educated youth. If the programme succeeds at 
attracting and skilling young people, they will also 
be able to use the certification from the programme 
to secure further opportunities in the private or 
public sector.
3.2.4 / How to seek and get 
employment
Works will be administered via the ULB (nagar 
panchayats, municipal councils, and municipal 
corporations). Each ULB will have a designated 
facilitation centre with at least three trained staff 
members to register employment. The registration
of work demand, date of the receipt, and the list of 
works would be available at the facilitation centre. 
Depending on the existing skill levels of the applicant, 
a set of possible works would be available. For each 
category of work, a work ID would be generated with a 
tentative work plan containing the number of person-
days of work required. The facilitation centre would 
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also have designated staff for registration of grievances. 
The aim is to strengthen urban local governance as well 
as assist ULBs in undertaking core functions.
3.2.5 /How will the programme 
affect the present ULB staff?
This programme seeks to address  capacity gaps by 
augmenting the number of people working for the ULB. 
It seeks to supplement and not replace the present 
workforce employed at the ULB, either directly or 
through contractual arrangements. In case of existing 
permanent employees, the rollout of this programme 
will not affect their employment in any way. The 
vacancies for permanent staff of the ULB also cannot 
be filled by hiring under this programme. The workers 
employed under this programme will be paid by the 
ULB from the grants earmarked for the programme 
while the permanent employees will continue to be 
paid by the ULB through its regular sources of revenue.
For workers employed under contracts between 
the ULB and a private contractor, the rollout of the 
programme will not affect them while the contract is 
in force. In some cases, workers may be on short-term 
contract with contractors for performing specific tasks. 
Such workers would be eligible for this programme 
upon completion of the contract. When working under 
this programme the workers will be paid by the ULB 
from programme grants and not by the contractors. 
Each ULB can identify a list of contractual workers who 
are employed under short-term contracts so that they 
can be employed under this programme.
3.2.6 / Governance
The ULB  is the principal authority responsible for 
administering this programme. The ULB shall be 
responsible for preparing the annual work plan, 
identifying the projects to be undertaken through this 
programme and implementing the identified projects 
and works. Each ULB will have a dedicated official in 
the form of a Chief Programme Officer who shall be 
responsible for administering the functions entrusted 
to the ULB.  For Type 2 and Type 3 Towns, Additional 
Programme Officers may also be recruited by the ULB 
to administer this programme.
Furthering the idea of a decentralised and 
participatory form of democracy as envisaged by the 
74th Constitutional Amendment, the ward can be 
empowered as the basic unit of governance vested 
with key functions.10 Each ward can have a Ward Officer 
whose sole responsibility will be to supervise all the 
work carried out under this programme. For Type 1 and 
Type 2 cities, based on the population of the ward, a 
Ward Officer may be made responsible for two or more 
contiguous wards.  Additionally, based on the specific 
demands of each ULB, one or more engineers and 
other technical officers may be appointed for 
designing and supervising the projects undertaken 
through this programme. 
Every ward of the ULB  will have a Ward Committee 
(a constitutionally recognised body consisting of the 
elected councillor of the ward and other members 
from civil society) which will identify the work to be 
undertaken through the programme and review the 
progress in monthly ward committee meetings.11  To 
ensure that the works under this programme are 
identified in a participative manner, the Ward Officer 
shall call for an annual meeting of the Ward Sabha to 
take inputs regarding the projects to be undertaken 
in the coming financial year. While the Ward Sabha 
consists of all adult members of the ward, this annual 
meeting is restricted to identifying the works under 
this programme and is hence specifically targeted at 
potential workers.  
In case of Type 3 Towns, which have higher population 
in each ward, the Ward Officer may hold a set of 
Mohalla Sabha meetings instead of the Ward Sabha 
meeting to ensure that every person in the Ward has 
an opportunity to participate in the meeting. The 
works suggested by the Ward/Mohalla Sabha are to 
be noted down by the Ward Officer who presents it 
before the Ward Committee. The Ward Committee shall 
then identify the list of projects to be undertaken and 
prepare the budget estimates for the same in the form 
of a priority list.  These will be submitted to the Chief 
Programme Officer at the ULB. The Chief Programme 
Officer can then make the Annual Works Plan and 
Budget based on demand from each ward and submit 
it to the council of the ULB for approval.   
The ULBs shall be administratively answerable 
to the Urban Development Department of the 
concerned state government. Each state shall 
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3.2.7 / Transparency and 
accountability
Transparency and accountability are twin pillars for 
successful implementation of any public programme. 
Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, 
concerning mandatory and proactive disclosure 
of information shall be strictly adhered to in the 
implementation of this programme. The programme 
design can draw from structures envisioned by the 
Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC) in 2010. 
CEGC is a statutory body for the implementation of 
MGNREGA and has laid down the ‘Minimum Principles 
of Transparency’ (CEGC Report 2010) that have been 
accepted by the Ministry of Rural Development.12
For the implementing agency, an online Monitoring 
and Information system (MIS) would be put in place to 
record the flow and detail of every transaction. All the 
work details, shelf of works, the measurements, the 
list of workers and so on would be presented through 
such an MIS. Again, there are important lessons to be 
learned from MGNREGA in this regard.  As Aggarwal 
(2017) indicates, in many situations, the MGNREGA MIS 
has become the de-facto implementing agency and 
thus a convenient tool to subvert worker rights.  Care 
should be taken that software code does not override 
legal code. Hence some of the MIS design principles of 
MGNREGA should not be replicated here. 
A well-functioning programme of this nature and scale 
should actively involve consultation with workers to 
suggest ways to improve their capacities and access 
to information. Information systems should have a 
worker-centric, inclusive, and compassionate design 
to enhance participatory democracy.  Thus, as a start, 
a critical feature of this programme is the design and 
development of a bottom-up, worker-centric, worker-
consulted, Janata Information System (JIS) whereby 
a worker’s job card would have an easily accessible 
virtual counterpart. Since workers are actively involved 
in the production of information, it would be a right for 
them to have a stake in information presentation and 
dissemination mechanisms and to have access to their
own work records on demand. 
Like a bank passbook, the job cards would get 
electronically updated with the essential demographic 
details, work details, wage details, and bank account 
constitute a Programme Director housed at the 
Urban Development Department who is responsible 
for the overall administration and monitoring of this 
programme across the state. The state government 
shall be responsible for collating, reviewing and 
approving the annual work plans of all ULBs and 
sending the estimate of expenses of the programme 
to the central government. In the central government 
a dedicated  Ministry of Employment may be made 
responsible for reviewing and approving the state 
plans under this project as part of a national strategy to 
address the employment problem. If such a ministry is 
not created, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs 
at the central level may be made responsible for the 
overall administration of this programme (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 : Programme Structure
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details at the facilitation centres. It will also act as 
a CV. As and when applicable, the job card would 
automatically be updated with the corresponding 
unemployment allowance and delay compensation (in 
the event of delays in wage payments) amounts due. 
Upon the completion of calculation of the total amount 
due to the worker, the job card would reflect the same 
for that corresponding work. As a back-up, workers will 
have the right to get a print-out of the electronic job 
card once every three months or after completion of 
30 days of work, whichever is earlier. Workshops with 
workers would be conducted periodically to incorporate 
workers’ inputs in improving their access to information 
and steps would be taken to enhance their capacities 
based on actionable information. To avoid a situation 
where an information system subverts legal rights, 
the JIS itself would be subject to periodic audits by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). 
Proactive disclosure would minimally include:
1. Reading out key pieces of information such as details 
about the work sites, budgets, expenditure, worker 
wages at the facilitation centres on the 1st and 3rd 
Saturday of each month.
2. Displaying periodically updated information through 
boards and wall paintings at the information facilitation 
centres at the wards.
3. Disseminating information using audio-visual tools 
such as voice broadcasts on the phone and SMS, and 
through radios and newspapers.
4. Free and open access to all the records on 
the internet.
For Category 1 workers, the wage disbursal would 
happen in  in the presence of all the workers, at the 
Facilitation Centre, on the 1st and 3rd Saturday of each 
month. Wage disbursal would be accompanied with a 
mandatory printed ‘wage slip’ containing the essential 
details such as (1) the worker’s job card details (2) the 
dates of work (3) the muster roll number (CEGC Report 
2010) that have been accepted by the Ministry of Rural 
Development. (4) the total wages earned and (5) the 
date of wage disbursal. A copy of all this would be 
automatically updated in the job card as well. 
For Category 2 workers, a  monthly stipend  would be 
deposited to their bank accounts directly on the last 
working day of the month.
Transparency is not an end in itself. Transparency 
mechanisms are put in to foster good accountability 
and governance that can at least be built in two 
ways. Proactive accountability is to ensure that 
implementation proceeds as envisioned. This can be 
achieved through mandatory and regular social audits. 
Reactive accountability addresses implementation 
lacunae via robust grievance redress structures.
3.2.8 / Mandatory social audits
Social audits are a process of verification of the 
implementation of the programme in consultation 
with the community. The Ward Officer will conduct 
concurrent social audits for all the work done each 
month. The details of all the work in the wards, the 
expenses incurred (both labour and material), the 
details of material sourcing, bills and vouchers will be 
proactively displayed in the public domain and will 
also be available at the facilitation centres for citizens 
to see and to take photocopies. Oral testimonies of 
people would be collected in addition to documentary 
verification and discussed with the citizens in public. 
The broad objectives of social audits are: (1) Ensure 
transparency and accountability (2) Inform and educate 
people about their rights and entitlements under the 
programme (3) Create regular, shared and collective 
platforms for the workers and the community to freely 
voice their grievances (4) Enhance participation and 
hence ownership in the programme implementation 
and (5) Build capacities of stakeholders/participants of 
the social audit process. 
An independent Social Audit Unit (SAU) would be set 
up by the state governments to facilitate the conduct 
of social audits at each ward. 3 per cent of the total 
allocated funds should be reserved for social audits. 
SAU resource persons would be identified and trained 
for this unit. For example, one ULB Resource person 
would be selected and trained in the audit processes. 
Every town can have a trained pool of social auditors 
who would be randomly assigned to conduct social 
audits making sure that an auditor is not assigned 
one’s own ward. The audits would be carried out once 
every quarter in each ward by a team of four social 
auditors and the ULB Resource person for that ward. 
Since all the required details would be proactively made 
available in the public domain, the social auditors 
need not necessarily depend on the local ULB for any 
other data. 
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The programme should adhere to the minimum 
principles of the auditing standards of social audits, 
formalised by the CAG.13 The minimum principles, can 
be classified under the following heads:
1. Access to Information 
    a. Understanding Entitlements -- Disclosure of job     
        charts, time frames and responsibilities of each 
        official in the programme 
   b. Equal and open access to information
   c.  Mandatory display and dissemination of   
        information  
2. Involvement and participation of citizens in the 
process of open decision making 
3. Protection of citizens   
4. Right to be heard through multiple modes
5. Collective platforms to be overseen periodically by 
independent ombudsperson(s) 
6. Public Hearing and dissemination -- at the end of 
the social audit in each quarter, a public hearing will 
be organised outside the Ward Office. It would be 
mandatory for the Ward Officer and the technical team 
at the ULB to attend the Public Hearing. The findings of 
each social audit would be publicly disseminated and 
available at the ward office. Each SAU would itself be 
subject to periodic audits by the CAG.
3.2.9 / Grievance redressal
A Grievance Redress Commission would be set up 
at the national and the state level with a Grievance 
Redress Officer (GRO) at each Ward. Such a GRO would 
be at the level of the Ward Officer. The Grievance 
Redress Commission would be an independent body 
dedicated to conduct inquiries, verification, and 
inspection of each registered grievance.
The GRO would ensure the creation of multiple 
channels of registration of grievances -- a kiosk at the 
GRO’s office, toll-free number, online option, and so on. 
Every grievance registered would get a dated receipt. 
In addition, the programme would contain a ‘Right 
to Timely Grievance Redressal’. Enquiry, verification, 
and inspection of each grievance must be completed 
within seven working days of receiving the grievance. 
The enquiry and verification process would comprise 
an independent team of three members: one member 
of the social audit team and two members of the 
grievance redressal team. After completion of each 
step in the grievance redress process, the complainant 
would be notified in person. The grievance would 
be considered closed only when there is a written 
notification by the complainant that the grievance has 
been resolved. There would be penalty clauses created 
in case of a delay in timely resolution of grievances 
or failure of redressal in genuine cases.  There will be 
appellate authorities created for grievance redressal 
procedures. A worker, unsatisfied with the grievance 
redressal procedure could appeal to a higher appellate 
authority who will oversee resolution in a time bound 
manner.
Upon completion of verification and inspection, the 
grievance must be resolved within 
seven more working days. Thus, every grievance must 
be resolved within 15 days of receiving the grievance.
3.3 / Programme Budget
We now discuss the programme wage, number of 
people covered, and the resulting budget. As with 
programme structure elaborated above, this is an 
illustrative exercise that is presented for further 
discussion and debate.
3.3.1 / Calculation of wage rate
A point of reference for setting programme wages 
comes from the wage structure observed for broad 
occupational categories in the CMIE Consumer 
Pyramids survey. We choose three occupations, 
casual wage work, self-employed entrepreneurs 
in the informal sector (people in various kinds of 
trades) and white-collar clerical workers. The first two 
are likely to sign up for work under Category 1. The 
last occupational type is closest to Category 2 work. 
According to these data, median earnings reported 
by casual wage labourers in urban India in 2018 were 
D9625  per month or 370 per day assuming a 26-day 
working month. Self-employed informal entrepreneurs  
reported median monthly earnings of D12,500 or 480 
per day. While white-collar clerical workers reported 
median earnings of D28,125  per month or 1082 
per day.14 
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In addition, we note that the overall median  daily wage 
(across all occupations)  in urban India in  2018 was 
D500 per day. 
The second point of reference for setting a programme 
wage is the recently proposed national floor minimum 
wage of D375 per day as well as the recent Ministry 
of Labour and Employment Government Order dated 
28/09/2018 that gives minimum wage rates plus 
variable dearness allowance for a variety of occupations 
covering most activities that can be undertaken in this 
programme.15 For Type B areas (intermediate towns) 
the proposed ‘unskilled’, ‘semi-skilled’ and ‘skilled/
clerical’ rates are 466, 527, and 617 per day, while for 
Type C towns (smallest towns) they are 373, 437, and 
527 respectively.
Taking these two points of reference and keeping the 
scheme simple in view of administrative constraints, 
we propose a wage rate of D500 per day for Category 1 
workers, and the same rate converted into a monthly 
stipend of D13,000 for Category 2 work (work requiring 
continuous presence of a person with a diploma or 
degree). Since Category 2 work is envisioned as a 
skilling or training apprenticeship programme for youth 
with diplomas or degrees beyond Class 12, it need 
not pay in accordance with market rates. This is also 
why we refer to the payment as a stipend rather than 
a wage or salary. The wage structure will be the same 
for men and women, following the gender parity norm 
established under MGNREGA. Wages would be indexed 
to CPI-U. The base wage rate may be adjusted upwards 
based on cost of living considerations. 
Setting the programme wage equal to the median 
urban wage, would raise earnings significantly at 
the bottom of the distribution. One criticism of this 
approach may be that as wages exceed the current 
market rates this will raise the cost of labour for local 
employers making some of their operations unviable, 
resulting in job losses.  On the other hand, low wages 
are widely acknowledged to be the principal problem 
facing urban informal workers. A rise in wages for 
this section of the workforce would have significant 
demand effects, including increased demand for goods 
and services provided by local entrepreneurs. This 
question has been extensively explored in the context 
of minimum wage laws in developed countries. The 
research over the effects of a rise in minimum wages 
in the US, the UK, and other developed economies 
points to a positive role for demand, while the negative 
effects in terms of loss of jobs are either small or non-
existent (de Linde Leonard, Stanley, and Doucouliagos 
2018; Manning 2016; Neumark and Wascher 2008). 
While these findings cannot be straightforwardly 
extended to the Indian context, to the extent that 
informal labour markets are imperfect with employers 
having some market power, the effects may be similar. 
Lastly, we also point out that instead of accepting 
low wages as the default mechanism for survival of 
small entrepreneurs, public policy should encourage 
increased productivity that can sustain higher wages 
while maintaining profit margins. 
3.3.2 / Calculation of the budget 
Here are our budget projections for guaranteed 
employment for 100 days (Category 1) and 150 days 
(Category 2) of the year. Appendix C has the detailed 
calculations.
The total budgetary requirement will have three 
components - labour, material, and administrative 
cost. We propose a 60:40 ratio, that is, 60 per cent of 
the total budgetary allocation would be labour cost 
and 40 per cent would be a combination of material 
and administrative cost. Labour costs should be split 
between the Centre and the states in a 80:20 ratio, 
while the non-labour costs would be shared between 
the Centre, the states, and the ULBs.  Payment of 
penalties to workers in case of delays in wage payments 
(delay compensation) would thus be proportionately 
allocated to the Centre and states depending on who is 
causing the delay. In case of Type 1 cities, the smallest 
and most resource constrained, the non-labour costs 
will be shared between the Centre, State and ULB in the 
ratio of 50:40:10. For Type 2 cities it will be in the ratio 
of 50:30:20 and Type 3 cities, the largest, in the ratio of 
50:25:25 . The sharing scheme is intended to create a 
sense of ownership of the programme across all three 
levels of government.
The programme should also encourage convergence 
with other central and state government programmes 
for urban development. In such cases, while the labour 
cost may be completely covered by this programme, 
the material and administrative costs may be covered 
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as per the terms of the other programmes. For 
example, if a ULB is laying new pipes for water supply 
under the AMRUT programme, the material costs may 
be paid by the central government as per the terms 
of AMRUT but for the payment of wages, the ULB may 
avail of funds from the Urban Employment Guarantee 
Programme.
The total estimated labour costs depend on the number 
of people expected to make themselves available for 
work. We have estimated this number based on the 
2018 CMIE Consumer Pyramids Survey. Data show 
that 50 per cent of workers earn up to D500 per day in 
urban areas. Data also show that around 25 per cent of 
the urban workforce has a diploma or degree beyond 
Class 12. Using these numbers, we present two possible 
schemes, one where one adult from every household is 
guaranteed work and one where every adult resident of 
a town is guaranteed work.
Scheme 1: Household
In order to calculate the potential workforce under the 
programme we start with the projected population for 
2018  which is 1.3 billion.16 Applying an urbanisation 
rate of 35 per cent gives us a total urban population 
of 474 million.17 Given that roughly 50 per cent of 
the urban population resides in towns of less than 1 
million, we get a small-town strength of 237 million. 
Assuming an average household size of four, gives us 
an estimated 59 million households. One worker from 
each household gives a total possible workforce of 59 
million or 5.9 crore.
If we assume that all workers earning less than the 
programme wage will demand work for the entire 
period, we get a Category 1 workforce of around 30 
million (half the total possible workforce). For Category 
2 work, only the higher educated qualify and in addition 
we assume that only the openly unemployed are likely 
to sign up since a continuous presence of five months 
is required. Using an unemployment rate of 20 per 
cent (the PLFS rate for the higher educated), we get an 
estimated 3 million workers. The programme cost in 
this case works out to a total of 2.8 lakh crores or 1.7 
per cent of GDP (see Appendix C). 
To put this number in perspective, note that if every 
job card holder under MGNREGA (~70 million) was to 
get the full 100 days of employment at a wage rate of 
D200 per day, the programme cost would be 2.3 lakh 
crores (1.4 per cent of GDP). Further, the World Bank 
noted that MGNREGA should be funded to the extent of 
1.7 per cent of GDP (Murgai and Ravallion  2005). This 
programme is in the same range. 
Scheme 2: Individual
Instead of guaranteeing employment to only one adult 
from every household, it would be preferable for the 
scheme to cover every adult resident, which was the 
original vision behind  the Right to Work campaign 
too. If this option is followed, the total possible worker 
pool would be 94.5 million or 9.4 crore. This number is 
obtained by starting from the estimated Indian working 
age population in  2018 (900 million), calculating the 
small-town fraction (14 per cent) and applying a labour 
force participation rate (LFPR) of 75 per cent. This LFPR 
is much higher than the observed average of around 
50 per cent as per the PLFS. This is because India’s low 
overall LFPR is driven largely by a very low participation 
rate for women, and a central aim of the proposed 
programme is to encourage participation of women in 
the workforce.
As before, assuming that all workers eligible for 
Category 1 will sign up and around 20 per cent of those 
eligible for Category 2 will do so, we obtain a total 
programme budget of 4.5 lakh crores, i.e.,  2.7 per cent 
of GDP. (See Appendix C for details)
The programme costs may seem high but we 
emphasise the positive spill-over effects that will result 
from higher wage rates, skilling components and the 
strong element of public goods creation. Thus, it is 
more an employment, skilling, and an asset creation 
programme in one. Finally, we have assumed that the 
entire bottom half of the urban wage distribution will 
demand work. We have also assumed a large LFPR for 
Scheme 2. These are strong assumptions and the 
actual demand for work, and thus the actual costs will 
likely be lower.
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3.3.3 / Budget planning
By December of each year, the state will submit its 
labour budget to the Centre by aggregating the labour 
budget of each ULB in that state. The labour budget  
will contain the planned person-days of work required 
for the next financial year. We propose a departure 
in the method of funds allocation from a centralised 
payment architecture of MGNREGA. Inadequate 
funds allocation has made MGNREGA a supply-driven 
programme. For instance, in 2018-19, MGNREGA funds 
were exhausted three months before the end of the 
financial year. Some state governments, such as the 
Government of Karnataka, have attempted to clear 
pending wage payments from their own exchequer 
based on a promise of reimbursement for the same 
from the Central government. However, news reports 
indicate that the Central government is yet to pay 
arrears to the tune of D950 crores from 2015-16 (CNBC 
TV18, 2019).  Moreover, as we outlined in Section 
3.1.2, a highly technical and centralised wage payment 
system has only added to worker woes instead of 
easing the wage payments process.  In such situations, 
workers are confronted with an opaque system where 
the baton of accountability is being passed around 
from the field functionaries to a ‘computer’.    
3.3.4 / Funds allocation and 
sharing
To honour a truly demand-driven programme, at least 
two things are critical. First, an inventory of work should 
be planned well in advance. Second, funds should be 
made available whenever there is a demand for work. 
In addition, wage payments should be made on time 
to be compliant with the Payment of Wages Act (1936). 
The planning and submission of the labour budget at 
each ULB takes care of the first aspect of the demand-
driven principle. The following example illustrates 
the second and third aspect of the demand-driven 
principle.
Consider a ULB in a Type 3 (largest) town. For such a 
ULB, the Centre’s share of labour cost is 80 per cent 
and the state government’s share is 20 per cent. For 
non-labour costs, the Centre’s share is 50 per cent, the 
state government’s share is 25 per cent and the ULB’s 
share is 25 per cent. Suppose that the labour budget (in 
person-days) of this ULB translates to a total monetary 
requirement of  D1000 for one financial year. Labour 
costs would account for D600 (60 per cent) and non-
labour costs would account for D400 (40 per cent).
In the first week of April in each financial year, the 
Centre would earmark and transfer D480 for labour 
wages (80 per cent of D600) and D200 (50 per cent of 
non-labour wages) to the state government’s account. 
Similarly, each respective state government would 
earmark and park D120 (20 per cent of the labour 
wages) and D100 (25 per cent of the non-labour costs) 
to be transferred to the ULB’s account. Therefore, at the 
beginning of each financial year, the state government’s 
account will have the total of the Centre’s share and the 
state government’s share required for the entire year. 
The state government will transfer money to the ULB in 
4 tranches, one tranche per quarter. All tranches, after 
the first would be transferred based on a utilisation 
certificate to be provided by each ULB to the state 
government. Such a utilisation certificate would explain 
how the allocated funds were used in a given quarter. 
Based on a quarterly utilisation, the state government 
will transfer the funds to the ULB’s account. Finally, the 
ULB will have earmarked and stored D100 (25 per cent 
of the non-labour costs) in its account. Care should be 
taken that no wage payment to a worker is withheld 
due to any delays in production and verification of the 
utilisation certificates.
There could at least be two legitimate concerns in this 
model. First, that ULBs might overestimate their labour 
budget requirements and thereby seek more funds 
than required. To address this, we propose two critical 
checks. First, once every quarter, the ULB will have 
to submit a utilisation certificate demonstrating the 
cost incurred during the period. Any unused amount 
would be accounted for and adjusted proportionately 
between the Centre and the states prior to the 
allocation of funds in the next quarter. Second, the 
ULB would not just be subject to a periodic social 
audit but also a quarterly financial and utilisation 
audit. This would also be under the CAG norms. The 
second concern could be that introduction of the 
state government and the ULB as intermediaries in 
the payment process might cause leakages. While this 
cannot be overruled, we postulate that this mechanism  
of financial management and funds transfer would 
increase local accountability, decentralisation and 
the state government’s and the ULB’s stake in the 
programme implementation. 
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Our proposal could address four key failings of 
MGNREGA: 
1. The urban employment guarantee programme 
would be genuinely demand-driven because funds 
for programme implementation are locally available 
throughout the year.
2. Giving monetary freedom to the state governments 
and the local ULBs would ensure better possibilities of 
timely wage payments.
3. This would ensure greater local accountability. 
In case of delays in payments, the workers would 
know that the ULB has the financial means to pay the 
workers. 
4. In MGNREGA, the Gram Panchayat has been 
rendered quite powerless with the centralised payment 
systems. This discourages effective implementation.  
With greater local autonomy, through upfront 
decentralisation of funds, the state government and 
the ULB would have more stake in better programme 
implementation.
3.3.5 / Payment of wages
For each work in a worksite, there will be a muster roll 
containing the job card details of the applicant, the 
work details and the attendance at the worksite. Each 
muster is weekly and at the end of the week, the wages 
for each worker, based on attendance is uploaded at 
the facilitation centre. Suppose T denotes the date 
of completion of a muster. Then the measurement 
for that muster of work must be completed within 
four working days, that is, by T+4. Then the work 
details and the corresponding pay order for that work 
must be generated by T+8. The pay order would be 
electronically sent to the ULB by T+10. The ULB would 
then disburse the cash/cheque/receipt of electronic 
transfer to the workers by T+15. Wage disbursement 
must happen on the first Saturday and the third 
Saturday of each month at the Ward office. The job 
card of each worker must have the provision to be 
electronically updated at the facilitation centre during 
wage disbursal day. As an option, instead of provision 
of a wage slip, the updated job card with the record of 
work and wages could be printed and provided. 
3.3.6 / Delay compensation
In case of a delay in payments, each worker will be 
eligible for a compensation. The compensation must 
be calculated for the full extent of delay - from the 16th 
day of closure of the muster roll to the date on which 
wage disbursal happens at the ULB. Since the ULB will 
have access to the full labour costs at the beginning of 
the financial year, the delay compensation would be 
borne entirely by the ULB. However, if the Centre or 
the state governments fail to transfer their amounts 
corresponding to the labour budget, the Centre and/or 
the state governments would be liable to pay the delay 
compensation.
3.4 / Conclusion and way 
forward
Criticisms of an urban employment guarantee scheme 
that have recently been made are that it does not aid 
India’s structural transition from rural to urban and 
from low-productivity to high productivity work .18  It is 
true that a jobs guarantee programme cannot make 
the growth process distributionally more equal by 
itself. But the programme that is implicitly assumed in 
this criticism is simply a direct extension of MGNREGA 
to urban areas. As we have outlined here, an urban 
programme can, and perhaps should, take a very 
different form. If an ambitious urban employment 
guarantee programme along the lines proposed here 
is implemented, it has the potential to transform 
the structure of the economy as well as contribute 
significantly to an improved quality of life for millions 
of people. Specifically, the following effects may be 
envisaged on the economy at large:
1. A multiplier effect resulting from reduced 
unemployment and underemployment and increased 
incomes. This will boost demand in small towns and 
create conditions for successful entrepreneurship in a 
distributed fashion.
2. Increased productivity as well as improved quality of 
life due to better functioning public goods and services.
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3. Increased employability and productivity in the 
private sector due to skilling in the programme.
4. Rising informal sector incomes due to an effective 
wage floor.
5. Reversal of ecological degradation.
The key steps involved in the rollout of such a 
programme are:
1. Passage of a National Urban Employment Guarantee 
Act - This Act will legally bind the state to provide a 
fixed number of days of work for all eligible people who 
apply under the programme, lay down the governance 
structure for administering the programme, and 
provide accountability mechanisms for its operation.
2. Creation of a Ministry of Employment - We propose 
that this programme be administered by a newly 
created Ministry of Employment under the Government 
of India. Such a Ministry will be responsible for all 
matters related to employment generation including 
the administration of MGNREGA.
3. Establishing functionaries for administering the 
programme - The Central and state governments 
have to hire, through an open process, a set of 
dedicated staff who are responsible for administering 
this programme as well as staff responsible for 
accountability measures under this programme.  
We believe that the time is right for India to embark 
on this path.
Endnotes
1. See “Recent Trends in Employment and Unemploy-
ment in India”, State of Working India 2019.
2. An antecedent to the SJSRY was the ‘Nehru Rojgar 
Yojana’ introduced in 1989.
3. The NULM was further restructured and renamed 
as the Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana-National Urban 
Livelihoods Mission (DAY-NULM) in 2016.
4. Local Self Government Department, Government of 
Kerala (http://lsgkerala.gov.in/index.php/en/schemes/
ayyankali_urban_employment_guarantee_scheme)
5. The Green New Deal seeks to provide everyone with 
“(i) high-quality health care; (ii) affordable, safe, and ad-
equate housing; (iii) economic security; and (iv) access 
to clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, 
and nature.” House Resolution.0109,116th Congress 
(https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/sites/ocasio-cortez.
house.gov/files/Resolutionper cent20onper cent20aper 
cent20Greenper cent20Newper cent20Deal.pdf) 
6. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985 
SCC (3) 545) the Supreme Court held that “An equally 
important facet of the right to life is the right to liveli-
hood because no person can live without the means of 
livelihood.”
7. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 SCC (1) 248) 
the Supreme Court held that “The right to live includes 
the right to live with human dignity and all that goes 
along with it...and also the right to carry on functions 
and activities as constitute the bare minimum expres-
sion of human self”.
8. There is a trend among census towns and other 
urbanising villages to remain administratively rural. 
While some of the reasons for the resistance to be 
classified as urban is to avoid higher taxes and tighter 
building regulations, Eric Denis, Partha Mukhopadhyay, 
Marie-Helene Zérah (2012) have noted “rural schemes, 
such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), the world largest 
programme of this nature, are a strong incentive for 
settlements to remain rural”
9. As per the 2011 Census, 53 cities have a population 
of over 1 million which account for 160.7 million per-
sons or 42.6 per cent of the urban population.
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10. The 74th Constitutional Amendment, passed in 
1992, added Part IX A “The Municipalities” into the 
Constitution of India. It mandated the creation of 
elected local governments in urban areas and sought 
to empower them through the devolution of functions, 
funds and functionaries.
11. Article 243-S of the Constitution, introduced by the 
74th Amendment, states that every Municipality having 
a population of three lakhs shall have Wards Commit-
tees. While it does not restrict Municipalities below this 
population to have Ward Committee, this provision has 
been poorly implemented since most ULBs, above and 
below 3 lakh population, do not have functioning Ward 
Committees. 
12. http://nrega.nic.in/CEGC/TransparencyandAccount-
ability.pdf
13. http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/Circu-
lars/1948Social_Audit_.pdf
14. Income data are obtained from the second wave 
(May to Aug) of the 2018 CMIE Consumer Pyramids 
survey, the most recent wave for which full data are 
available. The numbers presented pertain to all of 
urban India and not only small towns.
15. Report of the Expert Committee on Determining the 
Methodology for Fixing the National Minimum Wage, 
https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/Commitee_on_
Determination_of_Methodology.pdf. And VDA Minimum 
Wages order dated 28/9/2018: https://clc.gov.in/clc/
node/586
16. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social  
Affairs: https://www.un.org/development/desa/publi-
cations/world-population-prospects-the-2017-revision.
html
17. Urbanisation rate as per census 2011 was 31 per 
cent. In view of the rapid urbanisation in the last de-
cade, we have adjusted it upwards to 35 per cent.
18. https://www.hindustantimes.com/editorials/
urban-employment-guarantee-scheme-signifies-in-
dia-s-failure-to-address-inequality/story-WdvzySh9G-
yaRuodCAMCyNP.html
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Type 1 towns
(Up to 50,000 population)
Adoor (Municipality), Kerala
Afzalpur (Town Panchayat), Karnataka
Belonia (Municipal Council), Tripura
Chirkunda (Nagar Panchayat), Jharkhand
Degana (Municipal Council), Rajasthan
Golaghat (Municipal Board), Assam
Kovvur (Municipality), Andhra Pradesh
Kalimpong (Municipality), West Bengal
Lalganj (Nagar Panchayat) Uttar Pradesh
Mhowgaon (Nagar Panchayat), Madhya Pradesh
Mapusa (Municipal Council), Goa
Nakodar (Municipal Council), Punjab
Nelamangala (Town Municipal Council), Karnataka
Poonch (Municipal Council), Jammu and Kashmir
Rania (Municipal Committee), Haryana
Rameswaram (Municipality), Tamil Nadu
Soro (Municipality), Odisha
Sugauli (Nagar Panchayat), Bihar
Tuljapur (Municipal Council), Maharashtra
Vadnagar (Municipality), Gujarat
Type 2 towns
(50,000 - 300,000 population)
Anantapur (Municipal Corporation), Andhra Pradesh
Begusarai (Municipal Council), Bihar
Bhiwani (Municipal Council), Haryana
Cooch Behar (Municipality), West Bengal
Dewas (Muncipal Corporation), Madhya Pradesh
Dhamtari (Municipal Corporation), Chhattisgarh
Gandhinagar (Municipal Corporation), Gujarat
Imphal (Municipal Corporation), Manipur
Kohima (Municipal Council), Nagaland
Kottayam (Municipality), Kerala
Margao (Municipal Council), Goa
Mirzapur (Muncipal Corporation), Uttar Pradesh
Port Blair (Municipal Council), Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands
Ratnagiri (Municipal Council), Maharashtra
Raichur (City Municipal Council), Karnataka
Rishikesh (Municipal Corporation), Uttarakhand
Shimla (Municipal Corporation), Himachal Pradesh
Silchar (Municipal Board), Assam
Thanjavur (Municipal Corporation), Tamil Nadu
Tonk (Municipal Council), Rajasthan
Type 3 towns
(300,000 - 1,000,000 population)
Ajmer (Municipal Corporation), Rajasthan
Bhilai (Municipal Corporation), Chattisgarh
Bhubaneswar (Municipal Corporation), Odisha
Dehradun (Municipal Corporation), Uttarakhand
Erode (Municipal Corporation), Tamil Nadu
Gaya (Municipal Corporation), Bihar
Jammu (Municipal Corporation), Jammu and Kashmir
Kolhapur (Municipal Corporation), Maharashtra
Kozhikode (Municipal Corporation), Kerala
Kurnool (Municipal Corporation), Andhra Pradesh
Mangalore (Municipal Corporation), Karnataka
Mathura-Vrindavan (Municipal Corporation) Uttar 
Pradesh
Patiala (Municipal Corporation), Punjab
Rohtak (Municipal Corporation), Haryana
Rourkela (Municipal Corporation), Odisha
Salem (Municipal Corporation), Tamil Nadu
Siliguri (Municipal Corporation), Wet Bengal
Thiruvananthapuram (Municipal Corporation), Kerala
Tirupati (Municipal Corporation), Andhra Pradesh
Warangal (Municipal Corporation), Telangana
Appendix A - Sample list of towns
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Appendix B - Sample list of works
The following list of potential works that can be undertaken in the programme is based on 
Mundoli, Manjunath, and Nagendra (2015, 2017, 2018), Mundoli, Unnikrishnan, and Nagendra 
(2017a, b), Nagendra (2016), Unnikrishnan et al (2016), Vij and Narain (2016), Narain and Vij 
(2016) and on other unpublished work.
Works are aimed at addressing urban environmental issues such as:
• Water conservation and harvesting
• Flood control
• Enhancing urban greenery (reducing air and water pollution, maintaining urban micro-cli-
mate, biodiversity support, residents well-being, supporting biodiversity): Planting in public 
spaces especially where space is not a constraint e.g. roadside should be mostly keystone 
species like Ficus, or local fruiting trees like mango, jackfruit, tamarind, which are hardy, 
require less maintenance, long lived and do not need much watering
• Preventing coastal and hillside erosion of cities/towns situated in such specific ecological 
landscapes
• Disaster management 
• Enabling urban agriculture for subsistence
• Enabling livelihoods
• Recreation
• Biodiversity support
Possible List of works :
Space Purpose Actions Description
Waterbodies 
(ponds, tanks, 
lakes)
Water 
conservation 
Flood control
Biodiversity 
support
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of smaller tanks in 
lakes (for idol immersion)
Maintenance of bunds, deweeding, 
desilting, garbage/waste removal, 
fencing or repairing boundary walls 
and fences
Less reliance on STPs—reclaiming 
and rejuvenating wetlands
Waterbodies 
(ponds, tanks, 
lakes)
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air and 
water pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting, 
Maintenance 
Removal
Planting vegetation suited to water-
bodies, including trees where eco-
logically suitable, and otherwise, 
planning native plant species
Rejuvenating grasslands, 
Maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees; but 
with care to not affect hydrology
60
Space Purpose Actions Description
Waterbodies 
(ponds, tanks, 
lakes)
Supporting 
livelihood
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Floating wetlands that can be used 
to harvest reeds which can be used 
by local women’s self-help groups 
to make reed baskets, mats
Open wells Water 
conservation
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Sinking new wells, reviving disused 
wells, dredging
Wetlands Water 
conservation 
Flood control
Biodiversity 
support
Maintenance Cleaning weeds and garbage
Less reliance on STPs—reclaiming 
and rejuvenating wetlands
Supporting 
livelihood
Wetlands Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Floating wetlands that can be used 
to harvest reeds which can be used 
by local women’s self-help groups 
to make reed baskets, mats
Water channels 
including 
stormwater 
drains
Flood control Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Desilting, cleaning weeds and 
garbage
Constructing to aid flood control
Canals Water 
conservation 
Flood control
Biodiversity 
support
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Cleaning weeds and garbage
Maintenance of bunds, deweeding, 
desilting, garbage/waste removal, 
fencing or repairing boundary walls 
and fences
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Canals Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Preventing 
erosion
Planting
Maintenance 
Removal
Planting vegetation suited to 
canalside strengthening, including 
trees where ecologically suitable, 
and otherwise, planning native 
plant species. 
Maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees; but 
with care to not affect hydrology
Supporting 
livelihood
Canals Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Floating wetlands that can be used 
to harvest reeds which can be used 
by local women’s self-help groups 
to make reed baskets, mats
Coast/
beachfronts
Preventing 
coastal erosion
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction, maintenance of man-
groves wherever possible, supple-
mented with built structures such 
as groynes and other structures
Coast/
beachfronts
Disaster 
management
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction and maintenance of 
cyclone shelters
Coast/
beachfronts
Enabling 
coastal 
livelihoods
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Fish drying and processing sites
Riverside Water 
conservation
Flood control
Biodiversity 
support
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction, maintenance and 
repair of riverside bunds, desilting, 
deweeding and removing garbage
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Riverside Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Preventing 
erosion
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees; but 
with care to not affect hydrology.
River/riverside Supporting 
livelihood
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Floating wetlands that can be used 
to harvest reeds which can be used 
by local women’s self-help groups 
to make reed baskets, mats
Hill slopes and 
valleys
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Preventing 
erosion
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees
Hill slopes and 
valleys
Water 
conservation 
Flood control
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Constructing and maintaining 
structures to control and hold 
flow of water; including water 
harvesting 
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Parks (large 
and small 
neighbourhood 
parks)
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees
Focus on less landscaping and 
more planting of trees
Protected 
areas, forest 
land and 
wooded groves 
within cities
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
Government 
managed areas 
of worship 
– temples, 
churches, 
mosques, etc
Water 
conservation 
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction rainwater harvesting 
tanks
Maintenance of ponds and tanks—
deweeding, desilting
Government 
managed areas 
of worship 
– temples, 
churches, 
mosques, etc
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Roadsides Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
Wooded 
graveyards and 
crematoriums
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
Playgrounds 
and open 
spaces
Recreation Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of facilities for 
different games in playgrounds and 
maintenance
Alongside 
railway lines
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Below high 
tension wires 
and along 
buffer areas of 
land left aside 
for electric 
works
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees
Below flyovers Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
In the buffer 
areas around 
airports, ports 
and other 
similar facilities
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
Other 
unoccupied 
public lands
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water pol-
lution, main-
taining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees.
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Slums Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting trees that provide shade 
as well as nutrition (e.g. drumstick, 
fruiting trees) and medicinal plants, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees.
Slums Enabling urban 
agriculture for 
subsistence
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Individual and community farming, 
creating kitchen gardens with 
medicinal plants and greens to 
supplement nutrition
Slums Water 
conservation
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of rainwater 
harvesting  and storage for 
individual homes and for slum as 
a whole
Government 
schools and 
anganwadis
Water 
conservation
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of rainwater 
harvesting  and storage facilities
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Government 
schools and 
anganwadis
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Government 
schools and 
anganwadis
Enabling urban 
agriculture for 
subsistence
Planting
Maintenance
Individual and community farming, 
creating kitchen gardens with 
medicinal plants and greens to 
supplement nutrition
Government 
educational 
institutions (PU 
colleges/Uni-
versities/ITI/
hostels)
Water 
conservation
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of rainwater 
harvesting  and storage facilities
Government 
educational 
institutions (PU 
colleges/Uni-
versities/ITI/
hostels)
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and removal of dead trees 
Government 
educational 
institutions (PU 
colleges/Uni-
versities/ITI/
hostels)
Enabling urban 
agriculture for 
subsistence
Planting
Maintenance
Individual and community farming, 
creating kitchen gardens with 
medicinal plants and greens to 
supplement nutrition
Government 
housing proj-
ects (JNNUM/
AMRUT, 
Aashraya, em-
ployee housing 
etc)
Water 
conservation
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of rainwater 
harvesting  and storage facilities
Government 
housing proj-
ects (JNNUM/
AMRUT, 
Aashraya, em-
ployee housing 
etc)
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air and 
water pollution, 
maintaining urban 
micro-climate, 
residents well-
being, supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees 
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Space Purpose Actions Description
Government 
housing proj-
ects (JNNUM/
AMRUT, 
Aashraya, em-
ployee housing 
etc)
Enabling urban 
agriculture for 
subsistence
Planting
Maintenance
Individual and community farming, 
creating kitchen gardens with 
medicinal plants and greens to 
supplement nutrition
Other 
government 
facilities 
Water 
conservation
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Construction of rainwater 
harvesting  and storage facilities
Other 
government 
facilities 
Enhancing 
urban greenery 
(reducing air 
and water 
pollution, 
maintaining 
urban micro-
climate, 
residents 
well-being, 
supporting 
biodiversity)
Planting
Maintenance
Removal
Planting appropriate vegetation, 
including ecologically suitable local 
species of trees where relevant, 
maintenance, for example loping 
and  removal of dead trees
Others Vermi-
composting
Construction
Repair
Maintenance
Urban organic waste from markets 
for creating vermicompost that can 
be sold via nurseries. 
Construction, maintenance and 
repair of facilities 
Other 
government 
facilities 
Enabling urban 
agriculture for 
subsistence
Planting
Maintenance
Edible wild plant nurseries, coop 
nurseries for native fruiting species
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Environmental monitoring and evaluation at ward level : 
1. These are positions that can be for continuous months not exceeding 150 days in a year, and 
with a different set of people hired each year. 
2. The employment can be in certain months of the year (for example, post monsoon as one 
stretch)
3. This will require easy to use equipment for data collection and programs for data entry
4. The position is to provide both employment and experience for unemployed who hold a 
graduate or post-graduate degree (BA, BSc, BBA, BCA, MA, MSc, MBA, BCA and so on)
5. The jobs in this will not be to meet shortfall in already existing government positions but are 
in addition to these
6. The information from these monitoring and data collection could feed into prioritising the 
kind of works that need to be done (table above)
Type of work 
and kind of 
space
Purpose Actions Description
Land use 
mapping of all 
common and 
public lands in 
the ward
(lakes, wooded 
groves, tanks, 
ponds, water 
channels, 
rivers, school 
and so on)
Protection 
of common/
public land 
Data collection
Monitoring
Regular survey of all common and 
public lands 
Tracing boundaries using GPS 
points and marking land use 
features (for example lake inlets 
and outlets) 
Mapping of 
stormwater 
drains
Water 
conservation
Collecting data
Monitoring
Mapping all the stormwater 
drains using GPS and ensuring 
that they are maintained and not 
encroached upon.
Tree census 
of all trees 
in the ward 
(including trees 
on private 
property)
Biodiversity 
mapping for 
protection of 
greenery
Collecting data
Monitoring 
Collecting details of each trees in 
ward: GPS location, species, height, 
DBH
Water quality 
monitoring
Protection of 
water bodies
Collecting data
Monitoring
Collecting water samples from 
lakes, river, ponds, tanks, wells
Climate 
monitoring: 
Heat islands 
and air pollution 
sensors
Climate change Collecting data
Monitoring
Collecting information on  
temperature and air pollution to 
monitor status of environment
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Type of work 
and kind of 
space
Purpose Actions Description
Mapping waste 
dumps and 
stagnant water 
pools
Protecting 
against spread 
of urban 
disease
Data collection
Monitoring
Collecting information on waste 
sites and water pools to ensure 
that they are addressed to control 
disease
Social 
interviews with 
local residents 
and users of 
commons/
public lands
Information 
to understand 
continued and 
changed use 
environmental 
resources
Data collection
Monitoring
Interviews with those who use 
commons and public lands for 
livelihood and subsistence use. 
To monitor changes to use and 
understand causes. To provide 
information that can be used at 
time of rejuvenation works , for 
example, that of lakes to ensure all 
views and uses are included
Data entry Knowledge 
centre
Updating data collected in ward 
from surveys and mapping 
Appendix C -
Calculation of the programme budget
Scheme 1 :  Household
Population (2018)
Urban (35% of total)
Small town (50% of urban)
Households (avg size = 4)
1354
474
237
59.2
Millions
Workers (millions)
Wage per day
Number of days per year
Annual wage
Wage bill (millions)
Total bill (millions)
(labor:non-labour 60:40)
Total bill in lakh crores
% GDP
30
500
100
50,000
1480938
-
-
-
3
500
150
75,000
222141
-
-
-
33
-
-
-
1703078
2838463
2.84
1.7
Category 1 TotalCategory 2
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Working age population (2018)
Small town working age pop (14%)
Labour force (LFPR 75%)
900
126
94.5
Millions
Scheme 2 :  Individual
Workers (millions)
Wage per day
Number of days per year
Annual wage
Wage bill (millions)
Total bill (millions)
(labor:non-labour 60:40)
Total bill in lakh crores
% GDP
47
500
100
50,000
2362500
-
-
-
5
500
150
75,000
354375
-
-
-
52
-
-
-
2716875
4528125
4.53
2.7
Category 1 TotalCategory 2
Sources and Notes: Population figures are taken from World Population 
Prospects 2017, UN DESA (https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/
world-population-prospects-the-2017-revision.html). Category 1 worker pool 
is assumed to be the bottom half of the labourforce based on income data 
obtained from Consumer Pyramids Survey (CMIE). Category 2 worker pool is 
obtained by multiplying the share of higher educated in the urban labourforce 
(25%) with the rate of open unemployment among the higher educated (20%). 
See Section 3.3.2 for explanation.
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Chapter 4
A Universal Basic Services (UBS) programme 
can deliver human capital improvements 
resulting in increased productivity, improve the 
quality of life, reduce indebtedness and create 
a shared sense of the public. It will also create 
a large number of good quality jobs.
Creating Good Jobs Through a Universal
Basic Services Programme
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4. Creating Good Jobs Through A 
Universal Basic Services Programme
Rosa Abraham, Anjana Thampi, Tejas Pande, and Amit Basole
Centre for Sustainable Employment,  Azim Premji University, Bangalore
We would like to thank Anand Shrivastava, Deepti Goel and Krithika Raghavan for their com-
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Executive Summary
1. We propose the creation of a Universal Basic Services 
(UBS) programme that will expand the current public 
system of delivering key services creating millions of 
good jobs in the process.
2. India has experienced several years of high GDP 
growth with improvements in availability of private 
goods and services. However, it has failed to convert 
this growth into a strong system of public goods. 
As malls, mobiles, and motorcycles have flourished, 
streets, schools and sanitation have suffered.
3. Historical experience of industrialised economies 
shows that the transition to a mature democracy 
involves the creation of a strong and shared sense of 
the public. There is an urgent need to expand public 
spending on services that will create an inclusive and 
stable democracy.
4. In this paper, taking the example of two crucial public 
services, health and education, we first show that, 
despite improvements, India currently underperforms 
relative to comparable developing countries in terms 
of public spending as well as outcomes. Out-of-pocket 
spending by households on health and education is 
high, and a leading cause of indebtedness.
5. State-level analyses show considerable heterogeneity 
in spending as well as performance. We identify states 
that have performed relatively well in delivering public 
services given their level of per capita income. We find 
that states with relatively higher public spending on 
health per capita also tend to have lower out-of-pocket 
expenses in private health facilities. We also identify 
states which are providing public education that 
delivers outcomes on par with the private system and 
at a fraction of the cost to the household.
6. On the employment front, we find that a modest 
expansion of the current system, that consists of filling 
vacancies and eliminating shortfall in infrastructure 
in the health and education systems, can create more 
than 2 million jobs, which is around 15 per cent of the 
current workforce in these two sectors.
7. Regularising the employment of anganwadi workers, 
ASHAs, helpers, and other contractual employees in the 
public health and education system can create good 
jobs for another 3 million workers.
8. There have been calls recently to increase the health 
budget from around 1 per cent to 3 per cent of GDP, 
and the education budget from 4 to 6 per cent of GDP. 
Our analysis strongly supports the need to make this 
commitment. It will make enough resources available 
to eliminate existing shortfalls, expand capacity, and 
create decent jobs for millions of workers across the 
education and health spectrum.
9. We analyse the current policy approach to urban 
housing and argue for greater attention to the 
inadequate nature of available housing, rather than 
only its presence or absence. We also argue that there 
has been too much emphasis on ownership, and not 
enough on seeing housing in the holistic context of the 
lives and priorities of the working poor in urban areas.
10. We argue that provisioning of public housing is 
connected to employment in two keys ways: as a direct 
creator of jobs, and as a facilitator of good jobs via ease 
of access to transportation and other essential public 
services.
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4.1 / Why universal basic 
services?
The Indian economy has been on a sustained high 
growth path since the early 2000s and is consistently 
placed among the fastest growing countries in the 
world. It is time to harness this growth towards 
a fundamental transformation of Indian society 
by delivering quality public services to all citizens. 
Universal provisioning of basic services has far-
reaching private and public benefits (Centre for Equity 
Studies 2014). Both historical and contemporary 
evidence from industrialised as well as developing 
countries underline the importance of quality, 
universal, public goods and services in building a 
modern society. The idea of universal basic services 
(UBS) has been gaining visibility in India and elsewhere.1 
In this context we welcome the recent proposals to 
increase public expenditure on education to 6 per cent 
and on healthcare to 3 per cent of GDP.
Using the examples of health, education, and housing, 
we show that there is a strong case to be made to 
expand public spending on all three. We also focus on 
one often under-emphasised benefit of UBS, its job-
creating potential.
A UBS programme will improve the general quality of 
life in India as it would:
• Create a large number of good jobs for people with 
a variety of educational backgrounds as well as 
skills.
• Build a more cohesive society where there is 
greater equality of opportunity for advancement 
and everyone has a stake in effective delivery of 
services.
• Free up private resources for investment in small 
businesses by reducing the burden of out-of-
pocket expenditures on households.
• Support the private sector by improving worker 
productivity. 
Even though comprehensive data are not available, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the last two decades 
of rapid economic growth have seen a dramatic 
divergence between the quality of private and public 
goods. This is a result of underinvestment over the 
decades. India consistently underspends public 
resources on health and education relative to sub-
Saharan African countries, Brazil, Russia, China and 
South Africa (BRICS countries), as well as some of 
its South Asian neighbours. Public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP has stagnated in the case of health 
and even declined a little in the case of education after 
the year 2000. The out-of-pocket expenditure on these 
essentials is therefore higher in India than in many 
other countries of the world, many of which are poorer 
or have grown slower. There is also a problem of 
inadequate infrastructure in existing public services. 
The results are clear in terms of poor indicators of 
health, nutrition and education, and poorly-staffed 
public health facilities and schools. This is also revealed 
by migration to the private system by those who can 
afford to exit the public system. This compounds the 
problem of quality in the public sector as the ones 
with the least resources are largely the users of public 
services. The UBS approach sees the solution in a 
universalising of public services, thereby creating a 
stake for everyone in the same public system. 
Restoring as well as creating much-needed public 
goods for India’s future must be made our priority. 
One overlooked aspect of such an expansion of public 
service provisioning is that it can generate a large 
number of good quality jobs requiring a range of 
skills and education levels. Many of them are hard to 
mechanise, which resonates well with our comparative 
advantage of being a labour abundant country. They 
are also hard to substitute with imports and tend 
to employ domestic workers. But they do need a 
big commitment of fiscal resources. We cannot pay 
anganwadi workers a regular government wage or 
hire the teachers and doctors we need, without 
spending public money. However, if we do spend, 
then we will be repaid many times over, not only due 
to increased demand and multiplier effects, but also 
because such investments will increase productivity, 
and more importantly, the quality of life in India’s 
villages and cities. 
While a UBS programme can, and should cover 
many services, in this document we examine three – 
healthcare, education, and housing. Further work will 
deal with other crucial services. 
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4.2 /  Health
Healthcare has entered the discourse in the run-up to 
the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, with health manifestos 
released by members of Reclaiming the Republic, 
Jan Swasthya Abhiyan, Alliance of Doctors for Ethical 
Healthcare and Vikalp Sangam. Political parties also 
appear to be taking it seriously.2 The momentum on 
increasing public healthcare could be in response to 
the demands of the electorate – a recent cross-country 
survey revealed that after jobs, better healthcare 
facilities was the most important priority of voters 
(Association for Democratic Reforms 2018).
The healthcare sector is rife with market failures 
and often necessitates serious state intervention, 
not only for reasons of equity but also for reasons 
of efficiency. Over 50 years ago, Nobel laureate 
Kenneth Arrow pointed to many features of the 
sector such as lack of adequate information about the 
service being purchased and asymmetry of interests 
between healthcare providers and patients which 
led to catastrophic private market failures. In India, 
the proliferation of privately delivered healthcare 
has resulted in many cases of malpractice, over-
prescription of drugs, and unnecessary procedures 
(Gadre and Shukla 2016, Dongre and Surana 2018).
Public health also features a strong public goods 
component. As every economics students learns in 
microeconomic theory – public goods (goods that 
are non-rival and non-excludable) – are usually 
underprovided by the private sector. The public good 
features of healthcare are many: infectious diseases 
can affect more people than the immediate patient, 
and therefore, controlling them has benefits both in 
the vicinity and perhaps even globally (for example, 
the eradication of polio or smallpox); sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures that protect individuals have 
benefits beyond the individual; information about best 
practices in maintaining health spill over to others at no 
cost; and so on. As a result, there is a strong case to be 
made for public funding and provisioning of healthcare. 
A UBS programme would expand and improve the 
public provisioning of essential services, among which 
health is a clear priority. With inadequate health 
infrastructure and a poorly regulated private sector, 
India has much to gain from universal healthcare.
We also emphasise that direct provisioning of quality 
public healthcare is preferred to insurance-based 
models such as Ayushman Bharat. The biggest 
improvements in health outcomes across the world 
have come from improving preventive healthcare 
systems (Deaton 2013). However, the current approach 
being followed in India is that of an insurance-based 
model for healthcare. The emphasis on such an 
approach was clear from the launch of Ayushman 
Bharat or National Health Protection Scheme in the 
Union Budget 2018-19, and the increase in its allocation 
to D6,400 crore in the Union Budget 2019-20. The 
scheme entails providing insurance coverage of up to 
D5,00,000 per family per year to 10 crore identified poor 
families for 1300 secondary and tertiary healthcare 
packages, to be funded in a centre–state ratio of 60:40 
in most states. Under the scheme, eligible beneficiaries 
are expected to be able to avail benefits at public and 
empanelled private hospitals.
The scheme excludes primary healthcare, and has 
operated mainly for those who have availed tertiary 
healthcare – 77 per cent of the cases are tertiary care 
as per official government figures. Covering only 40 
per cent of households also excludes many vulnerable 
households: the difference between the monthly 
per capita consumer expenditure of a household at 
the 40th percentile and one at the 80th percentile is 
only around D1000, while the average out-of-pocket 
expenditure from private health facilities is D24,000 
(Smith, Chhabra, and Bhattacharya 2019). The scheme 
does not cover drugs or out-patient care, which are the 
main components of total out-of-pocket expenditure 
that is itself at least 20 times higher than the allotted 
budget under the scheme (Smith, Chhabra, and 
Bhattacharya 2019).
There is also evidence against the model from its 
predecessor Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana and state 
health insurance schemes. Nearly one in five of the 
poorest households spent more on health than their 
annual per capita consumption expenditure, and 80 
per cent of them were not under any insurance cover 
(Bhattacharya and Rathore 2018). In the lowest quartile 
of the population, nearly 40 per cent of those who died 
did not receive any medical attention before death, 
likely due to lack of access to public health facilities and 
insufficient coverage of health insurance (Bhattacharya 
and Rathore 2018). There could be extra charges levied 
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on them if the health facility has a monopoly in the 
district. There are also cases where the insured have 
been denied access or charged more than warranted 
(Das, Aiyar and Hammer 2018).
4.2.1 / Indian health spending 
and performance in global 
perspective
India currently spends only around 1 per cent of its 
GDP on public health expenditure, and has done so 
since 2000. India underspends on health even after 
accounting for its level of per capita GDP (Figure 
4.1). We examine India’s public health expenditure 
in comparison to a cohort of developing countries 
that are similar in various respects such as per capita 
GDP, population density and population size. We also 
examine India’s performance relative to some countries 
from the BRICS group. The country cohort comprises 
Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
and Vietnam. Figure 4.2 shows government health 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP for all cohort 
countries sorted by increasing order of per capita GDP 
(given below the country code). India fares poorly not 
just in comparison to richer countries such as China 
and Brazil, but also when compared to some poorer 
countries. The per capita GDP of Ethiopia is only around 
one-fourth that of India, but the former still manages to 
spend a roughly equivalent 1.1 per cent of its GDP on 
healthcare. Vietnam, at the same per capita GDP level 
as India, spends 2.4 per cent of its GDP on healthcare.
   
Figure 4.1 :  
Public 
expenditure 
on health as 
percentage of 
GDP, 2015
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank. See https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/content/
codes/country_codes.htm for country codes. Only countries with GDP per capita < $50,000. See https://wits.worldbank.org/
wits/wits/witshelp/content/codes/country_codes.htm for country codes
Figure 4.2 : 
Public health 
expenditure 
as percentage 
of GDP for 
selected 
countries, 
2015
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
ETH – Ethiopia, BGD – Bangladesh, PAK – Pakistan, MMR – Myanmar, VNM – Vietnam, NGA – Nigeria, IND – India, PHL – 
Philippines, IDN – Indonesia, LKA – Sri Lanka, CHN – China, BRA – Brazil
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As a result of this low level of public health spending, 
out-of-pocket expenditures on this essential service 
are higher in India than in many other countries of the 
world. As one might expect, with richer countries having 
better public healthcare, out-of-pocket expenditures 
by households as a percentage of total spending on 
health tend to fall with per capita GDP. However, the 
variation among poorer countries is much larger (see 
Figure 4.3), suggesting that some poor countries do a 
much better job of meeting healthcare needs publicly 
than others. At 65 per cent, India is a clear outlier on 
the high side. Out-of-pocket health expenditure in India 
is close to that in Pakistan, 20 percentage points higher 
than in Vietnam and almost 30 percentage points 
higher than in Ethiopia (Figure 4.4). India is among the 
top 10 countries in the world in this respect. This is also 
a matter of concern because high out-of-pocket health 
expenditures are an important reason for indebtedness 
in the country (Smith, Chhabra and Bhattacharya 2019). 
India underperforms relative to some comparable 
developing countries not only in terms of public 
spending on health, but also when it comes to health 
outcomes. We look at three different outcomes: life 
expectancy (Figure 4.5), infant mortality (Figure 4.6) 
and under-five mortality rates (Figure 4.7). Once again, 
Vietnam – which spends more than double the share 
of GDP on public healthcare that India does, and has 
a comparable per capita GDP – performs better on 
all three outcome indicators. Vietnam’s outcomes are 
comparable to richer countries such as Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Thus it appears that, following the 
example of other east Asian economies like China and 
South Korea, Vietnam has reaped the benefits of strong 
public investment in health.3 
Figure 4.3: 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure 
by households 
as percentage 
of total health 
expenditure, 
2015
Figure 4.4: 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure 
by households 
as percentage 
of total health 
expenditure 
for selected 
countries, 2015
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank. See https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/content/
codes/country_codes.htm for country codes
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
ETH – Ethiopia, BGD – Bangladesh, PAK – Pakistan, MMR – Myanmar, VNM – Vietnam, NGA – Nigeria, IND – India, PHL – 
Philippines, IDN – Indonesia, LKA – Sri Lanka, CHN – China, BRA – Brazil
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Figure 4.5: 
Life 
expectancy 
in selected 
countries, 2015
Figure 4.6: 
Infant 
mortality rate 
in selected 
countries, 
2015
Figure 4.7: 
Under-five 
mortality rate 
in selected 
countries, 2015
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
ETH – Ethiopia, BGD – Bangladesh, PAK – Pakistan, MMR – Myanmar, VNM – Vietnam, NGA – Nigeria, IND – India, PHL – 
Philippines, IDN – Indonesia, LKA – Sri Lanka, CHN – China, BRA – Brazil
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
ETH – Ethiopia, BGD – Bangladesh, PAK – Pakistan, MMR – Myanmar, VNM – Vietnam, NGA – Nigeria, IND – India, PHL – 
Philippines, IDN – Indonesia, LKA – Sri Lanka, CHN – China, BRA – Brazil
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
ETH – Ethiopia, BGD – Bangladesh, PAK – Pakistan, MMR – Myanmar, VNM – Vietnam, NGA – Nigeria, IND – India, PHL – 
Philippines, IDN – Indonesia, LKA – Sri Lanka, CHN – China, BRA – Brazil
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4.2.2 / A state-level analysis of 
health spending and outcomes
The foregoing analysis shows that current proposals 
to increase public health spending in India to around 
3 per cent of GDP are eminently reasonable given 
international standards. However, a commonly heard 
criticism of expanding public healthcare is that the 
existing system is inefficient. To the extent that these 
inefficiencies are due to lack of funding, the criticism 
only begs the question: why not a better funded 
system? But it is also possible that quite independent 
of resource constraints, the public sector is worse at 
delivering quality healthcare than the private sector. 
State level evidence, however, belies this claim. 
We can use the diversity across states in levels of per 
capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP), institutional 
capacity, health expenditure and outcomes to explore 
the effectiveness of the public health system.4 Further, 
because health is a state subject, states have a key role 
in determining health outcomes. Investigating inter-
state variations allows us to identify states that may 
be better performing, given their level of per capita 
income, as potential models.
Per capita public spending on health varies by more 
than 10 times across states, from around D500 per 
person in Bihar to D5800 per person in Mizoram (Table 
4.1). One determinant of public health spending is, of 
course, the size of the state’s economy. Interestingly, 
however, even states with similar levels of per 
capita NSDP have very different levels of public 
health spending per person (Figure 4.8). With lower 
populations, the north-eastern states generally have 
the highest per capita public spending on health. 
Bihar 
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Odisha
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Haryana
Karnataka
Punjab
Gujarat
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Chhattisgarh
Rajasthan
Kerala
Assam
Uttarakhand
Delhi
Manipur
Tripura
Meghalaya
Jammu & Kashmir
Nagaland
Himachal Pradesh
Goa
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Mizoram
491
716
733
778
866
927
1011
1013
1119
1124
1173
1189
1235
1322
1354
1360
1463
1546
1765
1992
2061
2183
2223
2359
2450
2667
3643
5126
5177
5862
State Expenditure (D)
Table 4.1: Per capita public spending on health by state, 
2015-16 (D)
Sources and notes: CBHI (2018)
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Figure 4.8: 
Per capita Net 
State Domestic 
Product and 
per capita 
public health 
expenditure,
2015-16
Sources and notes: CBHI (2018), Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation. Outlier states – Arunachal Pradesh, 
Goa, Mizoram and Sikkim – have been excluded. Refer List of State codes Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
However, even some larger, populous but poorer states 
have relatively high public health spending per person. 
For example, Chhattisgarh has a per capita NSDP half 
that of Haryana and Gujarat, but spends D1354 per 
person compared to D1119 for Haryana and D1189 for 
Gujarat. This is important since states with relatively 
higher public spending per capita also tend to have 
lower out-of-pocket expenses in private health facilities 
(Figure 4.9 and Table A4.1).
Figure 4.9: 
Per capita 
public health 
expenditure 
(2015-16) 
and out-of-
pocket health 
expenditure 
(2014) from 
private 
facilities
Sources and notes: NSS 2014b, CBHI 2018. Per capita public health expenditure is for 2015-16. Out of pocket expenditure is 
for 2014. Outlier states – Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and Sikkim – have been excluded. Refer list of state codes. 
Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
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The level of per capita public spending can indicate 
a state government’s priorities, but spending needs 
to be placed in the context of outcomes for a fuller 
picture. We find that in a sample of 25 states, increasing 
public spending by D100 per capita is associated with 
a reduced under-five mortality rate by nearly 1 per 
1000. This association of increased public spending per 
person with decreased under-five mortality persists 
and is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, 
even after controlling for per capita NSDP, though it 
reduces to 0.8 per thousand. 
In general, the relationship between per capita NSDP 
and health outcomes can help identify states that 
perform better than the national average even with a 
per capita NSDP that is lower than the national average. 
We look at infant mortality rate (Figure 4.10), under-five 
mortality rate (Figure 4.11), and immunisation rates 
(Figure 4.12). As one might expect, richer states tend to 
have power mortality rates and higher immunisation 
rates. Of greater interest are those states which are 
poorer than the national average but still perform 
better than average on outcomes. In Figures 4.10 
and 4.11, states that fall below the national average 
in infant or under-five mortality as well as below the 
per-capita average income will appear in the lower left 
quadrant. We see that large poor states such as Odisha 
and West Bengal perform relatively well in outcomes in 
spite of having lower than average per capita incomes. 
In Odisha, the outcomes could be a result of the revival 
in recent years of the Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) in the state, which provides health, 
nutrition and growth monitoring services to young 
children, pregnant women and lactating mothers 
(Khera 2015). By 2015-16, this state had the highest 
coverage of ICDS services (International Institute for 
Population Sciences and ICF, 2017). Odisha also has 
among the highest number of government health 
personnel per 1,00,000 population (NITI Aayog 2018).
More than two-thirds of the worst performing districts 
in terms of health outcomes are in the states of Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand. Districts with higher 
health deficits tend to have higher proportions of 
their population not using government health facilities 
and lower proportions of women with at least four 
antenatal visits before delivery (Bhattacharya and Jha 
2018). This could be due to either absence of facilities 
or staff or poor quality. Meanwhile, Kerala has the 
lowest under-five and maternal mortality rates and the 
highest number of government health personnel per 
1,00,000 population (NITI Aayog 2018). The superior 
health indicators in Kerala are linked to its history of 
public provisioning of well-functioning health services 
(Bardhan 1974, Ramachandran 1997). 
While no one state may appear as a model to be 
emulated along all dimensions, what is clear from the 
foregoing evidence is that there are benefits from 
expanding public healthcare facilities, and improving 
Figure 4.10:
Infant 
mortality rate 
and per capita 
NSDP, 2015-16
Sources and notes: NFHS-4 2015-16, EPWRF. Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
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Figure 4.11: 
Under-five 
mortality rates 
and per capita 
NSDP, 2015-16
Sources and notes: NFHS-4 2015-16, EPWRF. Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
Figure 4.12: 
Immunisation 
rates and per 
capita NSDP, 
2015-16
Sources and notes: NFHS-4 2015-16, EPWRF. Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
83
the number of vacant positions, calculated as the 
difference between sanctioned and actual positions in 
sub-centres, PHCs and CHCs. These positions include 
health workers (male and female) at sub-centres and 
PHCs; auxiliary nurse mid-wives at sub-centres and 
PHCs; health assistants (male and female), doctors and 
block extension educators at PHCs; pharmacists, 
laboratory technicians, nursing staff at PHCs and 
CHCs; specialists, general duty medical officers and 
radiographers at CHCs.
Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan have the highest number 
of vacant positions (at more than 15000 each) as well 
as the highest shortfall against the required personnel. 
In percentage terms, Bihar and Himachal Pradesh 
have the highest figures of vacant against sanctioned 
positions and shortfall against required personnel. All 
in all, if existing vacant positions were to be filled, 0.12 
million people would get jobs, and if the entire shortfall 
in personnel was to be taken care of, another 0.20 
million people would get jobs. It needs to be noted that 
these figures are only for the rural healthcare system, 
and therefore underestimate the number of jobs that 
would be created in the expansion of the public health 
system countrywide.
4.2.3.2 / Shortfall in rural health 
facilities
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 give the shortfalls in sub-centres, 
PHCs and CHCs, and the potential expansion in 
employment opportunities if these were to be bridged. 
There are two types of sub-centres and PHCs, Type 
A and Type B. Type B is required to be in place if the 
average number of patients is higher than prescribed, 
and it therefore requires more personnel. The Indian 
Public Health Standards (Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare 2012a, 2012b, 2012c) give the essential and 
desirable requirements in personnel for the three types 
of facilities. The expansion in employment by setting up 
new facilities is estimated using these requirements. By 
taking care of the shortfall in sub-centres, between 0.10 
million to 0.17 million people would get jobs. Similarly, 
83000 to 0.13 million people would get jobs in new 
PHCs and around 0.1 million people would get jobs 
in new CHCs. In total, between 0.29 million and 0.42 
million jobs could be generated if the shortfall in health 
facilities were to be bridged (Table 4.6).
their accessibility and quality to cater to the health 
needs of all citizens. And that public healthcare can be 
delivered effectively even in relatively poor states, if 
there is political will.
4.2.3 / Scope for employment 
generation
Apart from the intrinsic value of universally providing 
for basic needs and creating systems in which 
every citizen has a stake, UBS has the advantage 
of contributing to the creation of more decent 
employment opportunities in the country. As 
mentioned earlier, jobs thus created often have a 
care component and are thus relatively immune to 
mechanisation. Further, they tend to employ 
domestic workers.
Expanding and improving the provision of health 
facilities would increase employment by filling the 
existing vacant seats and/or shortfall in personnel 
in sub-centres, primary health centres (PHC) and 
community health centres (CHC). Universal provisioning 
of health services would also include covering up the 
shortfall in health infrastructure, and this would involve 
employing additional personnel in the new facilities.
A few important caveats are in order here. First, while 
there are several estimates of shortfall to be found 
in the press, we take a conservative approach and 
only present numbers that are provided by existing 
official reports. Second, the absence of statistics for 
urban India prevents us from estimating employment 
generation at the national level, so we present figures 
for the rural sector only. For both these reasons, our 
estimates of jobs created should be considered as a 
lower bound.
4.2.3.1 / Shortfall and vacancies in rural 
health personnel
Rural Health Statistics 2016-17 provide state-level 
information on the number of required and sanctioned 
positions in the public healthcare system, as well as 
the existing number of personnel. Table 4.2 shows the 
shortfall in health personnel in rural areas, calculated 
as the difference between required positions and actual 
positions in the rural health system. It also shows 
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Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttarakhand
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
A & N Islands
Chandigarh
D & N Haveli
Daman & Diu
Delhi
Lakshadweep
Puducherry
All-India
25647
2507
18552
35291
18233
652
32990
9308
9178
11569
12407
38159
19951
30907
38898
1675
2013
1265
1968
27516
11038
51471
490
32348
16013
2919
6333
77897
32022
456
83
233
108
55
98
498
570748
7094
1030
4043
17983
3279
222
5711
2352
4884
3589
4506
14112
4633
7952
10434
194
408
124
395
10032
2114
21429
130
11853
4267
859
3023
36017
11746
118
18
37
25
16
19
140
194788
27.66
41.08
21.79
50.96
17.98
34.05
17.31
25.27
53.21
31.02
36.32
36.98
23.22
25.73
26.82
11.58
20.27
9.80
20.07
36.46
19.15
41.63
26.53
36.64
26.65
29.43
47.73
46.24
36.68
25.88
21.69
15.88
23.15
29.09
19.39
28.11
34.13
31345
0
14581
9529
19282
667
34414
12195
7289
12398
10956
34396
20446
34163
42316
2766
2273
1909
1085
18171
14385
49601
390
34747
20060
1050
4193
63400
46774
782
117
91
107
97
172
481
546628
6590
0
443
3882
3927
83
6097
2897
2793
2083
2963
9486
0
8832
12116
430
77
683
34
2535
2693
15031
96
6898
4080
0
877
16888
12525
46
0
7
9
14
0
6
122934
21.02
0.00
3.04
40.74
20.37
12.44
17.72
23.76
38.32
16.80
27.04
27.58
0.00
25.85
28.63
15.55
3.39
35.78
3.13
13.95
18.72
30.30
24.62
19.85
20.34
0.00
20.92
26.64
26.78
5.88
0.00
7.69
8.41
14.43
0.00
1.25
22.49
State/UT Required
Table 4.2: Total shortfall in personnel and vacant positions in rural health system
Shortfall 
(Required - 
Actual)
Shortfall 
as % of 
Required
Sanctioned
Vacant 
(Sanctioned 
– Actual1)
Vacant 
as % of 
Sanctioned
Sources and notes: Rural Health Statistics, 2016-17
1. These positions include health workers, ANMs, health assistants, doctors, block extension educators, pharmacists, laboratory technicians, nursing 
staff, specialists, general duty medical officers and radiographers.
2. Sanctioned and vacant positions include two additional positions, general duty medical officers and block extension educators, for which informa-
tion on the number of required personnel and shortfall are not available. This explains the difference in the actual positions between these two sets, 
named Actual and Actual1.
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Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttarakhand
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
A & N Islands
Chandigarh
D & N Haveli
Daman & Diu
Delhi
Lakshadweep
Puducherry
All-India
0
6
1229
8688
0
0
0
712
0
0
2212
0
0
3223
2932
88
323
0
59
1505
518
0
0
0
0
0
0
10679
2714
0
0
0
0
73
0
0
34946
0
1.89
21.01
46.62
0
0
0
21.57
0
0
36.50
0
0
25.96
21.70
17.29
42.56
0
12.97
18.37
14.94
0
0
0
0
0
0
34.23
20.74
0
0
0
0
87.95
0
0
19.50
0
18
3687
26064
0
0
0
2136
0
0
6636
0
0
9669
8796
264
969
0
177
4515
1554
0
0
0
0
0
0
32037
8142
0
0
0
0
219
0
0
104838
0
24
4916
34752
0
0
0
2848
0
0
8848
0
0
12892
11728
352
1292
0
236
6020
2072
0
0
0
0
0
0
42716
10856
0
0
0
0
292
0
0
139784
0
24
4916
34752
0
0
0
2848
0
0
8848
0
0
12892
11728
352
1292
0
236
6020
2072
0
0
0
0
0
0
42716
10856
0
0
0
0
292
0
0
139784
0
30
6145
43440
0
0
0
3560
0
0
11060
0
0
16115
14660
440
1615
0
295
7525
2590
0
0
0
0
0
0
53395
13570
0
0
0
0
365
0
0
174730
State/UT Shortfall
Table 4.3: Shortfall in sub-centres and estimated employment through new sub-centres
% Shortfall
Type A
Essential Desirable Essential Desirable
Type B
Sources and notes : Rural Health Statistics, 2016-17
Personnel calculated on the basis of essential and desirable requirements specified for each sub-centre in Indian Public Health Standards (2012c)
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Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttarakhand
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
A & N Islands
Chandigarh
D & N Haveli
Daman & Diu
Delhi
Lakshadweep
Puducherry
All-India
50
0
0
1200
0
0
0
814
0
0
669
0
0
818
387
0
0
0
0
35
146
0
0
0
79
16
0
1573
1239
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
6409
4.18
0
0
38.72
0
0
0
33.45
0
0
69.25
0
0
41.13
17.58
0
4.39
0
0
2.66
25.26
0
0
0
10.29
14.68
0
30.28
57.55
0
0
0
0
61.54
0
0
21.85
650
0
0
15600
0
0
0
2392
0
0
8697
0
0
10634
5031
0
65
0
0
455
1898
0
0
0
1027
208
0
20449
16107
0
0
0
0
104
0
0
83317
900
0
0
21600
0
0
0
3312
0
0
12042
0
0
14724
6966
0
90
0
0
630
2628
0
0
0
1422
288
0
28314
22302
0
0
0
0
144
0
0
115362
700
0
0
16800
0
0
0
2576
0
0
9366
0
0
11452
5418
0
70
0
0
490
2044
0
0
0
1106
224
0
22022
17346
0
0
0
0
112
0
0
89726
1050
0
0
25200
0
0
0
3864
0
0
14049
0
0
17178
8127
0
105
0
0
735
3066
0
0
0
1659
336
0
33033
26019
0
0
0
0
168
0
0
134589
State/UT Shortfall
Table 4.4: Shortfall in primary health centres (PHCs) and estimated employment through new PHCs
% Shortfall
Type A
Essential Desirable Essential Desirable
Type B
Sources and notes: Rural Health Statistics, 2016-17
Personnel calculated on the basis of essential and desirable requirements specified for each PHC in Indian Public Health Standards (2012b)
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Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttarakhand
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
A & N Islands
Chandigarh
D & N Haveli
Daman & Diu
Delhi
Lakshadweep
Puducherry
All-India
106
0
80
624
24
0
0
25
0
0
53
120
0
188
190
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
78
6
0
476
189
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
2168
35.45
0
33.61
80.62
12.44
0
0
18.25
0
0
21.99
36.81
0
37.83
34.55
15.00
3.57
0
0
0
0
0
50
0
40.63
22.22
0
36.67
35.13
0
0
0
0
100.00
0
0
29.61
4876
0
3680
28704
1104
0
0
1150
0
0
2438
5520
0
8648
8740
138
46
0
0
0
0
0
92
0
3588
276
0
21896
8694
0
0
0
0
138
0
0
99728
5512
0
4160
32448
1248
0
0
1300
0
0
2756
6240
0
9776
9880
156
52
0
0
0
0
0
104
0
4056
312
0
24752
9828
0
0
0
0
156
0
0
112736
State/UT Shortfall % Shortfall Essential Desirable
Table 4.5: Shortfall in community health centres (CHCs) and estimated employment through new CHCs
Sources and notes : Rural Health Statistics, 2016-17
Personnel calculated on the basis of essential and desirable requirements specified for each CHC in Indian Public Health Standards (2012a)
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Table 4.6: Total requirements for health personnel in 
potential sub-centres, PHCs and CHCs
367882
422055
Essential Desirable
Type A
Type B
287883
329238
4.2.3.3. / Shortfall in physicians
In the earlier section, employment generation was 
estimated using the Indian Public Health Standards. 
For comparison across countries, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) uses a standard of one physician 
per 1000 population. As per the National Health Profile 
2018, the total number of registered allopathic doctors 
in India is 10,41,395. According to media reports, 80 
per cent of these doctors are actually available, giving 
a doctor-population ratio of 0.62:1000.5 Eliminating the 
shortfall vis-à-vis WHO standards via public recruitment 
would employ an additional 0.5 million physicians. It 
needs to be noted that this includes rural and urban 
areas, so that some of the additional employment 
would already have been covered in the earlier 
calculations in section 4.2.3.1. To put this number in 
perspective, note that this required addition to the 
number of physicians across the country constitutes 
around 10 per cent of the existing workforce in the 
health sector.
4.2.4 / Regularising existing 
employees
No discussion of jobs in healthcare (and education) 
can be complete without discussing a long-standing 
demand of activists and workers to regularise the 
employment of Accredited Social Health Activists 
6(ASHA) and anganwadi workers. There are around 
1.03 million ASHA workers (Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare 2018), 1.2 million anganwadi workers 
and 1 million helpers in rural and urban areas. In 
September 2018, the honorarium for these workers 
was increased by at least 50. Anganwadi workers are 
now to get D 4500 or D 3500 per month (depending on 
their earlier pay), anganwadi helpers are to get D2500 
per month, and the incentive amount for ASHA workers 
was increased to D2000 per month (Financial Express 
2018). However, these amounts are still far below what 
they would earn as regular government employees.
These workers form the frontline of public health 
service delivery across the country. Strengthening 
this system would pay itself many times over in the 
form of increased motivation and quality of service 
provisioning, dignity and respect for these (mostly 
women) workers, and increase in mass demand due to 
higher wages.
4.2.5 Summing up
To sum up, India needs to more than double its 
overall public spending on healthcare to catch up to 
comparable developing countries. This will be money 
well-spent because international as well as state-level 
evidence indicates a strong relationship between more 
public spending and better health outcomes as well as 
lower out-of-pocket expenses. 
Further, a large number of decent work opportunities 
will be created in the process. If the vacant positions 
as well as shortfall in personnel and in health 
infrastructure are filled, between 0.41 million and 0.62 
million jobs could be generated (Table 4.7). To put 
these numbers in perspective, this constitutes around 
8 to 12 per cent of the existing workforce in the health 
sector, and around 4.5 to 7 per cent of the unemployed 
who are at least graduates.
Sources and notes: Calculated from personnel requirements in Indian 
Public Health Standards. 
Table 4.7 : Requirements for health personnel if 
shortfall in personnel and shortfall in facilities are 
covered
Requirement Vacant
Type A
410817
Sources and notes : Calculated from Tables 4.2 and 4.6
Facility
Desirable
Essential
Shortfall
Type B
Desirable
Essential
490816
452172
544989
482671
562670
524026
616843
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Universalising public provisioning of healthcare could 
therefore take care of two of the most important 
priorities of the electorate – jobs and healthcare 
(Association for Democratic Reforms 2018). The 
National Health Policy (NHP) 2015 draft proposed 
enacting a National Health Rights Act which would 
recognise health to be a fundamental right, and 
therefore denial of this right would be justiciable. 
However, the final NHP 2017 diluted this proposal to 
an aspirational goal for the future. With the substantial 
progress to be made in improving health outcomes and 
citizens marking it as one of their major priorities, it is 
time to recognise health as a legally enforceable right 
creating millions of decent jobs in the process.
4.3 / Education
Education has an instrumental value, improving health, 
expanding opportunities and labour productivity 
and hence earnings. It has multiple neighbourhood 
benefits, enabling greater democratic participation 
and transforming of societies. Besides this, the 
attainment of learning has an intrinsic value in itself, 
being transformative and emancipatory. Given its far-
reaching benefits and the need to ensure affordable 
and accessible education, it is imperative that the State 
be actively involved in its provisioning. An affordable 
common schooling system, besides making schooling 
accessible to all, can also contribute to building a 
cohesive and equal society. 
With the passing of the Right to Education (RTE) Act 
in 2009, education was confirmed as a fundamental 
right of every child, committing the State to ensuring 
free and compulsory education for children between 
the ages of 6 to 14 years. The State’s commitment to 
providing accessible education is not restricted to the 
primary, and needs to extend to the secondary and 
tertiary levels. The public sector has also played a 
crucial role in higher education. Historically, some of 
India’s best colleges and universities have been public 
and this continues to be the case. Going beyond the 
elite public universities, higher education at a mass-
level has been attainable because of the vast state 
university system.  
Extending public educational opportunities to all 
implies hiring an adequate number of teachers and 
other professionals, as well as building adequate 
infrastructure. This can generate valuable work 
opportunities as well. 
In this section, as in the previous one, we argue that 
India currently underspends public resources on 
this vital service, compared to other countries with 
similar levels of income. Within India, we show that 
there are examples of states that have been able to 
provide public schooling at a reasonable cost without 
compromising on quality of the teaching imparted. 
4.3.1 / Indian educational 
spending and performance in 
global perspective
In India, the government (Centre and State, and across 
all levels of education) spends around 4 per cent of 
GDP on education. As early as 1966, the Report of the 
Education Commission (also known as the Kothari 
Commission) recommended an increase in educational 
expenditure to 6 per cent of national income. This 
demand continues to be reiterated even today both 
within the current government7 and outside.8 However, 
even with the implementation of the RTE in 2010, 
there has been no substantial change in the allocation 
towards education (Figure 4.13). 
Globally, unlike health, where India is below average, 
for education, India’s spending is very close to the 
global average given its level of per capita GDP (Figure 
4.14). But there is still room for improvement given 
that there are many countries with a per capita GDP 
very close to that of India, who spend 6 per cent or 
even more of their GDP on education.  As in the earlier 
section, we compare India’s spending on education 
with a cohort of countries that are similar in terms of 
per capita GDP, population size and population density. 
The cohort comprises Bangladesh, Brazil, China, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam to which 
we add Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Nepal, and Uganda for 
comparison with educational statistics from the World 
Development Report 2018.9
In 2013, India spent just a bit less than 4 per cent of 
GDP on education. Vietnam, with a similar GDP per 
capita, spent 5.6 per cent and countries like Ghana and 
Kenya, which have comparatively lower levels of GDP 
per capita, spent a far greater share  (Figure 4.15).
90
Figure 4.13: 
Trends in 
Government 
Expenditure 
on Education, 
India
Source and notes : Education expenditure data from Analysis of Budget Expenditure (ABE) 2012-2015, GDP data from 1999 
to 2013 from National Statistical Commission; 2014 and 2015 estimates from NSSO. Base year – 2011-12.
Figure 4.14: 
Public 
Expenditure 
on Education 
(as % of GDP) 
against GDP 
per capita, 
2013
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Countries with GDP per capita < $50,000. See https://wits.
worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/content/codes/country_codes.htm for country codes
Figure 4.15: 
Expenditure 
on Education 
(as % of GDP) 
across similar 
countries, 2013
Sources and notes: World Development Indicators, World Bank
1. Labels on X-axis represent country code and GDP per capita.  2. Bars ordered by increasing GDP per capita.
3. MWI – Malawi, UGA- Uganda, NPL –Nepal, KEN – Kenya, BGD – Bangladesh, GHA – Ghana, PAK – Pakistan, 
VNM – Vietnam, IND – India, IDN – Indonesia, LKA – Sri Lanka, BRA – Brazil. 
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In the last two decades, the highest government 
expenditure on education as a share of GDP was 
4.4 per cent in 2000 even as other developing 
countries have either gradually increased education 
expenditure over time (Nepal, Indonesia) and/or spent 
a considerably higher share than India (Brazil, Malawi).
As with health, spending is only half the story, 
outcomes matter as much. Educational achievements 
or outcomes may be measured on the basis of 
enrolment rates, literacy rates, and drop-out rates as 
well as in terms of quality using indicators capturing 
basic learning such as students’ performance and 
comprehension skills.  
Despite low and stagnant levels of expenditure on 
education, India’s literacy rates have steadily risen 
over the years, increasing from 18.3 per cent in 1951 
to 72.1 per cent in 2011, according to Census reports. 
Enrolment rates have also risen and gross primary 
enrolment rate was 84 per cent in 2016-17 (NIEPA 
2018). In 2014, nearly 93 per cent of rural households 
had a primary school within one kilometre of their 
house (NSS 2014). Therefore, in terms of coverage 
and reach, educational outcomes, particularly at the 
primary level, have improved gradually over the years. 
When placed in the context of other developing 
countries, however, India’s performance leaves 
something to be desired. In 2011, less than 70 per cent 
of the adult population were literate, while in Sri Lanka 
and Vietnam, more than 90 per cent of adults were 
literate. In 1960, adult literacy rate in India was 28 per 
cent compared to 9 per cent in Nepal. By 2010, adult 
literacy rate in India and Nepal were almost equal at 
around 60 per cent. Similarly, in 1980, youth female 
literacy in India was around 40 per cent. In 30 years, 
this increased to 74 per cent. During the same period, 
Bangladesh was able to increase its youth female 
literacy from a much lower initial level of 27 per cent to 
74 per cent (Rathore and Das 2018). Finally, in India, the 
net enrolment rate in lower secondary (Classes 9 and 
10)10 in 2013 was only 66 per cent compared to 93 per 
cent and 90 per cent in Sri Lanka and Vietnam. 
Despite the near-universal enrolment at the primary 
level, the quality of education leaves much to be 
desired. As per the 2018 World Development Report, in 
2017, almost 90 per cent of Grade 2 students in rural 
India could not read a single word of a short text, and 
more than 80 per cent failed to perform basic two-digit 
subtraction.11 Nepal, despite a lower per capita GDP, 
had a similar government expenditure on education 
to GDP ratio as India, and achieved far better learning 
outcomes. Several other sub-Saharan African countries 
such as Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya, despite 
being poorer than India, have shown better learning 
outcomes (World Bank 2018). 
In summary, international comparisons, with the 
earlier-mentioned caveat on accounting for institutional 
differences, show that India can afford to spend much 
more on education and also do much more to improve 
the quality of public education.
4.3.2 /  A state-level analysis 
of educational spending and 
outcomes
In 1976, education was moved to the Concurrent 
list of subjects, and the allocation of resources and 
expenditure became a shared responsibility of the 
Centre and states. The Centre devolves a certain share 
of its revenues to the states and the latter may also 
have their own sources of revenues for 
financing education.
In 2015-16, the total budget provision (revenue 
account) of Education Departments at the Centre and 
states amounted to D4,33,342 crores. Of this, about 80 
per cent was for states and Union Territories. Across 
states, there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
allocation to education. For instance, Bihar allocates 6.8 
per cent of SDP to education, well above the national 
average of 4.1 per cent, and that of other higher income 
states such as Kerala (2.7 per cent), Tamil Nadu (2.1 per 
cent) and Gujarat (1.8 per cent) (MHRD 2016). 
However, expenditure on education as a share of GSDP, 
as a measure, is skewed in favour of lower-income 
states. Poorer states like Bihar and Assam will show 
relatively high shares due to their GSDP being much 
lower in comparison to richer states like Tamil Nadu or 
Maharashtra. The absolute spending per child in these 
latter states will be much higher.
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We look at another indicator of state’s commitment 
to education, i.e. resources allocated by the state 
government on a student enrolled in government or 
government-aided schools. In 2014-15, Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar had amongst the lowest expense per 
enrolled student (D7613 and D9583). Goa spent the 
highest, D67,041 per enrolled student. All southern 
states spent well above the national average of  
D13,974 (Figure A1 in Appendix) (CBGA 2016).
Not surprisingly, states with higher per student 
spending are associated with better learning outcomes 
(Dongre, Kapur, and Teary 2014). We confirm this in 
Figures 4.16 and 4.17. Kerala and Himachal Pradesh 
spent among the highest per student, and also 
performed well above average in learning outcomes in 
English and Math. On the other hand, states like Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Assam spent the 
least per student in public schools, and the learning 
outcomes were among the lowest in the country. West 
Bengal and Orissa are states which have been able to 
achieve relatively high learning outcomes with only 
moderate spending per student. Recall that these two 
states also featured as having better than average 
health outcomes given lower than average NSDP.
Figure 4.16: 
Learning 
outcomes 
(reading) by 
government 
expenditure 
per student
Sources and notes: ASER 2016, CBGA 2016. Public expenditure per student is for 2014-15. ASER learning outcomes are for 2016. 
Public expenditure per student is for 2014-15. ASER learning outcomes are for 2016. Refer Appendix B for list of State codes. 
Figure 4.17: 
Learning 
outcomes 
(mathematics) 
by government 
expenditure 
per student
Sources and notes: ASER 2016, CBGA 2016. Public expenditure per student is for 2014-15. ASER learning outcomes are for 
2016. Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
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Learning outcomes differ significantly between private 
and public schools. On an average, twice the number of 
students in private schools were able to achieve basic 
reading/math comprehension compared to students 
in public schools. But this too varies across states. For 
instance, in states like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh, private schools had four to five times 
more success in achieving basic learning outcomes. In 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Punjab, outcomes were 
broadly similar between private and public schools. 
Notably, in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, public schools 
fared better in reading achievements compared to 
private schools (ASER, 2016). The National Achievement 
Survey (2017) also confirms that these two states 
achieve learning outcomes above the national average. 
This survey includes both rural and urban government 
and government-aided schools, unlike ASER (2016) 
which covers only rural schools. 
But these two states are exceptions and in most 
instances, public schools have failed to provide quality 
education to their students. Dongre et al (2014) show 
public schools in India face a ‘double inefficiency’ 
where the expenditure incurred by the government per 
student in public schools are higher than expenditure 
incurred by private institutions per student, while 
learning outcomes are lower.12 
While private schools show better learning outcomes, 
most poor households cannot afford a private 
education. Out-of-pocket expenditure by households in 
an academic session on a student at primary level was 
D1111 in government institutions compared to D10,623 
in private unaided institutions (NSS 2014). On an 
average, primary education in public schools cost only 
one-tenth of the cost of primary education in private 
schools (Figure 4.18). These differences narrowed 
marginally as the level of education increased, but even 
at higher-secondary education level, private education 
cost three times as much as public education 
(NSS, 2014).13
Taking into account the relative cost of private vs public 
education, how do educational outcomes fare across 
private and public schools? Figure 4.19 compares the 
performance of private schools vis-à-vis public, against 
the relative costs to the household of each. The top left 
quadrant represents states which have relatively small 
differences in what households pay out-of-pocket for 
private versus public schooling, but large difference in 
learning outcomes in favour of private schooling. The 
top right quadrant comprises states with high public-
private cost differential and learning differentials. In 
all states, except Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (seen 
below the X axis), private schools outperformed 
public schools. In all states, private schools were more 
expensive than public, although the extent of disparity 
varied greatly across states. In Kerala, for example, 
private schools cost five times more than public, 
while in Andhra Pradesh they were twenty times 
more expensive.
Figure 4.18: 
Out of pocket 
expenditure 
on primary 
schooling by 
management 
type, 2014.
Sources and Notes: NSS 2014a
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Figure 4.19: 
Differentials 
in Costs and 
Learnings 
Outcomes 
– Public vs 
private schools
Sources and notes: ASER 2016, NSS 2014a. ASER Learning outcomes are for 2016. Cost of schooling is for 2014. 
Refer Appendix B for list of State codes.
In summary, it is possible to identify states which are 
providing public education that delivers outcomes on 
par with the private system at a fraction of the cost to 
the household.  Additionally, controlling for factors such 
as family background, mother’s education and school 
infrastructure, learning differential between private and 
public schools has narrowed in recent years, suggesting 
that public schools and private schools are converging 
in their performance (ASER 2016). Moreover, only 40 
per cent villages had a private school (ASER 2016).  
Therefore, education via the public schooling system 
enables reaching out to a vast population, and as 
recent evidence shows, this can be done without 
compromising on learning outcomes.
An interesting recent case study in public education 
is Delhi. Revamping the public schooling system 
was one of the major priorities of the Aam Aadmi 
Party (AAP) leadership when it was elected into 
power. Massive investments in infrastructure were 
undertaken – including revamping existing classrooms, 
providing training for teachers and recruitment of 
more teachers. In 2017-18, nearly a quarter of the 
budget was allocated for education. In 2016, students 
in Delhi’s public schools outperformed their private 
school counterparts, and recorded the second-best 
performance among government schools across the 
country, finishing behind Thiruvananthapuram.14 
While educationists and the teachers themselves have 
praised the new initiatives, the outcomes of these 
investments on students’ learning will take longer to 
materialise, as the existing learning deficits are huge 
and there is a steep learning curve ahead for students. 
Despite this, the revamped public schools and the 
experiences of teachers and students in these schools 
are testimony to the possibilities for effective public 
investment in education.
4.3.3 / Scope for employment 
generation
As the cases of states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and 
Maharashtra demonstrate, there is scope for providing 
affordable and good quality basic education at low 
costs via public schools. This requires supplementing 
the existing infrastructure of schools with both human 
and physical infrastructure. Both of these create 
opportunities to expand employment directly 
and indirectly. 
4/3.3.1 / Teacher shortfall and vacancies 
According to the RTE Act, teacher vacancy rate 
should not exceed 10 per cent. In 2016, there was a 
total shortfall of 0.9 million elementary teachers in 
government schools alone (MHRD, 2018), a vacancy 
rate of approximately 18 per cent against all sanctioned 
posts (Table 4.8). Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh 
had among the highest vacancy rates, together 
accounting for half the vacant posts in the country. 
Ensuring all these posts are filled means creating   
almost a million additional jobs in the country. This is 
only for ensuring adequate teaching capacity at the 
primary level. 
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A & N Islands
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chandigarh
Chhattisgarh
D & N Haveli
Daman & Diu
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Lakshadweep
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Puducherry
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
Uttarakhand
West Bengal
All-India
402
19468
783
39522
203650
1232
43100
174
59
14132
0
24841
11931
2726
11833
73793
19486
1383
58
63851
13857
364
873
1135
317
0
524
22340
37522
0
15705
13049
1298
174666
7676
85835
907585
10.7
13.2
5.8
19.6
34.4
23.1
17.8
9.6
9.8
25.0
0.0
11.0
17.0
5.5
11.7
38.4
8.4
1.1
7.8
17.6
4.6
1.9
3.9
9.1
1.9
0.0
13.5
23.4
13.2
0.0
9.6
13.4
3.8
23.0
16.7
18.9
17.5
State/UT
Vacant 
Posts
Vacant Posts 
as % of total 
Sanctioned 
Posts
Table 4.8: Vacancies against sanctioned posts of 
Elementary school teachers, as on 31.03.2016.
Sources and notes : MHRD, Educational Statistics 
at a Glance, 2018.
At the secondary level too, there are unmet teacher 
needs, although the extent of teacher shortfall in the 
secondary level is not easily available. Available official 
statistics suggest that at the secondary level, there are 
1,06,906 vacancies for secondary school teachers.15  
Meeting officially sanctioned teacher requirements, 
at the primary and secondary levels alone, implies 
creating another million jobs, at least. Based on 
available estimates, this is about 11.45 per cent of the 
currently educated unemployed and almost 5.4 per 
cent of the current workforce in education. 
This number will be even larger if we include pre-
schools, in the form of the large network of anganwadis 
serving infants, young children and mothers across the 
country. Anganwadis are typically understaffed and 
consequently, anganwadi workers (AWW), overworked.  
As of 2015, there were 1,17,035 vacant positions for 
AWW  and 19,755 vacant positions for supervisors16. 
4.3.3.2 / Expanding capacity
In recent years, there has been a change in focus 
to improving qualitative outcomes, moving from 
an input-based orientation in education policies to 
outcome-orientation. However, as Kundu (2018) argues, 
ensuring basic social and physical infrastructure inputs 
– not just more teachers, but more schools, adequate 
infrastructure including classrooms, toilets and other 
facilities, can themselves be instrumental in improving 
learning outcomes. Therefore, a focus on meeting 
quantitative targets can go a long way in achieving 
qualitative improvements. 
As per DISE, as many as 1,08,680 schools were single 
teacher schools.  Here, there is scope for greater 
job generation simply by ensuring that potential 
capacities are met. 
In 2013, lower secondary enrolment was only 66 per 
cent compared to 92 per cent at the primary level. 
Drop-out rates peak at Class 5 and Class 8. In 2016, 
about 2.16 crore children dropped out of secondary 
school. If these children are brought back into the 
schooling system, this implies the need for additional 
teaching capacity, and more teaching jobs.  
Besides employing more teachers, building the 
infrastructure of existing school systems is also 
imperative. Most primary schools lack basic physical 
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infrastructure. In 2015-16, about 13 per cent of primary 
schools were in need of major repair works, about 6 
per cent were single-classroom schools (students from 
Classes 1 – 3 would share one room) 
3.4 / Regularising existing 
employees
Alongside creating new jobs to fill existing vacancies, 
there is also an urgent need to regularise teachers’ 
employment. In 2016-17, of nearly 11 lakh teachers, 
about 14 per cent of school teachers were contract 
workers by official estimates, of which almost 60 per 
cent were women (DISE 2017). Public schools accounted 
for the majority of contract teachers (60 per cent).  
Contract teachers earn only a fraction of regular 
teacher salaries, with the differential varying across 
states. For example, in Rajasthan, the starting salary of 
a regular teacher in a primary school was D26,013 per 
month while a contract teacher earned about D4,800. 
In Punjab, on the other hand, a regular teacher earned 
about D36,000 per month, while a contract teacher 
earned D31,000 (NUEPA 2016).   
It is imperative that teaching jobs be made 
remunerative. Therefore, contract and para 
teachers who are professionally qualified must be 
regularised and paid salaries on par with current 
permanent teachers. 
4.4 / Housing 
Access to good housing ensures an individual’s ability 
to live a secure, productive, and healthy life. It is 
instrumental in providing an improved quality of life 
for those incapable of becoming productive members 
of the society, especially the young, old, abandoned/
widowed, of ill health, unemployed or differently abled 
(King et al 2017). Adequate housing options imply the 
inclusion of sufficient access to basic services required 
to live a healthy and secure life, especially for the urban 
poor – affordable and sufficient nutrition, reliable public 
transportation, electricity, solid waste management, 
safety, clean potable water and sanitation, and other 
public health measures (King et al 2017). At the same 
time, it is widely acknowledged that housing no longer 
refers to a physical unit of dwelling alone. It is the site 
of an individual’s assertion of self-identity, community 
ties (CSE 2017), and portal for availing services (Bhan 
et al. 2014). It is important to address issues regarding 
access to adequate and affordable housing options 
in cities so as to not adversely impact one’s economic 
productivity as well as urban sustainability and equity. 
Failure to provide these services affects the lives of all 
citizens, and impacts the smooth functioning of the city, 
at large. In the absence of housing options available in 
well-serviced locations, the urban poor are often forced 
to look for housing on the city’s periphery plagued with 
irregular access to basic services, lack of employment, 
fragmented social networks, and longer and unreliable 
commutes. Importantly, providing adequate, quality 
housing will also lead to the generation of a large 
number of jobs. 
We develop  an understanding of inadequate housing 
that is not limited to an absolute lack of housing 
units, and emphasise the need to think beyond home 
ownership alone. We also address the question, 
what constitutes a holistic policy response to housing 
provision. We outline the broad challenges faced 
by stakeholders involved in providing and availing 
adequate and affordable housing options. We put 
forth three responses that are needed, in light of the 
challenges outlined: augmenting housing stock keeping 
household needs in focus, outlining pathways to enact 
a right to housing, and thinking of housing provision as 
a way to create jobs.
4.4.1 / Challenges 
4.4.1.1 / Housing inadequacy 
First, it is important to understand the nature of 
the housing deficit in the country to measure the 
effectiveness of the State’s response to housing 
provisioning. According to the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban Affairs (MoHUPA), the total housing deficit in 
urban India at the end of 2012 was pegged at 18.78 
million units (Kundu 2012). According to the 2011 
census, 32 per cent (approximately 78.9 million) of total 
households in India were found in urban areas. This 
indicates that nearly a quarter of urban households 
experienced housing deficiency and homelessness. 
The report’s estimates provide us with a more nuanced 
portrait of the nationwide housing deficit.
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Table 4.9 demonstrates that the number of households 
living without access to shelter are far fewer in 
comparison to those living under significantly deficient 
conditions. While the total number of housing units 
considered non-serviceable (katcha) was just under 
a million, the report included prevalent instances of 
housing poverty (households in unacceptable physical 
and social conditions) to define housing shortage. 
Housing poverty included housing units experiencing 
material dilapidation and several families living within 
a single housing unit out of necessity for a multitude 
of reasons. Thus, even for those households who had 
access to shelter, this was inadequate to provide a 
good quality of life. This allows us to approach the total 
deficit with two approaches: absolute shortage and 
inadequacy (Bhan et al. 2014). 
Deficit in access to adequate and affordable housing 
is experienced by economically weaker sections (EWS) 
and low income groups (LIG) the most, thus forcing 
them to choose one or the other (Kundu 2012). This 
exacerbates the crisis in providing affordable and 
adequate housing (see Table 4.10).
Responses towards addressing housing shortage and 
poverty rely on varying notions of affordability for 
specific population groups. Reserve Bank of India’s 
Bulletin (January 2018) outlined a number of measures 
undertaken by them to promote the construction of 
affordable housing units by the private sector as well as 
demonstrate the efficacy of state-run subsidy schemes 
to increase housing affordability across Indian cities 
(Palayi and Priyaranjan 2018). 
4.4.1.2 / Overemphasis on home 
ownership 
Aggarwal et al. (2014) analysed the total number of 
urban households according to their monthly income 
against their ability to afford household units at market 
prices. They found that 62 per cent of all households 
were not able to afford houses over 4 lakhs, and hence 
were priced out of the market since rates usually 
exceeded this threshold. Thus in absence of subsidies, 
the housing market excludes those households who 
need new housing options the most (Agarwal et al. 
2014, Palayi and Priyaranjan 2018).  
Households living in non-serviceable 
katcha houses
Households living in obsolescent houses
Households living in congested houses
Households in homeless condition
Total Urban Housing shortage
0.99
2.27
14.99
0.53 
18.78
Factors
As at 
end-2012
Table 4.9: Distribution of estimated urban housing 
shortage in India (in millions)
Sources and notes : Report of Technical Group (TG-12) on Estimation of 
Urban Housing Shortage 2012, Ministry of Housing & Urban 
Poverty Alleviation.
10.55 (56%)
7.41 (40%)
0.82 (4%)
18.78 (100%)
Economic Groups
As at 
end-2012
Table 4.10: Distribution of estimated urban housing 
shortage in India (in millions)
Sources and notes : Report of Technical Group (TG-12) on Estimation of 
Urban Housing Shortage 2012, Ministry of Housing & Urban 
Poverty Alleviation.
Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)
Low Income Group (LIG)
Medium and High Income Group 
(MIG+HIG)
Total
98
Owning a home can lead to creating a financial asset 
in addition to providing shelter and access to basic 
services. In fact, in many countries like India, housing 
is observed to be a household’s most valuable asset 
(Singh et al. 2014).  However, this option is not available 
to many urban households and nor is purchase 
of housing a priority for poor households given 
expenditures on health, education, food and other 
necessary goods and services. As King et al (2017) 
observe housing units are not shelters differentiated 
according to the purchasing power of a household 
(Figure 4.20). Instead, they are characterized according 
to access to services, heterogeneous ownership, and 
financing options. It is important to note that many 
households do not experience a linear progression 
towards owning a house. They may well remain lifelong 
renters with a probable increase in quality of life and 
better access to services.
Figure 4.20: 
Is home 
ownership 
the ultimate 
goal? Mapping 
shelter 
possibilities for 
urban India
Sources and notes : King, R., et al. 2017. Reprinted with permission.
All types of housing conditions can range from short to long term. While not represented in the diagram, homelessness is an 
important issue in some cities in the global South. The dotted line indicates the variability of this characteristic across cities.
Scholars and activists, alike, have pointed out the 
difficulties posed by emphasis on home ownership 
and land titles on improving access to basic services 
for the urban poor (Yap 2016). Documentary proof for 
places of residence are used by the state machinery to 
provide services, often without clear and/or consistent 
definitions of what constitutes such proof. However, 
such requirements end up enshrining the need for 
ownership and clear titles in policy guidelines (Bhan et 
al. 2014). In a first, a comprehensive Central housing 
program such as Rajiv Awas Yojna (RAY) declared that 
land titles and housing tenure was to be decoupled 
from access to services. While this was hailed as the 
first step towards enshrining housing as a right for all, 
the efficacy of implementation of services depended 
on coordination as well as consistent interpretation 
of policy guidelines across levels and bodies of 
government, which was often lacking (Bhan et al. 2014). 
Thus, it is important to decouple access to housing and 
allied services from home ownership.
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4.4.1.3 / Insufficient policy response 
Around the 1980s, policy analysts and international 
financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank argued 
that governments the world over had failed to provide 
effective services, especially for their marginalized 
communities (Harriss 2007). The State’s role was seen 
as one establishing the necessary institutions for 
effective service delivery. They promoted institutional 
reforms through privatisation, decentralisation, civil 
society participation, and community involvement 
(ibid). This affected the housing sector, too. 
Housing policies enacted by the Central government 
slowly changed the latter’s role from a direct provider 
of housing units to that of an enabler creating a policy 
framework as well as financial institutions to increase 
access to housing. The National Housing Policy (NHP) 
1988 saw the establishment of the National Housing 
Bank along with other enabling policy measures to 
create a better-functioning housing market and help 
those in the lower income groups get assistance in 
accessing private sector housing with greater ease. 
While access to housing finance and private sector 
housing increased, public-private partnerships geared 
towards creating affordable housing stock remained 
elusive (Joshi and Selva 2018). 
The NHP was designed to provide housing for urban 
as well as rural citizens. But subsequent policies were 
introduced to address the housing challenges posed 
by a steady increase in cities across India. One of the 
most significant policy interventions to improve the 
urban standard of living was the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM). Launched 
in 2005, it sought improvements in basic services and/
or construction of new housing stock for the urban 
poor in 65 cities through public-private partnerships. 
One of the sub-missions under the program – Basic 
Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) – addressed 
concerns endemic to urban poor communities living 
in slums. In addition, the Integrated Housing and Slum 
Development Program (IHSDP) was taken up in cities 
not included under JnNURM. Housing units constructed 
under a PPP model were provided to families, who 
were expected to shoulder 12 per cent of the total unit 
cost (MoHUPA 2005). 
While the government ran ambitious targeted 
programs like the JnNURM to create additional stock for 
EWS households, its credit subsidy schemes to help LIG 
households to access finance to procure housing units 
were less effective (Joshi and Selva 2018). Little success 
was achieved for reasons including lack of adequate 
subsidy, high transaction costs, unwillingness of banks, 
and availability of clear land titles (Standing Committee 
Report 2014).  
Building on the moderate success of building housing 
units through BSUP, the Centre launched Rajiv Awas 
Yojna (RAY) in 2013 to create ‘slum-free cities’ (MoHUPA 
2013). The scheme promoted greater involvement 
of the private sector for in situ slum redevelopment 
as well as increasing affordable housing stock under 
Affordable Housing in Partnership (AHP). While RAY 
was credited with many progressive policy measures 
that addressed the socio-economic needs of the EWS 
and LIG residents, it remained biased towards home 
ownership, mired in implementation issues, and was 
short-lived. After the NDA government was voted 
into power, RAY was discontinued and replaced with 
Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna-Urban (PMAY-U) in 2015 
with the expressed goal of providing ‘Housing for All by 
2022’ (MoHUPA 2016). 
RAY and PMAY-U shared their common objective to 
usher in formal housing and creating ‘slum-free cities’. 
In contrast to RAY, though, the PMAY-U program 
was designed to be more decentralised in financing, 
construction, and development of housing by providing 
assistance to Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) through states 
and union territories. The program implemented in situ 
development of slums, offered a credit-linked subsidy 
scheme (CLSS) for affordable housing units belonging 
to EWS/LIG households, created additional affordable 
housing stock in a public-private partnership, and 
offered subsidy for a beneficiary seeking housing 
enhancements. (MoHUPA 2016). Schemes like CLSS 
have been proven to increase the affordability of 
housing across 30 Indian cities (Palayi and Priyaranjan 
2018). However, they do not take cognizance of 
spending patterns of urban poor households. Higher 
out-of-pocket expenditure on education, health, and 
mobility might impede a household’s ability to invest 
in a housing unit and continue living in insecure and 
inadequate housing (King et al. 2016). So far, PMAY-U 
has failed to met targets by large margins, with 
issues ranging from low rate of completed homes to 
unwillingness from private developers and lending 
institutions.17 The government, on its part, has been 
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taking aggressive measures to stimulate the housing 
sector and meet its policy objectives by classifying 
housing under priority sector lending, extending 
CLSS to include MIG households, and refinanced 
loans through National Housing Bank (NHB) (Kundu 
and Kumar 2017). However, soaring per unit costs, 
unavailable land, supply side constraints, and 
emphasis on home ownership have skewed the policy 
response against providing housing to those who 
need it the most.  
4.4.2 / Responses
4.4.2.1 / Adequate housing 
The discussion around inadequate housing 
underscored a few key issues: overcrowding, 
unaffordability, and lack of options. It was not just an 
absolute lack of housing but the lack of adequate living 
conditions in existing housing that drove the demand 
for new and affordable housing units in the lower 
income groups. Going forward, it would be prudent to 
understand the paths adopted by urban households 
towards achieving self-sufficiency with respect to 
housing needs. 
While owning a new house might be desirable, it 
might not be necessarily feasible. It is important to 
acknowledge and provide for a multitude of housing 
options instead of locking in households to live in a 
narrowly-understood definition of an owned house. 
For example, while a large number of households own 
homes in urban areas, there are a significant number of 
renters, too (Table 4.11). 
Table 4.11: Distribution of estimated urban housing shortage in India (owners/renters)
770,817
219,183
Number 
of families 
living in 
old houses
Families 
living in 
katcha 
houses
Self-owned
Rented
Total
1,395,735
870,417
Sources and notes : Report of Technical Group (TG-12) on Estimation of Urban Housing Shortage 2012, Ministry of Housing 
& Urban Poverty Alleviation.
326,430
203,570
Number of 
families in 
congestion
Families 
without 
homes
9,188,746
5,700,019
Total 
Urban 
housing 
shortage
11,681,728
6,993,189
18,674,917
Tenure
Rental housing may be seen as a solution and an 
approach with which to respond to the housing crisis. 
It provides the necessary flexibility to access economic 
opportunities and grow out a house incrementally 
according to the specific needs of the household. 
Illustratively, access to rental housing has a direct 
impact on workforce participation (Harish, 2016). 
Currently, rental housing exists as a private market 
consisting of small landlords with little to no oversight. 
Despite recent policy encouragement to build public 
rental housing, this has yet to be taken up by most 
urban centres (Bhan et al. 2014). 
Housing experts also contend that well-serviced 
mass housing be made available through plotted 
development that takes into consideration a 
household’s heterogenous needs with an ability to 
grow out incrementally, engage in diverse economic 
activities, and maintain community ties.18 This includes 
a combination of market-based interventions and 
public provisioning. The path to creating affordable 
housing stock from the supply side has met with policy 
and financial hurdles ranging from lack of serviced land 
to cost of construction and technological innovation 
to unwillingness of housing finance institutions to 
fund projects (CBRE & FICCI 2018). Proposed solutions 
from private developers and housing experts have 
included earmarking land for affordable housing in 
city master plans, transfer of development rights (TDR) 
to incentivise private developers, amendments to 
rental laws, and increasing public sector’s direct role in 
building more housing units (Bhan et al 2014, King et al 
2016, KPMG 2012).
101
4.4.2.2 / Right to housing
Housing rights activists have stressed upon the 
centrality of access to adequate housing in order 
to achieve good quality of life as recognized by 
international declarations to push domestic policies to 
follow suit. For instance, the United Nations General 
Assembly signed into effect the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) that envisaged the right to 
adequate housing as a basic human right as early 
as 1948 (Assembly, U.G., 1948). In India, access to 
housing is not enshrined as a right, but a need that is 
to be provided for by a bouquet of welfare schemes 
operationalised by the Centre and state governments 
and public/private employers. While welfare schemes 
mandate access to adequate and affordable housing, 
there are no clearly-defined consequences should 
entities fail to meet their targets. Similarly, in the 
absence of a rights-based mechanism for redressal, 
private builders are not mandated to fulfil the unmet 
need for affordable housing (Bhan et al. 2014, Joshi 
and Selva 2018). 
The right to housing may be secured through a multi-
pronged approach so that not only is a household able 
to secure a house, but is also able to attain housing 
security. Policy measures are crucial to regulate 
irregularities and distortions so that cost escalations for 
houses built through subsidy schemes are not borne by 
beneficiaries, especially those from low income groups 
(Joshi and Selva 2018). For instance, it was found that 
delays in approvals and cash transfer resulted in higher 
out-of-pocket expenditures (Joshi and Selva 2018), 
often driving beneficiaries to borrow from informal 
lenders at higher interest rates (Singh et al. 2014) to pay 
contractors for timely completion of projects. For long-
term urban poor residents, especially those residing in 
informal housing (as defined by various state agencies), 
it is important to set up procedures to procure 
land tenure so as to alleviate fears of unplanned 
evictions, regularisation of basic services, and orderly 
incorporation into the urban fabric. For renters, it is 
imperative that the State enforce frameworks that 
benefit the rights of landlords and tenants, both. It is 
also important that there be legal recourse to resolve 
biases against renting on the basis of their caste, 
gender, religion, and sexual orientation. Lastly, the well-
established linkages between employment, mobility, 
and adequate housing need to be exploited to meet the 
housing gap in urban areas (NCEUS 2007). 
4.4.2.3 / Housing and employment 
generation
Housing programs such as RAY and the BSUP sub-
mission under JnNURM envisaged provision of 
livelihood opportunities around the sites of affordable 
housing so as to maintain housing-livelihood linkages 
and incentivise adoption of affordable housing 
units located in peri-urban areas of the city. Proper 
implementation of such initiatives would also mandate 
that such economic opportunities would not be 
provided at the expense of physical mobility. 
Housing market dynamics affect economic activity 
with respect to changes in employment patterns and 
demand for housing (Singh et al. 2014). In fact, housing 
construction itself (both, public and private) contributes 
directly and indirectly to the economy and employment 
opportunities significantly (Tipple 1994). The 
construction sector’s growth might be directly affecting 
the economy through its impact on employment 
(Mallick and Mahalik 2010). The Economic Survey 2018 
estimated that realty and construction sectors are likely 
to generate 15 million new jobs by 2022 (MoF 2018). It 
is prudent to create a secure and skilled workforce to 
meet the demands of such an influx of new projects. 
At the same time, there is a need to reverse the trend 
of high levels of employment precarity – especially 
amongst the informal and migrant labour – caused 
by hostile labour practices and importance of social 
ties in securing work in the sector (Pattenden 2016). 
While the government has worked towards creating an 
enabling framework for the augmentation of the total 
urban housing stock, it has lagged in providing a model 
for regularised employment in the construction sector 
through state-run construction organisations such 
as National Building and Construction Company 
(India) Ltd. 
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4.5 / Employment 
generation through 
universal basic services
There exist several reasons to invest in a strong public 
system of universal basic services. In this paper we 
highlight an often less emphasised one: the creation of 
a large number of high quality jobs. We have indicated 
some numbers in this regard. 
In this section, we bring these numbers together 
and also comment on the wider multiplier effects of 
increased government spending in the health and 
education sectors.
Expanding 
Capacity
Regularising 
Employees
0.20 million 
health workers 
(rural)
+ 
1 million 
teachers (rural 
and urban)
+
1,17,035 
anganwadi 
workers
+
19,755 
supervisors
Filling 
Vacancies
0.29 – 0.42 
million health 
workers (rural)
1.03 million 
ASHA workers 
(rural and 
urban)
+ 
1.2 million 
anganwadi 
workers (rural 
and urban)
+ 
1 million 
helpers  (rural 
and urban)
The numbers presented in the above table are very 
conservative estimates, which exclude urban health 
system requirements as well as number of additional 
teaching professionals needed for expansion of 
schooling capacity beyond the primary level, due to lack 
of data. Even then we find that nearly 2 million jobs can 
be created by filling vacancies and expanding capacity. 
This constitutes 15 per cent of the existing workforce in 
the health and education sectors. By another estimate, 
using the WHO standards for physicians required per 
1000 people, we find that the required addition to the 
number of physicians across the country constitutes 
around 10 per cent of the existing workforce in the 
health sector. Lastly, by regularising ASHAs, and 
anganwadi workers and helpers, over 3.2 million 
persons in these positions would have decent jobs. 
The employment effects of an expansion in the health 
and education sectors that would result from increased 
public expenditure in these areas would not be limited 
only to these sectors. As these sectors expand, the 
demand for inputs from other sectors that supply to 
these two sectors would also increase, thus increasing 
their output and hence employment. Two factors are 
important here: the share of the output for a given 
sector that goes as input into the health and education 
sectors, and the absolute size of the input sector. For 
example, health and education together account for 
0.1 per cent of the output of the trade sector, but trade 
employs 48 million people. So, a 20 per cent increase 
in health and education output may proportionally 
generate 97000 jobs. These effects would flow through 
the economy and the final effect on employment will be 
significantly larger than only on health and education.
4.6 / Conclusion
India stands at a crucial juncture in its economic 
history. It has an opportunity to leverage nearly two 
decades of rapid economic growth into the creation of 
modern democracy with essential services provided 
publicly to all. A Universal Basic Services (UBS) 
programme can put the country firmly on such a path. 
It can deliver human capital improvements resulting 
in increased productivity. It will improve the quality of 
life, reduce indebtedness and create a shared sense 
of the public. And lastly, it will create a large number 
of good quality jobs. For all these reasons we call for a 
comprehensive UBS programme in India.  
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Endnotes
1 For India, see http://reclaimingtherepublic.in/ and 
https://www.ideasforindia.in/topics/poverty-inequal-
ity/a-proposal-for-universal-basic-services.html. A 
proposal for UBS in the UK (Portes, Reed, & Percy 2017) 
with seven free public services (healthcare, education, 
democracy and legal services, shelter, food, transport 
and information) argues that besides directly meeting 
basic needs, UBS would increase efficiency, reduce 
costs, facilitate the labour market, and strengthen 
social institutions and social cohesion.
2. The Congress Party has proposed increasing public 
health spending to 3 per cent of GDP by 2023-24. The 
manifesto of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
also includes implementing a right to free healthcare, 
and raising public expenditure on health to 5 per cent 
of GDP.
3. However, some caution is necessary in interpreting 
these figures. The institutional context within which 
the public system operates is crucial to how effective 
it is in delivering healthcare. For example, Bangladesh, 
which has a much lower per capita GDP than India 
and spends a much lower share of GDP on healthcare, 
shows better outcomes than India. On the face of it, 
this may undermine the argument for public spending 
on health. However, as a recent WHO report argues, 
Bangladesh has “set an extraordinary example of gain-
ing good health at a very low cost and has been pro-
posed as a role model for other developing countries 
in the region” (Ahmed, et al., 2015, p. xxiv). To ensure 
quality of care and better outcomes it is necessary to 
strengthen key institutions so that they become more 
accountable. In this respect, there may be much to 
learn from countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh.
4. In a way, therefore, international comparisons that 
take India as one unit of analysis are somewhat mis-
leading due to intra-country variations.
 
5. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/less-than-
one-doctor-for-1000-population-in-india-government-
tells-lok-sabha-4760892/ 
6. Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) are trained 
female community health workers who are chosen 
from the village to work as an intermediary between 
the community and the public health system by creat-
ing awareness of good health practices and facilitating 
the use of health services. Anganwadi workers and 
helpers work at centres that provide the services cov-
ered under the Integrated Child Development Services 
scheme, including supplementary nutrition, pre-school 
education and health services.
7. http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Strategy_for_
New_India.pdf
8. http://reclaimingtherepublic.in/education/
9. Ethiopia, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Philippines have 
been excluded for reasons of data availability.
10. In general, primary schooling covers the first 5 years 
of formal education, i.e. from Classes 1 to 5. Classes 
6th, 7th, and 8th are referred to as middle/upper pri-
mary school. Formal schooling up to Class 8 is known 
as elementary schooling. Secondary schooling or lower 
secondary includes Classes 9th and 10th, while Classes 
11 and 12 are referred to as higher secondary 
schooling.
11. These numbers for India correspond only to chil-
dren in rural schools. At the national level when com-
paring across other countries, India ranked 72nd out of 
74 countries in 2009 in the Programme for Internation-
al Student Assessment (PISA) ranks.
12. Student achievements between private and public 
schools are not perfectly comparable unless students’ 
background, school infrastructure and family char-
acteristics are controlled for. For instance, one study 
finds that 75 per cent  of learning differentials can be 
explained by the influence of characteristics such as 
parents’ education, siblings, and other factors (ASER, 
2016). Yet, the differentials persist, although perhaps at 
a lower magnitude.
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13. While students in public schools spent far less on 
their education than students in private schools, the 
NSS 71st Report also found that students in govern-
ment institutions were spending more on private 
coaching than their counterparts in private institutions. 
For instance, in primary level, government-school 
students spent 28 per cent of expenditure on private 
coaching, compared to about 5 per cent in the case of 
students in private unaided schools. Therefore, the low-
er costs of public schooling may be more than offset by 
higher tuition expenditure, pointing towards the need 
to make qualitative improvements in public schools.
14. It has been argued that the higher pass percentage 
in Class XII was achieved by holding back poor perform-
ing students in Class IX. But these criticisms may not 
be valid. https://www.newslaundry.com/2018/06/09/
delhi-government-schools-print-filtering-stu-
dents-aam-aadmi-party
15. https://www.ndtv.com/education/indias-teachers-
crisis-country-falls-short-of-1-million-school-teach-
ers-1778220
16. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mbErel.aspx?relid=133102
17. As of March 2018, barely 8 per cent of the target 
for construction of houses had been met: https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-awas-yojana-
only-8-target-met-under-urban-housing-scheme/article-
show/63405544.cms
18. Refer Joshi and Selva (2018) for detailed analysis of 
design and implementation issues affecting housing 
provisioning in urban Karnataka and how targeted in-
terventions can help beneficiaries while meeting policy 
objectives.
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Appendix A
Delhi
Meghalaya
Tamil Nadu
Nagaland
Jharkhand
Uttarakhand
Goa
Kerala
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Telangana
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Mizoram
Assam
Haryana
Chhattisgarh
Tripura
Karnataka
Bihar
Sikkim
Jammu & Kashmir
Manipur
Punjab
West Bengal
Odisha
Arunachal Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
0.39
0.42
0.54
0.58
0.62
0.63
0.67
0.72
0.82
0.82
0.96
0.97
0.97
1.03
1.1
1.11
1.18
1.19
1.21
1.22
1.26
1.26
1.3
1.41
1.58
1.76
2.18
2.31
2.36
3.18
4.85
2.26
4.43
1.43
3.38
3.11
5.92
3.54
3.18
2.68
4.5
3.32
6.42
5.32
4.21
2.51
3.84
4.39
5.75
3.84
4.91
4.2
4.33
5.8
3.12
4.15
5.08
7.99
2.69
4.54
Tamil Nadu
Nagaland
Sikkim
Mizoram
Maharashtra
Telangana
Chhattisgarh
Rajasthan
Kerala
Gujarat
Uttarakhand
Karnataka
Delhi
Andhra Pradesh
Tripura
Meghalaya
Jammu & Kashmir
Madhya Pradesh
Jharkhand
Arunachal Pradesh
Goa
Bihar
Manipur
Haryana
Uttar Pradesh
Assam
West Bengal
Punjab
Odisha
Himachal Pradesh
0.45
0.62
0.62
0.64
0.7
0.74
0.77
0.8
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.88
0.89
0.93
1.02
1.05
1.12
1.15
1.15
1.18
1.3
1.37
1.44
1.49
1.58
1.64
1.95
2.03
3.33
5.52
2.36
4.24
1.84
3.79
3.69
4.6
3.32
3.74
2.75
4.92
4.22
3.27
3.83
7.77
2.36
4.04
4.08
2.44
2.03
4.28
4.25
3.34
3.63
5.35
7.98
6.17
3.2
5.29
2.78
State StatePublic Private Public Private
Rural UrbanTable A1: 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure 
of households 
from public 
and private 
health 
facilities as 
percentages 
of monthly 
per capita 
consumer 
expenditure, 
2014
Source: Calculated from NSS Social Consumption – Health survey, 2014
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Figure A1: 
Spending 
per student 
by State 
Government, 
(Revised 
Expenditure 
estimates)
Source: CBGA 2016
Appendix B - State acronyms
AP  Andhra Pradesh
AR  Arunachal Pradesh
AS  Assam
BR  Bihar
CG  Chhattisgarh
CH  Chandigarh
DL  Delhi
GA  Goa
GJ  Gujarat
HP  Himachal Pradesh
HR  Haryana
JH  Jharkhand
JK  Jammu and Kashmir
KA  Karnataka
KL  Kerala
MH  Maharashtra
ML  Meghalaya
MN  Manipur
MP  Madhya Pradesh
MZ  Mizoram
NL  Nagaland
OR  Odisha
PB  Punjab
PY  Puducherry
RJ  Rajasthan
SK  Sikkim
TL  Telangana
TN  Tamil Nadu
TR  Tripura
UK  Uttarakhand
UP  Uttar Pradesh
WB   West Bengal
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Chapter 5
After a long period out in the wilderness, 
state intervention in industrialisation has 
been making a comeback in scholarly and 
policy circles. There is now greater 
recognition of the fact that economic 
growth is delayed not just by government 
failures, but often more severely due 
to market failures. 
How to Revive Indian Manufacturing? 
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Executive Summary
1. This paper argues that the absence of a well-
articulated industrial policy has been a major stumbling 
block in expanding manufacturing employment in the 
country. 
2. State intervention has played a crucial role in 
the successes of the East Asian economies such as 
South Korea and Taiwan where the ‘leading hand of 
the State’ was instrumental in identifying potential 
areas of growth, as well as in guiding, promoting, and 
disciplining the private players.
3. The withdrawal of the State from industrial 
development in India after the 1990s has implied not 
only a marked deceleration in public investment but 
also the State’s abdication from the sphere of industrial 
policy. This has been a crucial difference between the 
Indian and the East Asian industrialisation experiences.  
4. After a long period out in the wilderness, State 
intervention in industrialisation has been making 
a comeback in scholarly and policy circles. There is 
now greater recognition of the fact that economic 
growth is delayed not just by government failures, but 
often more severely due to market failures. Recent 
discussions highlight the role of State as a leading 
player, especially in the creation of new technologies 
and in the setting up of sophisticated industries.  
5. After 2004-05, while there has been a marked 
acceleration in the growth of factory employment in 
India, the growth of overall manufacturing employment 
decelerated, mainly due to the stagnation in 
employment growth in the small and informal sector 
firms. The ‘spread effects’ of the growth of the factory 
sector on small firms in the informal sector have clearly 
reduced after the 2000s. 
6. At the same time, there has been growing 
informalisation within the factory sector during recent 
years. The shares in incremental employment of 
contract workers and other employees who are outside 
the purview of the labour laws have been rising sharply 
since the 2000s onwards. Also, as shares of gross value 
added in the factory sector, profits have been rising and 
wages declining during this period.
7. Given such a context, labour laws no longer appear 
to be a constraint on the growth of the manufacturing. 
Experiences from various industries show that 
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employers find different ways to circumvent the 
existing labour regulations, while the authorities adopt 
a lax attitude towards implementing them.
8. After 2011-12, the sharp decline of investment in 
the Indian economy has contributed to a slowing 
down in the growth of the factory sector. But the 
growth-retarding effects are likely to be much higher 
in the informal sector, especially in the aftermath 
of demonetisation of high value currency notes in 
November 2016 and the introduction of goods and 
services tax (GST) in July 2017.
9. The paper identifies the following key issues in Indian 
manufacturing, which a new comprehensive industrial 
policy should address. 
a. Public investment: Investment rates in India had 
reached the levels achieved by China by 2007. However, 
the Chinese and the Indian rates began to diverge after 
that. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, while 
the State in China responded with massive investments 
in infrastructure and new technologies, the Indian 
economy suffered due to stagnation in both public and 
private corporate investments.
b. Infrastructure: In India, electricity shortages have had 
a significant negative effect on the growth of output 
and revenues of manufacturing firms. The growth-
retarding impacts of power shortages have been more 
severe on small industrial units, which cannot afford to 
install generators. Our field research in Coimbatore in 
Tamil Nadu confirms that power shortages have been 
the most serious constraint to growth in this industrial 
town between 2007 and 2014.
c. Finance: From the 2000s onwards, development 
banks in India as well as in many other countries began 
offering ‘universal banking services’, diluting their 
core strengths in long-term lending.  With the crisis 
due to NPA and other problems affecting the banking 
sector, credit disbursed by the commercial banks to 
the industrial sector has declined sharply from 2014-15 
onwards. Several owners of small and medium firms 
we spoke to highlighted the problem of relatively high 
interest rates.
d. Trade liberalisation: The weighted average of import 
tariffs in India on capital goods declined from 94.8 per 
cent in 1991-92 to 5.6 per cent in 2009-10. The tariff 
reductions have adversely affected the prospects of 
India’s manufacturing firms, which are, as noted above, 
already disadvantaged by many supply-side constraints.
e. Capital account liberalisation: The gradual 
liberalisation of India’s capital account from the 2000s 
onwards and the resultant increase in the inflows of 
foreign portfolio investments (FPI) into the country 
have created problems for the country’s manufacturing 
sector. The volatility in FPI flows has led to wide 
fluctuations in exchange rates and also in the prices of 
several commodities (such as steel and cotton).
f. FDI: Recent studies show that the impact of FDI in 
promoting manufacturing growth in India, especially 
by bringing in new technologies and managerial 
capabilities, has not been very high. 
g. Regional diversity: In India, industrial policies should 
reflect the priorities and requirements for industrial 
development across various regions. There are 
variations across states with respect to demographic 
structures, which also have important implications 
for their labour markets. This paper uses the example 
of Kerala to illustrate the importance of state-specific 
industrial policy.
h. Research and development: India requires 
technological advances that generate new economic 
opportunities and absorb — not displace — labour. It 
needs to be noted that innovations and technological 
interventions are needed in the case of traditional and 
labour-intensive industries as well. 
i. Domestic Market: India should envisage an industrial 
growth that is driven more by the domestic market, 
which will benefit from an improvement in the wages 
and incomes of its rural and urban informal workers. 
In any case, the prospects for a growth strategy led by 
exports are rather bleak, given the continuing crisis and 
the uncertainities in the global economy.
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5.1 / Introduction
A striking feature of the Indian economy has been 
the relatively small contribution made by the 
manufacturing sector to the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) and, more importantly, to employment. 
In 2017, manufacturing accounted for only 15.1 
per cent of India’s GDP, compared to 29.3 per cent 
in China.1 In 2011-12, India’s manufacturing sector 
provided employment to 61.3 million, which was only 
13 per cent of the country’s total workforce of 472.5 
million.2
What explains India’s relatively slow progress in 
industrialisation and industrial growth? This note 
argues that the absence of a well-articulated industrial 
policy has been a major stumbling block to expanding 
manufacturing employment in the country. 
In India, manufacturing consists of the organised and 
unorganised (or registered and unregistered) sectors. 
The organised manufacturing sector is almost identical 
to the factory sector. The factory sector comprises 
factories that employ more than 10 workers and 
operate with the aid of electric power (as well as 
factories that employ more than 20 workers without 
the aid of electric power). Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI) is the main source of data on the factory sector, 
and according to ASI, the factory sector employed 13.3 
million workers in India in 2011-12 (and 14.9 million 
workers in 2016-17). 
The National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) household 
surveys on Employment and Unemployment (EUS) 
is the other major source of information on Indian 
manufacturing.  According to the EUS conducted in 
2011-12 (which is the latest publicly available survey), 
the size of India’s manufacturing workforce (organised 
and unorganised combined) was estimated to be 61.3 
million. This implies that factory workers (13.3 million) 
comprised 21.7 per cent of all manufacturing workers 
in India in 2011-12. At the same time, close to 80 per 
cent of all manufacturing workers in India are outside 
the factory sector, engaged in small, informal (or 
unregistered) enterprises.3 It is notable that despite 
its low share in employment, the organised sector 
contributed 67.6 per cent of India’s total manufacturing 
GDP in 2010-11 (GOI 2016). 
5.2 / The role of state in 
Industrial development 
There has been a long-standing debate on the extent 
to which interventions by States or governments, 
especially in the building of technological and 
institutional capabilities, contribute to the process 
of industrialisation.  It is well known that State 
intervention in industrialisation has been extensive 
in the case of the former Soviet Union, China during 
its Maoist phase, and India during the planning years. 
In each of these industrialisations, the public sector 
played a dominant role, even in the operations of 
private firms which had been subjected to significant 
controls by the State. These experiments produced 
mixed results with respect to achieving industrialisation 
and economic growth.   
According to many commentators, State intervention 
played a crucial role in the miraculous successes of 
the East Asian economies too, such as of South Korea 
and Taiwan (Amsden 1989; Chang 2007). Remarkably, 
in these countries, the role of State intervention was 
not in the setting up of public sector units. On the 
other hand, the ‘leading hand of the State’ had been 
instrumental in identifying potential areas of growth, 
as well as in guiding, promoting, and disciplining the 
private players (such as the chaebols in South Korea) 
(Amsden 1989). 
Nevertheless, neoclassical economists and ‘Washington 
institutions’ such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank have been arguing for a 
limited role for the government in industrial and 
economic development. They contend that the ‘invisible 
hand of the market’, in itself, will bring in economic 
development and that the government only needs to 
ensure that conditions exist for the free operations 
of the markets.  Pointing to many instances of 
government failures (such as the inefficiency in public 
sector units in some countries), the IMF and the World 
Bank oversaw ‘structural reforms’ in several developing 
countries from the 1980s onwards. These reforms 
resulted in a retreat of the State from industrial and 
economic development.
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However, a number of economists have challenged 
the neoclassical narrative on how industrialisation 
could be driven by market forces alone. Alice Amsden 
(1989) pointed out that the East Asian countries 
achieved their successes not by sticking to only those 
industries in which they had comparative advantages 
(such as labour intensive industries). On the contrary, 
they (South Korea, for instance) made bold forays into 
diverse and challenging areas such as shipbuilding and 
steel making. They managed to achieve this because 
the governments in these countries offered assistance, 
especially in the form of subsidies, to the deserving 
firms. In other words, Amsden (1989) argued that late-
industrialising countries such as South Korea achieved 
success by ‘getting relative prices wrong’ (for instance, 
with subsidised credit, capital was being made cheap 
in a capital-scarce country) -- not by ‘getting relative 
prices right’ as the neoclassical economists contend 
(Amsden 1989). 
In the case of the advanced economies of today, 
including Britain and the United States, Ha Joon Chang 
(2002) pointed out that the State intervened to nurture 
industries in these countries too, during their phases 
of industrialisation. Therefore, when institutions such 
as the IMF deny developing countries the opportunities 
for industrialisation with State support, they are, in 
fact, ‘kicking away the ladder’ for climbing the steps for 
development (Chang 2002; Chang 2007).
The voices favouring State intervention in 
industrialisation have been growing louder during 
recent years. First, there is now greater recognition of 
the fact that economic growth is delayed not just by 
government failures, but often more severely due to 
market failures, especially with the eruption of financial 
crises in many parts of the world. Secondly, the 
spectre of deindustrialisation is emerging as a threat 
to employment growth not just in the developed world 
but also in developing countries. According to Rodrik 
(2015), deindustrialisation refers to a situation in which 
countries ‘[run] out of industrialisation opportunities 
sooner and at much lower levels of income compared 
to the experience of early industrialisers.’ Rodrik (2015) 
attributes this to globalisation and labour saving 
technological progress in manufacturing. 
Given such a context, there is now a much greater 
appreciation for the role of industrial policy in aiding 
industrialisation. Mazzucato (2011) has highlighted 
the critical contributions made by the ‘entrepreneurial 
State’ towards achieving economic growth. She argues 
that State has been a leading agent – and not just a 
facilitator – in achieving innovative breakthroughs, 
including in the case of the internet, the computer 
industry and the pharma-biotech industry. The IMF, 
in a recent paper, seems to have finally admitted the 
role of what it describes as ‘Technology and Innovation 
Policy’ in fuelling economic growth. This paper points 
out how the East Asian miracle economies followed the 
‘moonshot’ approach to development: the leading hand 
of the State directing domestic firms in these countries 
into technologically sophisticated industries (Cherif and 
Hasanov 2019). 
The role of the State in financing industrial 
development is important too, as development 
banks played a vital role in the industrialisation of 
Germany (Gerschenkron 1962). Development financial 
institutions (DFIs) have been crucial for providing 
long-term finance for manufacturing growth in 
several countries including Germany, Japan, South 
Korea, Brazil, and India. Commercial banks suffer 
from a problem of maturity mismatch when it comes 
to lending for long-term investments, as they are 
dependent on short-term borrowings from depositors. 
While the decline of DFIs in India since the 2000s has 
hampered the country’s industrial growth, the setting 
up of China Development Bank in 1994 has really 
boosted that country’s industrialisation drive during the 
recent years (Nayyar 2018).  
5.3 / State and 
industrialisation in india
As is well known, India had launched an ambitious 
programme of industrialisation led by the State and 
the public sector during the 1950s, which had indeed 
been a model for other developing countries too.  
Industrialisation in India during the 1950s through the 
1970s had been characterised by large investments by 
the public sector in key, strategic areas, as well as by 
extensive control of the State over the activities of the 
private sector through the licensing regime. 
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Industrial development that occurred in India 
during the planning phase had been unsuccessful 
in generating adequately large manufacturing 
employment, particularly considering the vastness of 
the country’s labour reserves. India’s Second Five-
Year Plan model emphasised the building of a capital 
goods sector, comprising machines that produce other 
machines. According to this model, greater allocation of 
investment to the capital goods sector would result in 
faster growth of savings, investment and output in 
the long run. 
Investment into capital- and technology-intensive 
sectors during the planning years (including into areas 
such as space science and atomic energy) laid the 
foundations for India’s diversified economic base. At 
the same time, however, the employment generating 
potential of the capital goods sector had been limited. 
Given such a context, it was believed (perhaps a little 
too naively) that handicrafts and the production of 
consumer goods in the small-scale sector would 
alleviate the problem of unemployment in the country. 
Nevertheless, Indian planning did very little to 
remove the hurdles to the growth of agriculture and 
small-scale industries (SSIs). India’s record during 
the post-Independence period in implementing land 
reforms and ensuring primary education for all has 
been rather unimpressive. As a result, the benefits 
from State-led development have so far reached only a 
minority of Indians. The slow growth of rural incomes 
and the persistence of high income inequalities have 
dampened the growth of industrial demand in the 
country, especially for mass-consumption goods (such 
as apparels or processed food). 
India’s economic development shifted from being 
State-led to increasingly market-driven from the 1980s 
onwards. The licensing requirements for private sector 
investments began to be liberalised from the 1980s 
itself. India inaugurated far-reaching market-oriented 
economic reforms in 1991. With the 1991 reforms, the 
Indian economy has become increasingly open for 
foreign trade and investment. Quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) on imports had been virtually removed by the 
early 2000s, and tariffs on most goods have been 
reduced drastically in the following years. The norms 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) had been liberalised. 
The reservation of certain sectors for the small-scale 
sector had been abolished in 1991. At the same 
time, with the reforms in the banking sector, credit 
received by micro and small industries as well as small 
agricultural cultivators has been on a decline. 
Public investment in India has been declining sharply 
from the 1990s onwards. In fact, the capability of 
the State to undertake public expenditures has been 
undermined by its commitment to maintain fiscal 
discipline. With the opening of the capital account, 
increasingly from the 2000s, the Indian economy has 
been coming under the influence of highly volatile, 
short-term capital inflows. Given India’s heavy 
dependence on the imports of oil (and in recent years 
electronic goods), the country’s current account has 
been in a deficit thereby increasing the vulnerabilities 
on the external front. 
It may be noted that the withdrawal of the State from 
industrial development in India after the 1990s has 
implied not only a marked deceleration in public 
investment but also the State’s abdication from the 
sphere of industrial policy. This has been a crucial 
difference between the Indian and the East Asian 
industrialisation experiences. In fact, during the 
post-1991 period, state governments (in particular) 
in India have had very little autonomy with respect to 
investments and policies related to industrial growth. 
Given the imbalances in the nature of Centre-state 
fiscal relations in India, state governments do not 
have large enough financial resources at their 
command to make impactful interventions in the 
industrial sector. They are often compelled to compete 
with each other in attracting domestic private and 
foreign investments by extending tax and other 
concessions to the private industrialists.
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5.4 / Trends in indian 
manufacturing
According to estimates based on EUS, India’s 
manufacturing employment was 32.2 million in 1983, 
39.8 million in 1993-94, 55.2 million in 2004-05, and 
61.3 million in 2011-12 (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). 
The size of the manufacturing workforce relative to the 
country’s total workforce remained steady at 10.6 per 
cent between 1983-84 and 1993-94, but rose to 12.1 
per cent by 2004-05 and to 13 per cent by 2011-12 (see 
Table 5.1). 
Despite the growth in the size of the overall 
manufacturing workforce, there had been hardly any 
significant change in the size of India’s factory sector 
during the 1980s and 1990s. According to the ASI, 
factory sector employment in India was 8.2 million in 
1983, 8.8 million in 1993-94, and 8.5 million in 2004-
05. Factory sector employment as a share of total 
manufacturing employment in India declined from 25.5 
per cent in 1983 to 15.4 per cent in 2004-05 (see Table 
5.1 and Figure 5.1). The factory-based production of 
cotton and jute textiles suffered steep declines during 
the 1980s, with thousands of mill workers losing jobs in 
Mumbai, Kolkata, Ahmedabad, and other 
industrial centres.
The introduction of economic reforms in 1991-92 
was followed by a surge in industrial investments in 
India. Almost all factory-sector industries experienced 
acceleration in the growth of output and employment 
from 1991-92 to 1995-96, and the star performers had 
been minerals and metals, machinery, automobiles, 
and chemicals and petrochemicals. However, the 
growth of output in India’s organised manufacturing 
sector decelerated between 1996-97 and 2001-02, with 
several industries recording negative or very low rates 
of growth. Factory-sector manufacturing employment 
increased sharply, by 1.5 million, during the first half 
of the 1990s, and declined subsequently by 1.1 million, 
during the second half of the 1990s (see Figure 5.2 and 
Table 5.2).
Given the above-referred context, India’s industrial 
growth during the 1980s through the first half of the 
2000s has been described as ‘jobless.’ That is, despite 
the relatively fast growth of factory-sector output, the 
growth of factory-sector employment in the country 
has been stagnant during this period (see Figure 5.2). 
Some scholars have argued that labour regulations 
have restricted flexibility in India’s labour market which 
slowed down the growth of factory employment in the 
country.
It is notable that despite the stagnancy in the growth of 
factory employment, total manufacturing employment 
in India (NSS-EUS) increased by 23 million (from 32.2 
million to 55.2 million) between 1983 and 2004-05 
(see Table 5.1). This suggests that the expansion of 
manufacturing employment in India during the early 
1980s to the middle of the 2000s occurred largely in 
micro and small units in the unorganised sector.
5.4.2 / Manufacturing 
employment during a phase of 
fast growth : 2004-05 to 2011-12
The growth of employment and output of the organised 
manufacturing sector (as well as of overall GDP) in 
the country registered an impressive revival during 
the early 2000s. Factory sector employment in India 
increased from 8.5 million in 2004-05 to 13.4 million 
in 2011-12 (see Figure 5.2) – an increase of 4.9 million 
new jobs over this seven-year period. That was 
remarkable compared to the near ‘jobless’ growth that 
characterised this sector for the two-and-a-half decades 
since the 1980s. 
The record of employment growth in the unorganised 
manufacturing sector, however, presents an altogether 
different picture. Between 2004-05 and 2011-12, 
NSSO EUS data shows that overall manufacturing 
employment in India increased from 55.2 million 
to 61.3 million – thus an increase of only 5.1 million 
new jobs. At the same time, as we have already seen, 
organised manufacturing employment had registered 
a sharp increase during this very period (4.7 million 
new jobs from 2004-05 to 2011-12). Thus, between 
2004-05 and 2011-12, the growth of employment in 
the manufacturing sector (organised and unorganised 
sectors combined) decelerated, despite a revival in 
5.4.1 / Growth of indian 
manufacturing over the decades
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employment growth in the organised sector. Clearly, 
this points to a sharp downward fall in the growth of 
employment in India’s unorganised manufacturing 
from the mid-2000s onwards.
Between 1983 and 2004-05, employment in the 
relatively ‘modern’ industries – chemicals, petroleum, 
rubber and plastic products, minerals, metals, metal 
products, machinery, equipment, instruments, motor 
vehicles, and transport equipment – increased by 
approximately 6.3 million (NSS-EUS). During this period, 
the net increase in factory employment in the same 
set of industries was only 0.9 million (see Table 5.2). 
This suggests that for every new job in the factory 
sector, approximately six jobs had been generated in 
the unregistered sector in the above-referred set of 
industries during the years from 1983 to 2004-05. 
The period between 2004-05 and 2011-12, however, 
presents a completely different picture. The net 
increase in factory employment during this period 
(according to ASI data) in the modern industries 
referred above was 3.2 million (thus a much better 
record compared to the corresponding increase of 
only 0.9 million between 1983 and 2004-05). At the 
same time, the NSS-EUS suggest that the net increase 
in overall employment in these industries during the 
2004-12 period was also 3.2 million. This implies that 
there had been hardly any net increase in employment 
in the unregistered sector in a wide range of industries, 
including chemicals, plastic products, minerals, metals, 
metal products, machinery and equipment, and 
motor vehicles. 
It is important to note that even within the factory 
sector, a substantial share of the incremental 
employment created after the 2000s has been in 
relatively large factories. Rakshit (2019) shows that 
factories that employ 200 or more workers accounted 
for 61 per cent of the total factory employment in India 
in 2014-15, up from 54 per cent only in 2000-01. In fact, 
43 per cent of the incremental employment during the 
2000-2015 period occurred in factories employing 500 
or more workers (Rakshit 2019).
1983
1993-94
2004-05
2011-12
2017-18
8.2
8.8
8.5
13.4
14.9**
32.2
39.8
55.2
61.3
303.4
374.4
457.8
472.5
10.6
10.6
12.2
13.0 16.7
15.6
Years Factory 
sector
Table 5.1: 
Employment 
in the Factory 
Sector and 
Manufacturing 
in India, 
in million 
numbers and 
as % of total 
employment in 
the country
Manufacturing,
 total
Total 
Employment
 (all sectors)
All workers Urban 
male 
workers*
Manufacturing employment as 
% of total employment
Employment in million numbers
Sources and notes: Author’s estimations based on various rounds of EUS conducted by the NSSO (for manufacturing and total 
employment) and ASI (for factory sector employment). See Thomas and Johny (2018) for more details; *Jha (2019) based on 
the yet-to-be released Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) conducted by the NSSO. Relates to working-age population only; 
** relates to the year 2016-17. 
Figure 5.1: 
Employment 
in the Factory 
Sector and 
Manufacturing 
in India, 
in million 
numbers
Sources and notes : Author’s estimations based on various rounds of EUS conducted by the NSSO (for manufacturing and 
total employment) and ASI (for factory sector employment).
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Figure 5.2: Log 
of Gross Value 
Added and 
Employment in 
lakhs, India’s 
Factory Sector: 
1991-92 to 
2016-17 
Sources and notes : Annual Survey of Industries, various years
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Table 5.2: 
Employment 
in the Factory 
Sector in India, 
industry-wise, 
numbers in 
1000s
Employ-
ment
in 2016
-17
Increment to employment
Sources and notes : Annual Survey of Industries, various years
1980-81 
to 91-92
(11 yrs)
-35
-160
4
188
164
139
61
378
34
1991-92 
to 95-96
(4 yrs)
207
377
67
264
217
181
143
1524
381
1995-96 
to 04-05
(9 yrs)
1
6
50
48
-108
-230
-170
- 471
-52
2004-05 
to 11-12
(7 yrs)
406
821
105
729
1275
649
558
4675
668
2011-12 
to 16-17
(5 yrs)
100
404
121
427
79
91
223
1435
287
2322
3090
515
2325
2775
1543
1304
14289
-
Log GVA_manu
Emp_manu
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5.4.3 / Growth of manufacturing 
employment after 2011-12
The growth of overall GDP and of manufacturing 
incomes in India had been at extremely fast rates 
(annual growth rates of above 8 per cent for both) 
during the years 2003-04 to 2007-08. However, the 
worldwide economic crisis, which became pronounced 
by 2008, affected Indian industries too, especially 
the export-oriented sectors including garments and 
engineering. The expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies initiated in India to tide over the economic 
slowdown, which included greater lending by banks, 
helped to overcome the crisis to some extent.
Nevertheless, the Indian economy has been facing 
greater difficulties after 2011-12. First, there has been 
a slowdown in investment rates in the Indian economy. 
Gross capital formation as a proportion of the country’s 
GDP was 39.5 per cent in 2012-13 but declined to 33.5 
per cent by 2016-17. India’s exports have slowed down 
in growth too, with a decline in the global demand 
conditions. India’s current account deficit had dipped 
to very high levels by 2012-13 (touching 5 per cent of 
GDP in that year). The change in the base year for GDP 
estimations from 2011-12 onwards makes it difficult to 
compare the rates of growth before and after that year. 
However, certain points are worth noting. There has 
been a clear deceleration in the growth of agricultural 
incomes and rural demand in India after 2011-12 
(compared to the years between 2003-04 and 2011-
12). The construction sector which had been the most 
important source of employment in the country during 
the period from 2004 to 2012, experienced a noticeable 
slowdown in the growth of incomes after 2012-13. 
According to ASI data, the growth of value added and 
employment in India’s factory sector decelerated 
markedly from 2011-12 onwards, relative to the growth 
during the 2004-11 period.   The growth of value added 
had revived somewhat during the 2014-16 period 
but slowed down again in 2016-17. The slowdown in 
employment growth after 2011-12 in industries such as 
machinery, minerals, and metal products is of particular 
concern (see Figure 5.2).
As is well known, demonetisation of high-value 
currency notes in November 2016 and the introduction 
of goods and services tax (GST) in July 2017 have been 
landmark events with very serious implications for 
the economy and the labour market. Small units in 
the informal sector have been adversely affected by 
these policies. When informal sector units have been 
compelled to become part of the formal sector in 
the wake of demonetisation and GST, many of them 
may have possibly perished, causing severe loss of 
employment. 
The employment situation in India has now reached a 
tipping point. An expansion of the country’s working-
age population, on the one hand, and the structural 
shift of the workforce away from agriculture, on the 
other, implies that new jobs will have to be generated 
in the non-agricultural sectors at a relatively fast rate. 
We have estimated that the potential workforce in India 
in industry and services grew at the rate of 14.7 million 
a year during the 2004-12 period. At the same time, 
the actual rate at which employment was created in 
industry and services in the country during the above-
referred period was only 6.5 million per year -- or at 
less than half of the potential rate (Thomas 2015). 
It is difficult to understand what may have happened 
to overall manufacturing employment growth in 
India during the recent years, given that the NSSO 
has not released any survey on employment and 
unemployment after 2011-12. The State of Working 
India 2018 report prepared by Azim Premji University, 
which examined evidence from Labour Bureau and 
other sources, and surveys conducted by the Centre 
for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE) has 
concluded that the growth of employment in India 
has clearly slowed down after 2011-12. It is learnt 
that the NSSO survey for the year 2017-18 has been 
completed, and some media outlets have published 
reports based on the yet-to-be-released data. According 
to these reports, the unemployment rate in the 
country had reached a record high level of 6.1 per 
cent in 2017-18 (Thomas 2019). These reports further 
suggest unimpressive growth in overall manufacturing 
employment. The share of manufacturing workers 
among all workers in the case of urban males (aged 15 
years and above) declined from 16.7 per cent in 2011-
12 to 15.6 per cent in 2017-18 (see Table 5.1).
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5.5 / Industrial policy: 
parameters and 
considerations
The ‘jobless’ growth – stagnant growth of employment 
despite a relatively fast growth of value added – in 
India’s factory sector between the 1980s and early 
2000s has been the subject of scholarly debate. Some 
economists have argued that the slow growth of 
factory employment in India during the 1980s and 
in later decades has been mainly on account of the 
rigidity in the country’s labour market. This rigidity 
has been attributed to the introduction of certain 
labour regulations in the country during the late 
1970s, which, it is argued, made it difficult for the 
employers to retrench workers (Fallon and Lucas 
1993; Besley and Burgess 2004). At the same time, 
some other scholars have questioned the argument 
that India’s labour market is rigid, and even pointed to 
some of the problems in the methods used in studies 
that attributed jobless growth to labour regulations 
(Bhattacharjea 2009; see also the review in Thomas 
2018a).
However, there are enough grounds to contest the 
above assessment, particularly in the context of the 
rising share of informal employment even within the 
formal segment of Indian manufacturing. Between 
1999-2000 and 2014-15, directly employed workers 
accounted for only 33.5 per cent of the incremental 
employment in India’s factory sector, while the rest 
were contract workers or other employees who are 
outside the purview of the labour laws (see Table 
5.3). Annavajhula and Pratap (2012) find that contract 
workers are employed in almost every aspect of the 
production operation and they form 70-80 per cent of 
all workers in Maruti Suzuki’s plants in Gurgaon and 
Manesar. 
In recent years, trade union activism has declined in 
India, and the bargaining strength of labour relative 
to capital have substantially reduced. In India’s 
factory sector, as a share of gross value added, profits 
increased sharply from 19.0 per cent in 2000-01 to 
53.8 per cent in 2007-08, whereas workers’ wages 
declined from 15.5 per cent to 9.2 per cent during the 
same period. Although profits as a share of gross value 
added declined afterwards (to 39.5 per cent in 2014-
15), this decline was more due to the rise in interest 
charges and salaries for supervisors and managers 
(see Figure 5.3). Experiences from various industries 
show that employers find different ways to circumvent 
the existing labour regulations, while the authorities 
adopt a lax attitude towards implementing them (Dutta 
2016). In a field study of women garment workers in 
Bangalore, Johny (2018) writes about the strategies 
adopted by the employers to avoid payment of gratuity 
benefits to workers (including persuading workers to 
terminate their current contract and re-join the same 
factory within a week or so on a new contract) (Thomas 
and Johny 2018).
All Persons 
Employed
Workers
Directly employed
Men
Women
Employed through 
contractors
Employees other 
than workers
Supervisory and 
Managerial Staff
100
76.8
61.7
50.9
10.8
15.2
23.2
10
100
77.5
50.1
40.1
10
27.4
22
9.8
100
78.4
33.5
24.7
8.8
44.9
20.3
9.5
Category
1999-
2000
Table 5.3: Distribution of employment in India’s factory 
sector, by categories, 1999-2000 to 2014-15, as % of all 
persons employed
2014-
2015
Incremental 
employment, 
1999-2000 to 
2014-15
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various years
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Figure 5.3: 
Expenditures 
on Labour and 
Capital as % 
of Gross Value 
Added, India’s 
Factory Sector, 
1991-92 to 
2016-17
Sources and notes : Estimates based on Annual Survey of Industries.
5.5.2 / Investment and industrial 
growth
In India, the growth of the industrial sector has been 
closely linked to trends in investment. Gross capital 
formation (GCF) as a proportion of GDP in India was 
19.2 per cent in 1980-81, rose to 23.0 per cent in 
1992-93, but following stagnation in investment after 
the mid-1990s, was still at 24.3 per cent in 2000-01 
(all estimations using 2004-05 as the base).  In fact, 
there has been a sharp fall in public investment in the 
Indian economy since the 1990s. Gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) in the public sector as a proportion 
of India’s GDP peaked at 12.2 per cent in 1986-87, but 
subsequently declined to 6.6 per cent by 2002-03. 
Private corporate sector GFCF too was on a decline in 
the country from the middle of the 1990s.4
There has been a significant revival in investment 
and industrial growth in India since the early 2000s 
onwards. GCF as a proportion of GDP rose impressively 
to 38 per cent in 2007-08. This revival had been led 
by private corporate sector investments, which were 
financed largely by a notable rise in corporate profits 
and savings. However, after 2007-08, the private 
corporate sector GFCF has registered a decline in India. 
According to national income estimates with 2011-12 
as the base year, GCF as a proportion of GDP in India 
was 39 per cent in 2012-13 but fell to 33.3 per cent by 
2016-17.5
It is important to note that, as per the data compiled by 
the World Bank, investment rates in India had reached 
the levels achieved by China by 2007. However, the 
Chinese and the Indian rates began to diverge after 
that. By 2011, while GCF as a proportion of GDP was 
39.6 per cent for India, this rate had risen to 47.7 
per cent for China (see Figure 5.4). In the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis, while the State in China 
responded with massive investments in infrastructure 
and new technologies, the Indian economy suffered 
due to stagnation in both public and private corporate 
investments.
5.5.3 / Infrastructure challenges 
In India, the growth of the infrastructure sectors such 
as electricity, roads, and ports have failed to catch up 
with the overall pace of economic growth. This has 
resulted in severe supply-side bottlenecks, adversely 
affecting the growth of the country’s manufacturing 
sector. The constraints in the infrastructure sector raise 
the costs of Indian firms, especially the micro, small and 
medium units, and reduce the competitiveness of their 
products both in the domestic and export markets.
Estimates by the Ministry of Power show that the 
energy availability in India during 2011-12 was 857.9 
billion units (or kilowatt hours), which was 8.5 per cent 
less than the energy required for that year. Power 
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Figure 5.4: 
Gross Capital 
Formation 
as % Gross 
Domestic 
Product, India 
and China: 
1992 to 2017
Source: World Development Indicators
demand-supply shortages have been reported from 
every region of India and from a majority of Indian 
states in 2011-12 (CEA 2012, Annex II). By 2017-
18, energy availability in India increased to 1203.6 
billion units, and the deficit in energy availability was 
reduced to 0.7 per cent.  The decline in deficit does 
not, however, confirm that the power situation has 
improved in the country. The reduction in the deficit 
could partly be a consequence of the slowdown in 
energy demand (which grew at an annual rate of 
only 3.2 per cent between 2013-14 and 2017-18), 
arising from a slow growth of demand from the 
industrial sector.6
It needs to be noted here that the power generation 
capacity in China was 2.4 times the power generation 
capacity in India in 2000 and 4.1 times the Indian 
figure in 2008. By 2017, electricity generation in 
China (in gigawatt hours) increased to 4.7 times the 
corresponding Indian level.7 Public sector power 
utilities under the control of the Central or the state 
governments accounted for more than 80 per cent 
of the total energy generation capacity in India even 
in 2011-12 (and 53.9 per cent in 2019).8 It is clear that 
investments by the public sector in power generation 
are crucial, especially given the long gestation nature of 
power projects.
Allcott et al. (2015) show that in India electricity 
shortages have had a significant negative effect on 
the growth of output and revenues of manufacturing 
firms. They further show that the growth-retarding 
impacts of power shortages have been more severe 
on small industrial units, which cannot afford to install 
generators. Our field research in Coimbatore in Tamil 
Nadu confirms that power shortages have been the 
most serious constraint to growth in this industrial 
town between 2007 and 2014. For instance, in January 
2012, industrial units in Coimbatore suffered from six 
hours of power cuts on a daily basis, and as a result, 
several units were operating at 50 per cent or even less 
of their actual production capacities. The owner of a 
leading pump manufacturer in Coimbatore recounted 
the schedule of power cuts affecting his factory in 
January 2012: 10 am to 12 noon, 4 pm to 6 pm, 7.30 pm 
to 8.15 pm, and 9.45 pm to 10.30 pm.9
There are other forms of infrastructure bottlenecks that 
affect the growth of small industrial units.  Consider, 
for instance, the case of agro- and food-processing 
industries. The prospects for the growth of such 
industries, especially in relatively small-scale units, 
are indeed very high in India. These industries will be 
beneficial for farmers and will also help provide cheap 
food for the general public. However, a major hurdle 
for the growth of such industries is the absence of the 
necessary infrastructure. Even facilities for storage and 
transport of fruits, vegetables and other agro-based 
products from the farm to the market (cold storages, 
for instance) are extremely poor in most parts of
the country.
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5.5.4 / Banking and credit 
India used to have a relatively strong institutional 
mechanism for the long-term financing of industrial 
development, but this began to weaken from the 2000s 
onwards (Nayyar 2018). The development finance 
institutions (DFIs) in India included term-lending 
institutions such as Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation of India (ICICI) and Industrial Development 
Bank of India (IDBI); State financial corporations 
and State industrial development corporations; and 
institutions such as Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) and 
Unit Trust of India (UTI), which mobilised savings from 
households. Lending by DFIs as a proportion of GFCF by 
the private sector in the country climbed to 75 per cent 
by 2000-01 (Nayyar 2018). 
However, from the 2000s onwards, development 
banks in India as well as in many other countries 
began offering ‘universal banking services’, diluting 
their core strengths in long-term lending.  On the 
other hand, from the mid-2000s onwards, commercial 
banks in India increased their lending to large-scale 
industries, including units notably in the power and 
telecom sectors (Nagaraj 2013). Long-term lending by 
commercial banks to large-scale industries eventually 
led to the ballooning of their non-performing assets 
(NPAs).
During the pre-1990 years, targeting of bank credit to 
agriculture and SSIs was an important aspect of India’s 
banking policies. The availability of subsidised credit 
made sizeable contributions to the growth of SSIs, for 
instance, the garment industry in Tiruppur (Chari 2000). 
However, the shares of agriculture and industry in 
the total allocation of credit by scheduled commercial 
banks in India declined from the 1990s onwards. As a 
proportion of non-food gross bank credit, advances to 
SSIs fell from 15.1 per cent in 1990-91 to 6.5 per cent 
in 2005-06, 5.7 per cent in 2010-11, and only 4.9 per 
cent in 2017-18 (see Figure 5.5). The number of loan 
accounts of the SSI sector in commercial banks had 
declined from 219 million in 1992 to 93 million in 2005. 
On the other hand, the share of personal loans and 
professional services in total outstanding bank credit 
in India increased from 9.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 27 
per cent in 2005-06 and was 22.8 per cent in 2017-18 
(Reserve Bank of India 2006; also see Figure 5.5). 
It is important to note that with the crisis due to NPA 
and other problems affecting the banking sector, credit 
disbursed by the commercial banks to the industrial 
sector has declined sharply from 2014-15 onwards. 
The year-on-year growth of bank credit received by 
micro, small and medium industries had been negative 
during 2015-16 and 2016-17, and only marginal (only 
0.5 per cent) in 2017-18. In comparison, the year-on-
year growth of personal loans disbursed by scheduled 
commercial banks was above 15 per cent in each of 
these years (Reserve Bank of India).
Several owners of small and medium firms we spoke to 
highlighted the problem of relatively high interest rates. 
They say while they have to pay interest rates of 10-11 
per cent in India, Chinese firms receive loans at much 
lower interest rates (say 4 per cent).10 The high interest 
rates on working capital loans, in particular, are a heavy 
burden for the entrepreneurs. Typically, working capital 
requirements are relatively high during periods of 
recession, when firms are more likely to be burdened 
with the non-payment of dues from their customers 
(other firms, which may also be feeling the pains due 
to the recession). On the contrary, however, banks 
are reluctant to provide loans to firms during periods 
of recession due to the fear that they may default on 
the loans. Also, if a firm delays its repayment of a loan 
(which is more likely during a recession) by more 
than a certain period, banks begin to charge penal 
interest rates.11
At the same time, micro enterprises (mostly in the 
unregistered sector) receive very little credit from 
banks and other institutional sources. Typically owners 
of microenterprises depend on their own personal or 
family savings for investment in machinery.
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5.5.5 / Trade liberalisation 
and rising import intensity of 
manufacturing 
India has reduced the tariffs on the import of several 
manufactured goods into the country during the 2000s. 
The weighted average of import tariffs in India on 
capital goods declined from 94.8 per cent in 1991-92 to 
28.7 per cent in 1995-96, 23.1 per cent in 2001-02, 9.5 
per cent in 2005-06, and to 5.6 per cent in 2009-10. The 
tariff reductions have adversely affected the prospects 
of India’s manufacturing firms, which are, as noted 
above, already disadvantaged by many supply-side 
constraints. Some of the industries that recorded fast 
rates of growth of imports into India from the 2000s 
onwards include machine tools, electrical and non-
electrical machinery, electronic and computer goods, 
and transport equipment (see Figure 5.6). 
In the case of the electronics industry, India has 
been liberalising duties from the middle of the 
1990s onwards, initially as part of its World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) requirements and later as a 
result of the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that India 
and some of the East Asian countries entered into. 
Given such an environment, domestic manufacturers 
of electronic components could not develop the 
technological capabilities needed to survive in this 
fast-changing industry. Despite being a major market 
for mobile phones, India is today a large importer of 
telecommunication products (Francis 2018).
Figure 5.5: 
Shares of 
Industry and 
Agriculture in 
outstanding 
non-food gross 
bank credit in 
India, 1991-92 
to 2016-17 in %
Source: Reserve Bank of India
5.5.6 / Exchange rate 
fluctuations  
The gradual liberalisation of India’s capital account 
from the 2000s onwards and the resultant increase in 
the inflows of foreign portfolio investments (FPI) into 
the country have created problems for the country’s 
manufacturing sector. The volatility in FPI flows has led 
to wide fluctuations in exchange rates and also in the 
prices of several commodities (such as steel and cotton) 
(see Figure 5.7). It may be noted that unlike India, China 
has had strict controls on foreign capital movements 
across its borders to filter out volatile, short-term 
capital flows, which are often harmful to the economy. 
In the context of Brazil, Nassif et al. (2019) show how 
long-term industrial and technological policies have 
been weakened due to their incompatibility with short-
term macroeconomic policies.  
Industrial growth that is increasingly based on imported 
components reduces the growth opportunities for the 
domestic industry and depresses the possible linkages 
between the large and the small-scale sectors. Typically, 
a substantial part of the production of ancillaries and 
components for machinery, and transport-equipment 
industries in India has been in the small-scale or the 
unorganised sector. With the rise in the import of 
components, such opportunities for production in the 
small-scale sector have been reduced.
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Figure 5.6: 
Imports of 
Machinery, 
Electronic 
Goods, and 
Transport 
Equipment 
into India, 
1998-99 to 
2017-18: in 
million dollars 
and as a share 
of Domestic 
Production of 
these Products 
in India 
Sources and notes: Import data as reported in the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India; Output 
data from Annual Survey of Industries. Based on data on imports and output of the following goods: machine tools; ma-
chinery except electrical and electronic; electrical machinery except electronic; electronic goods; computer goods; transport 
equipment; and project goods.
The Rupee-Dollar exchange rate appreciated sharply 
between May 2007 and April 2008, resulting in a steep 
decline in the revenues and employment of export-
oriented industries such as textiles, garments, leather, 
and engineering in India. At the same time, there has 
also been equally sharp depreciation of the Indian 
Rupee, such as during the second half of 2008 and 
Figure 7: 
Rupee-Dollar 
Exchange Rate 
and Inflows 
of Foreign 
Portfolio 
Investment 
into India, July 
2005 to August 
2018
Source : Portfolio investment from RBI Website;  Exchange Rate until April 2011 also from RBI; Exchange rate for other months 
from http://www.x-rates.com/d/INR/USD/hist2011.html
again during the period from May 2011 to August 
2013 (see Figure 5.7). During these periods of currency 
depreciation, imports of machinery and raw material 
become costlier. Also, many Indian firms, which have 
availed of foreign-currency loans, incur heavy losses 
when they are required to repay their loans in the 
depreciated rupee.
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Central government public sector enterprises (PSEs) 
and research and educational institutions funded 
by the Central Government have a relatively small 
presence in the state (In 2013-14, Kerala’s share in 
total investment by Central government PSEs was only 
1.9 per cent, much less than Kerala’s share in India’s 
population, which was 2.8 per cent in 2011).
5.5.7 / Industrial policies for 
regional development
In India, industrial policies should reflect the priorities 
and requirements for industrial development across 
various regions. There are variations across States with 
respect to demographic structures, which also have 
important implications for their labour markets. In 
2011, the population in the age group of 0 to 14 years 
as a share of the total population was 23.4 per cent 
only in Kerala and 40.1 per cent in Bihar (according 
to data from the Census of India). Within India, the 
largest additions of the working-age population over 
the coming years are going to come from some of the 
poorest regions, including states such as Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar. At the same time, states such as Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu will see their population ageing.
Kerala has already started facing a severe shortage of 
unskilled workers, whereas, at the same time, educated 
workers from this state have been seeking employment 
opportunities elsewhere. According to an estimate 
by the state government, 1.4 million Keralites were 
working in various professions outside the country in 
2011 (Pravasi Malayali Census 2011). At the same time, 
a rising stream of migrant workers from other states, 
including Bihar, West Bengal, and Odisha, meets the 
large demand for unskilled labour in Kerala. According 
to an estimate in 2011, migrant labourers in Kerala 
from the other Indian states numbered approximately 
2.5 million, which was close to 20 per cent of the state’s 
total workforce (12.7 million) at that time.
Given such a context, the Approach Paper for the 
Thirteenth Five Year Plan for Kerala (from 2017 to 2022) 
had suggested that the future industrial development 
of Kerala should focus on industries that build on the 
advantages of a skilled workforce. Kerala aims to make 
a mark in sectors such as biotechnology, life sciences, 
pharmaceuticals (thus furthering Kerala’s expertise 
and advantages in the area of healthcare), electronics 
hardware, and knowledge industries in general. 
Kerala is indeed making steady progress in some of 
these areas (a Life Sciences Park is being set up in 
Thiruvananthapuram). However, a relative shortage 
of financial resources is a big hurdle for the state in 
setting up research centres and other institutions that 
are crucial for the nurturing of knowledge industries. 
5.5.8 / Services v/s manufacturing
India’s recent economic growth has been led by the 
services sector. The relatively fast growth of the services 
sector, especially of sectors such as information 
technology (IT) and financial services has, in fact, 
created some disadvantages for the manufacturing 
sector in India. Most importantly, services sector 
growth has pushed up the cost of land and also for 
skilled labour in the country. Entrepreneurs we talked 
to in different parts of the country (Gujarat, Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka) have cited availability and 
cost of land as a key concern for them.12 For instance, 
in Peenya industrial estate in Bangalore, the cost of 
one acre of land would be higher than Rs. 10 crores, 
according to some estimates in 2017. Therefore, for an 
entrepreneur, the cost of land would become a heavy 
drain on her financial resources even before she 
begins production. 
Many engineers and other skilled professionals find 
the services sector more attractive (in terms of salaries 
and working conditions) compared to manufacturing. 
Manufacturing firms find it difficult to offer salaries 
comparable to those offered in sectors such as IT or 
financial services. Owners of manufacturing firms 
complain that even less skilled workers prefer to 
work in shopping malls or retail services rather than 
in factories.
5.5.9 / Small firms v/s big firms 
In India, public sector units have facilitated the growth 
of small firms around them, typically as suppliers of 
inputs or as players in some stage of the value chain. 
For example, a number of industrial units in Peenya 
have been engaged in the aircraft industry, to a large 
extent due to the linkages built in this industrial area 
by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore. 
Similarly Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) in 
Tiruchirappalli and Indian Petrochemicals Limited (IPCL) 
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5.5.10 / Foreign investment and 
the ‘Make in India’ initiative 
To promote the growth of manufacturing in India, the 
Union government, led by the National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA), has launched a ‘Make in India’ initiative. 
Previously, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government had rolled out the National Manufacturing 
Policy with the same objective. The thrust of both these 
initiatives has been to attract private investments, 
especially foreign investment, with the government 
acting as a facilitator for private investors. In recent 
years, rules relating to FDI have been liberalised to a 
great extent, with more and more sectors being put 
under the ‘automatic route’ for approval. 
in Vadodara in 1969 had helped the emergence of 
clusters of small industrial units in these cities.13
However, in recent years, leaders of small-industry 
associations point out that they receive very little 
assistance from the bigger private firms, especially 
foreign-owned firms. For instance, small firms 
engaged in the power equipment industry note that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in this sector (such 
as Hitachi or ABB) prefer to work with other foreign 
firms (as suppliers), and not with the small-scale Indian 
firms. They also point to how a major Indian private 
company in the power sector imported most of the 
machinery it needed while setting up its new plant 
thereby denying smaller Indian firms the opportunity to 
benefit from such a large demand.14
A major complaint of micro and small industries is 
that the charges they receive from the bigger firms for 
turning, milling or other machining operations (what 
are commonly referred to as ‘job works’) have hardly 
improved over the years. In fact, with the emergence of 
computerised numerical control (CNC) machines, the 
bigger firms have to depend less on the small firms for 
machining and other operations. Delay in payments 
from their buyers (which are typically bigger firms) is 
another major problem faced by the smaller firms.  
This increases the working capital needs of the small 
firms especially because they will have to make ready 
payments for purchasing their inputs.15 
International experience suggests that FDI will 
contribute to development only if it brings in 
technologies and managerial capabilities, and not just 
capital, to the host nation. If the objective of the foreign 
investors is only to gain better access to the markets in 
the host nation, they could end up weakening, rather 
than strengthening, the domestic firms.  
Given this context, there are concerns on the nature 
of FDI flows into India during recent years. Rao and 
Dhar (2018) show that about half of the total reported 
FDI inflows into India between 2004 and 2014 were 
not ‘realistic’ – these were investments made either by 
financial investors or by national investors investing 
in the domestic economy through the FDI route. They 
further show that the share of manufacturing in total 
FDI flows into India declined from 47.8 per cent during 
the period October 2012 - September 2014 to only 
30.3 per cent during the period October 2014 - March 
2017 (Rao and Dhar 2018). Further, an increasingly 
larger share of FDI flows into India is not in the form of 
‘greenfield’ investments, but is achieved through the 
acquisition of shares of domestic firms (Nagaraj 2017).
Since 2011-12, investments in the country by domestic 
private firms have been on a low key. The possible 
reasons include the slowdown in demand at home and 
abroad, unutilised capacities of these firms, and their 
high levels of indebtedness. Given such circumstances, 
the expansion in public expenditures will be a critical 
component of any effort to promote economic growth 
and development in India.
5.5.11 / Guiding technological 
development
Technological changes in the manufacturing sector 
have been increasingly labour saving, and this brings 
in a new dimension to the challenge of employment 
creation.16 New technologies such as of electric vehicles 
or of renewable energy sources will absorb much less 
labour than their earlier generation of technologies 
(compared to diesel or petrol engine vehicles, electric 
vehicles require much fewer components). Further, 
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India is highly dependent on imports in the case of 
many new technologies (for instance, in the case of 
electric vehicles, India is dependent on the import of 
lithium batteries). 
Given such a context, it is important to invest in 
the creation of new technologies. India requires 
technological advances that generate new economic 
opportunities and absorb — not displace — labour. 
Consider, for instance, advances in biotechnology 
that may find new commercial applications for our 
agricultural products, or electric vehicles and renewable 
energy solutions that depend less on imported material 
(Thomas 2018b).  Nevertheless, India’s spending on 
research and development (R&D) has been rather 
inadequate. Nagaraj (2017) reports that in 2011, R&D 
spending as a proportion of GDP was only 0.8 per 
cent for India, compared to 1.8 per cent for China. In 
fact, China is gradually shifting its economic base from 
low-wage industries and is now emerging as a global 
leader in several new technologies, including artificial 
intelligence and renewable energy.
It needs to be noted that innovations and technological 
interventions are needed in the case of traditional and 
labour-intensive industries as well. Consider the case of 
the textile industry, which employs 9.3 million workers 
in India, out of which 84 per cent are outside the factory 
sector (in 2011-12) (Thomas and Johny 2018). Many 
of these workers are attached to handlooms or other 
traditional forms of production, with extremely low 
levels of productivity. For instance, in a major centre 
for handloom weaving in Kannur district of Kerala, a 
worker is able to weave only 5 to 6 metres of cloth in 
a day (and earn only around Rs.350-400 a day). On 
the other hand, in a newly set up high-tech weaving 
factory in the same district, a worker can oversee the 
production of up to 450 metres of cloth in a day.17 It is 
clear that in handlooms and other traditional sectors, 
both technological and organisational innovations are 
needed to increase productivity, improve wages, and at 
the same time, avoid job losses.
5.6 / Concluding remarks
Given the growing size of the working-age population 
of India, the employment-challenge for India is 
possibly bigger than that faced by any other country 
(except China) in the world. At the same time, a large 
population also offers a sizeable market, which can 
be turned into a significant advantage for domestic 
manufacturers. In the Indian context, however, 
low levels of rural incomes and a high degree of 
inequality are constraints to realising the potential of 
the domestic market. In rural India, in 2011-12, the 
richest decile of households accounted for 55.7 per 
cent of the total consumption expenditure on durable 
goods (NSSO’s surveys on household consumption 
expenditures). SSIs in the unregistered sector, which 
cater to the demand from the poorer sections of the 
population, have been trapped in a cycle of poor quality 
of production, outdated technologies, and low levels of 
profitability.
India should envisage industrial growth that is driven 
more by the domestic market, which will benefit from 
an improvement in the wages and incomes of its rural 
and urban informal workers. In any case, the prospects 
for a growth strategy led by exports are rather bleak, 
given the continuing crisis in the global economy, the 
growing tide of protectionism in the developed world, 
and competition from other labour surplus countries 
such as Bangladesh. Once the domestic market is seen 
as the anchor for its future growth, the Indian industry 
will realise that it is not in its interests to squeeze 
more labour. On the contrary, rising wages and labour 
incomes could provide the basis for a revival of mass 
demand, and fuel the growth of a range of industries 
including food, clothing, and consumer durables. 
India’s policymakers should realise that planning and 
industrial policies are not incompatible with markets 
and globalisation. In fact, the need for industrial policies 
is ever greater now given the uncertainties associated 
with technological changes and turbulence in the global 
economy. At the same time, there are huge investment 
needs in the country today in the areas of irrigation, 
electricity, rural and urban infrastructure, as well as in 
many areas of basic research. With greater investment 
and well-directed industrial policies, India should try to 
revive its manufacturing sector, fully tapping into the 
potential of its vast home market and also of its young 
workers and entrepreneurs.
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Endnotes
1. Data obtained from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators available at http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator
2. According to data from the National Sample Survey 
Office (NSSO) on Employment and Unemployment 
Survey. 
3. It needs to be highlighted, however, that NSSO’s em-
ployment survey is a survey of households while ASI is 
a survey of enterprises. This difference in the nature of 
the two surveys is a limitation while making an estimate 
of employment in the unorganised manufacturing sec-
tor using a combination of data from the NSSO and ASI.
4. Data obtained from National Accounts Statistics, 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India, available at http://www.mospi.
gov.in/13-national-accounts-statistics
5. Data obtained from National Accounts Statistics, 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India, available at http://www.mospi.
gov.in/13-national-accounts-statistics
6. https://powermin.nic.in/en/content/power-sector-
glance-all-india
7. Data obtained from World Development Indicators, 
World Bank.
8. Information from the Ministry of Power, Government 
of India reported in http://www.indiastat.com
9. Based on the author’s field research on Coimbatore’s 
industrial sector from 2008 onwards. See also Thomas 
(2009).
10. Based on the author’s field research in Coimbatore, 
Peenya (Bangalore), and Kollam (Kerala) (all during 
2017-2018).
11. Based on the author’s field research at various 
industrial towns, including Coimbatore, Rajkot (2015-
2016), and Kollam (2018).
12. Based on the author’s field research in Coimbatore, 
Rajkot and Vadodara (2015-2016), Peenya, Bangalore 
(2017), and various industrial locations in Kerala.
13. Based on the author’s field research in Vadodara 
(2015-2016), Peenya, Bangalore (2017), and Tiruchirap-
palli, Tamil Nadu (2018).
 
14. Based on the author’s field research in Vadodara 
(2015-2016) and Peenya, Bangalore (2017).
15. Based on the author’s field research in Coimbatore, 
Rajkot (2015-2016) and Tiruchirappalli (2018).
16. For instance, as of now, the Rourkela plant of a 
major public sector Steel company employs around 
12,000 workers and produces 4.5 million tonnes of 
steel annually. Company sources suggest that, during 
the early 1990s, this plant had employed around 30,000 
workers, although its production capacity then, had 
approximately been only one-third of the current level. 
Based on the author’s field research in Rourkela (2018).
17. Based on the author’s field research in Kannur, 
Kerala (2019).
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Chapter 6
Fiscal deficits are generally viewed negatively 
and seen as a threat to financial and economic 
stability. While some of the concerns
 are legitimate, history and empirical analysis 
shows that many of the fears are either 
unfounded or overblown. 
Using Fiscal Policy to Alleviate the Job Crisis
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Executive Summary
India consistently ranks high among major economies 
in economic growth, but its record in employment 
generation has been underwhelming. As the State of 
Working India report (2018) shows, each percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) growth has resulted in 
fewer jobs being created over the past 25 years, barring 
the 1999-2004 period. While India has made great 
progress in alleviating extreme poverty, employment 
generation is critical if we want to move the masses 
toward middle income. Most of macroeconomic policy 
and strategy is focused on generating growth, but little 
attention is paid to employment generation beyond 
lamentations, especially when there is good evidence of 
a substantial difference in outcomes when fiscal policy 
is directed towards employment. 1
India needs a comprehensive national employment 
policy, supported by fiscal expansion, driven by 
policy designs that promote labour-intensity while 
addressing the vast needs of basic services, ecological 
sustainability, and preservation of heritage and 
traditional crafts. However, such a policy will flounder 
if the bogeyman of fiscal sustainability forever hobbles 
the fiscal support needed. In particular, the obsession 
with rating agency decisions is pernicious. As I discuss 
in Section 6.2 below, there are major misconceptions 
about India’s fiscal policy, government debt, and fiscal 
sustainability that are belied by India’s own experience 
since the 1980s. Unquestionably, developing economies 
face greater constraints than developed economies 
on the balance of payments (BOP) front. I discuss 
these challenges in Section 6.3. However, currently, 
with the central government primary deficit almost 
vanishing, there is ample fiscal space to support 
employment programmes.
133
6.1 / Job growth and job 
quality, both inadequate
India’s employment statistics have generated a great 
deal of controversy in recent times. The survey with 
the longest history—Employment Unemployment 
Survey (EUS) by the National Sample Survey Office 
(NSSO) was last conducted in 2011-12 and has since 
been discontinued. The Periodic Labour Force Survey, 
also conducted by NSSO, was launched in 2017 to 
provide timely information on the labour market. 
Unfortunately, the release of the first report has been 
delayed. While leaked versions showed unemployment 
rising to a 45-year high in 2017-18, the survey is not 
strictly comparable to the old EUS. To be clear, the 
NSSO data are not without problems, but they are the 
only comprehensive, long time series data on the state 
of the labour market in India. Surveys carried out by the 
Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) also 
paint a grim picture. On the other hand, employment 
based on the number of enrollees in Employee 
Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) database shows 
solid job growth in the past two years. However, the 
EPFO data covers only a small sliver of the workforce 
and there are questions about the interpretation of 
the data. The weight of evidence suggests that job 
growth has been weak, even if we cannot have much 
confidence in the precise estimates. 
More importantly, there has been a worrisome long-
term trend toward progressively weaker job growth 
6.2 / The need for fiscal 
expansion to support 
employment
No matter how many employment generation 
programmes are created and how well they are 
designed, if inadequately funded, these programmes 
will fail to create a meaningful increase in employment. 
However, a large budgetary allocation would face 
immense pushback from economists and policymakers 
concerned about fiscal sustainability, inflationary 
pressures, and BOP risks. The relationship between 
fiscal deficits and economic growth has become a 
hotly debated topic in the aftermath of the 2008-09 
global financial crisis, with recent studies recognising 
that fiscal ‘austerity’—fiscal contraction—may have 
hurt growth. Nonetheless, in the Indian context, fiscal 
deficits are generally viewed negatively and are seen as 
a threat to financial and economic stability. While some 
of the concerns are legitimate, history and empirical 
analysis show that many of the fears are either 
unfounded or overblown.
Figure 6.1 :
Gross Fiscal 
Deficit as a 
Percentage 
of GDP
Sources and Notes: RBI: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy: https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?-
head=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20Indian%20Economy
CSO: http://www.mospi.gov.in/publication/national-accounts-statistics-back-series-2011
for a given percentage point of GDP growth. In other 
words, economic growth is translating into fewer jobs. 
Last but not least, the vast majority of workers earn 
below what would be termed living wage (State of 
Working India 2018). In short, employment growth and 
job quality have both been inadequate.
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One of the most striking features of India’s post-
independence economy is that the socialist 
governments of pre-1980 were ironically more fiscally 
prudent than the market-friendly governments since 
1980. Up until 1980, the consolidated public sector 
gross deficit rarely exceeded 5 per cent (Figure 6.1).2 
Also, until 1980, the revenue account was generally 
positive, with the capital expenditures accounting for 
the overall deficit. Thus, borrowing was presumably to 
fund investment, which is conventionally considered 
sound. In contrast, since 1980, India has often run large 
deficits on the revenue account; that is, borrowing 
to finance current spending, which is a major red flag 
in conventional wisdom. Moreover, the overall deficit 
has been generally much larger than the pre-1980 
peak. Only in one year, 2007-2008, did it fall below 
the peak of the pre-1980 range; in every other year 
since 1980, it has been higher than the peak of the pre-
1980 range. Yet, this period has also coincided with the 
takeoff in India’s GDP from the previous Hindu rate 
of growth (Figure 6.2).
Sources and Notes: Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Union and the State Governments in India and Budget 
ocuments of the State Governments. See Table 237 : Select Debt Indicators of the Central and State Governments (as per-
centage of GDP), Reserve Bank of India
Sources and Notes: RBI: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy: https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?-
head=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20Indian%20Economy  
CSO: http://www.mospi.gov.in/publication/national-accounts-statistics-back-series-2011
Figure 6.2 : 
High Deficit 
Periods Have 
Also Been 
Periods of 
High Growth
Figure 6.3 : 
Government 
Debt-to-GDP 
Ratio
6.2.1 / History of fiscal deficits and growth
135
Of course, a mere juxtaposition does not prove 
causality. However, with the notable exception of 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004), there is widespread 
agreement that the growth acceleration in the 1980s 
was caused by fiscal expansion. At the same time, 
most mainstream economists hold the view that 
the 1980s fiscal expansion led to a surge in debt 
and was ultimately unsustainable (Srinivasan and 
Tendulkar 2003), culminating in the 1991 BOP crisis 
(I tackle the BOP issue in Section 6.3 below). Yet, the 
empirical evidence does not support the assertion. 
Fiscal deficits have been structurally higher since 
1980, as has been government debt scaled to GDP 
(Figure 6.3). The natural question is if deficits and debt 
were unsustainable in the long-term, how have they 
remained at high levels for nearly 40 years, which by 
most definitions would 
be long-term?
Contrary to the dominant view, there is empirical 
support that the increase in deficits was a proximate 
factor in triggering India’s take-off. Kevin Nell (2012) 
has argued that India was demand constrained in the 
1952-1979 period and that fiscal expansion brought 
the economy closer to potential. Using different 
methods, I show that there is a positive, long-term 
causal relationship between fiscal deficits and economic 
growth (Thiruvadanthai 2018). This contradicts the 
general assumption among mainstream economists 
that deficits drove growth in the short-term, but were 
ultimately harmful. 
In fact, from a financial Keynesian perspective, there 
are solid reasons why deficits can have a positive 
influence. In a market economy, demand is constrained 
by cash income. However, since one person’s demand 
represents income for someone else in the economy, 
cash income, in turn, is constrained by demand. This 
trap can be broken by financial deepening that allows 
people to borrow and thereby generate demand over 
and above their cash income. However, in developing 
countries, financial deepening can be limited by a lack 
of collateral and the absence of a secondary market 
for debt instruments. Government deficits can help 
bridge the gap by providing cash income—when 
the government runs a deficit, the private sector, by 
definition, runs a surplus. Moreover, a large stock of 
government debt means a corresponding large stock 
of financial savings for the private sector, which can 
be the foundation for a sustained consumer-demand 
led economy. A growing body of research shows that 
financial instability is primarily caused by buildup in 
private sector debt rather than fiscal profligacy (Jorda 
et al. 2013). Indeed, there are good arguments on why 
sovereign debt accelerated the Industrial Revolution in 
the United Kingdom (Ventura and Voth 2015).
6.2.2 / Need for fiscal expansion
India’s present fiscal policy is too tight. The 
consolidated deficit for 2018-19 is estimated to be 5.9 
per cent of GDP, which would be the lowest in the last 
forty years except for the two boom years of 2006-07 
and 2007-08 when economic growth was close to 10 
per cent. In fact, as I elaborate below, fiscal policy has 
been too tight for a few years, given the deleveraging 
imperatives of the corporate sector, the balance sheet 
problems of the banking sector, and the backdrop of 
weak global growth. Thus, fiscal expansion aimed at job 
creation would also serve to accelerate growth, help the 
corporate sector repair its balance sheet, and alleviate 
the non-performing loans in the banking sector.
By 2013, it was clear that the Indian corporate sector 
was struggling with debt-servicing and that banks 
were faced with surging non-performing assets (NPA). 
Capital spending slowed sharply as businesses began 
to retrench and deleverage. To understand the financial 
dynamics, it is useful to look at the aggregate flow of 
funds and sector financial balances. Sector financial 
balances is a useful framework for understanding the 
effect of financial flows on balance sheets and the 
feedback from balance sheets to the real economy. 
The British economist, Wynne Godley, developed the 
concept of sector financial balances from the national 
income and product accounts (Godley and Lavoie 
2012). Essentially, the sector financial balance is an 
accounting identity that relates saving/investment 
decisions to the net accretion/reduction of financial 
asset position across the four major sectors of an 
economy—the private corporate sector, the household 
sector, the government sector, and the foreign sector. A 
sector runs a positive financial balance when its savings 
exceed its investment and vice versa. We can write the 
sector financial balance in commonly understood terms 
as follows:
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Government Sector Balance + Private Corporate 
Sector Balance + Household Sector Balance 
= Current Account Balance
A sector running negative financial balances is either 
running down its cash balances or running up debt. 
Usually, cash balances are unimportant over longer 
periods of time, and negative sector balances are 
closely related to a build-up in debt in the sector 
running negative balances. When the corporate sector 
is trying to reduce its borrowing, by definition, the other 
domestic sectors have to reduce their net lending or 
increase their borrowing. In India’s case, the adjustment 
occurred via a reduction in the current account deficit 
from 2013 to 2016 (that is, reduced borrowing from 
foreigners), which allowed the corporate sector to 
sharply reduce its net borrowing from 2012-13 to 2015-
16. Since then, the current account deficit has widened 
again. The government has compounded the problem 
by cutting the deficit by nearly a percentage point of 
GDP. The sector financial balance equation shows that 
a widening current account deficit and a shrinking 
government deficit together imply a worsening financial 
balance of the combined corporate and household 
sector. While household financial savings changed little, 
corporate sector borrowing picked up. Little wonder 
that the NPA problem has proved so intractable.
Looking ahead, with the global economy decelerating 
and global trade volumes contracting, there is not 
much scope for improvement in exports. Meanwhile, 
as long as India grows robustly, its imports will tend 
to rise. Of course, decline in oil prices can mitigate 
the impact on imports, but further improvements in 
the current account deficit are unlikely. Under these 
circumstances, fiscal expansion is necessary to support 
economic growth while alleviating the financial stresses 
in the private economy. Fiscal deficits serve two 
purposes. The first is increasing the demand for goods 
and services directly purchased by the government 
or indirectly induced through transfers. Second, it 
enables the corporate sector to run financial surpluses 
and rapidly deleverage, thereby strengthening its 
balance sheet, and eventually positioning it to power 
the economy. 
In fact, another episode from the past may be 
instructive. From 1998-2002, the corporate sector was 
dealing with high levels of debt and difficulties 
in debt-service. As the sector underwent balance sheet 
repair, the government ran large fiscal deficits through 
that period, supporting growth. Government debt as 
a percentage of GDP rose steadily, peaking in 2004 
at 83 per cent for the centre and state governments 
combined and at about 66 per cent for the central 
government. Currently, the central government debt 
is about 48 per cent of GDP, the lowest level since 1984-
85. The consolidated public sector debt stands at 68 
per cent of GDP, which is near the low end of the range 
of the last 20 years. Thus, there is scope for significant 
fiscal expansion.
6.2.3 / Will bigger deficits fuel 
inflation? 
A common fear is that expanding fiscal deficits will 
kindle inflationary pressures. The big fiscal expansion 
in the immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2008-09 undoubtedly contributed to the 
high inflation. Unquestionably, any policy that boosts 
demand will tend to push up inflation. However, the 
inflation level is much lower today than it was in 2008-
09 and a moderate rise would still keep it well within 
the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) target range. Presently, 
India’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation is 2.05 
per cent, and Wholesale Price Index (WPI) inflation is 
running at 2.76 per cent. Core CPI inflation is higher 
at 5.36 per cent but is still well within the RBI’s band. 
The RBI estimates that a percentage point increase 
in deficit leads to a 25 basis points increase in WPI 
inflation (Khundrakpam and Pattanaik 2010). Given 
the present level of inflation, one should hardly be 
concerned about the potential increase in inflation 
caused by larger deficits. 
Moreover, the broader economic context suggests 
that fiscal deficits are unlikely to result in much higher 
inflation. There are three reasons why inflation is 
likely to remain subdued. First, oil prices, which have 
a significant influence on inflation, are subdued. 
In contrast, in the previous two episodes of rising 
inflation, oil prices were either rising or historically 
elevated. In the 1980s, oil prices bottomed in 1986 
and increased over the next few years, spiking during 
the first Gulf War. In the most recent episode of high 
inflation, oil prices consistently ran above $100/barrel 
from early 2011 until mid-2014. Second, food prices, 
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which also have a large influence on overall inflation 
in India, have been benign. In contrast, both in the 
late 1980s and earlier in this decade, weak domestic 
agricultural output, coupled with surging global 
food prices, caused soaring food inflation. Third, the 
strength of the feedback from deficits to inflation 
depends on the context. Running large deficits in the 
midst of robust private sector activity is likely to result 
in overheating as supply constraints and bottlenecks 
become binding. In the 1980s, and from 2010-12, the 
private sector was expanding rapidly, and increased 
government spending caused the economy to bump up 
against supply constraints, stoking inflation. Currently, 
there is a capacity glut. For example, capacity utilisation 
in the manufacturing sector is running well below the 
early 2011 peak. In short, the conditions that promote 
rising inflation are currently absent.
6.3 / Managing the balance 
Of payments
The biggest challenge to any significant fiscal expansion 
is the stress on the BOP. India runs a current account 
deficit, which makes it necessary to attract foreign 
capital to fund the deficit. While the effect of fiscal 
deficits on BOP is often exaggerated, it is true that fiscal 
expansion will spur growth as well as imports and will 
tend to increase the current account deficit. Indirectly, 
fiscal expansion is likely to incur the disapproval of 
rating agencies and—since ratings can significantly 
influence capital flows—exert pressure on the BOP. 
What can India do to manage the BOP constraint in a 
world of sluggish international trade and rising trade 
tensions is something that policymakers need to think 
deeply about. 
6.3.1 / The twin deficits myth 
Twin deficits—the idea that fiscal deficits cause current 
account deficits—is a popular myth that underlies 
much of the misgivings about fiscal activism. In the 
Indian context, because unsustainable fiscal expansion 
has been cited as a major cause the 1991 BOP crisis, 
exploration of the twin deficit hypothesis is all the 
more important. 
One of the persistent myths about India's 1991 BOP 
crisis is that the event was caused by profligate 
government deficits and the consequent buildup in 
government debt. Most recently, this idea was mooted 
in Economic Strategy for India report (2018) released 
by a group of eminent economists. The fact is that 
most of the evidence for linking the 1991 BOP crisis to 
fiscal deficits takes the form of hand-waving, post hoc 
ergo propter hoc kind of arguments. The econometric 
evidence is inconclusive. There are many studies that 
explore the twin deficits link, for example, Anoruo 
and Ramchander (1998), Parikh and Rao (2006), and 
Ramu (2017). Anoruo and Ramchander limit their study 
to short-term dynamics and come to the surprising 
conclusion that current account deficits cause fiscal 
deficits rather than the other way around. In contrast, 
both Ramu as well as Parikh and Rao, find that fiscal 
deficits cause current account deficits. The contrasting 
findings reflect flawed assumptions underlying the 
papers. In particular, all three papers fail to account 
for structural breaks in time series on current account 
deficit scaled to GDP. It is well-known that failure to 
account for structural breaks can lead to erroneous 
inference about stationarity (Perron 2005), which all 
three papers indeed do. Correcting for those flaws, I 
find that there is no statistically significant link between 
fiscal and current account deficits in the case of India 
(Thiruvadanthai 2018).   
Let us focus on the narrative analysis of the economic 
developments and whether they support the causal 
mechanisms of the twin deficit hypothesis. At its heart, 
the twin deficit hypothesis stems from an accounting 
identity:
Current Account Deficit (CAD) = Fiscal Deficit (FD) + 
Domestic Private Sector Deficit (PD)3
Since this is an identity--true by definition--if fiscal 
deficits increase, then CAD must increase if PD remains 
constant. The second if is a big if. Nonetheless, it is 
not hard to imagine that expansionary fiscal policy 
stokes domestic demand, which in turn spur imports 
and causes the CAD to worsen. That argument is 
unexceptionable. However, the data do not show that 
this channel was crucial in causing the 1991 crisis. 
Imports scaled to GDP did not increase much in the late 
1980s. Only when the Iraq War started and oil prices 
jumped, did imports surge in 1990.  
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The crisis was triggered by the instability of capital 
flows. Political uncertainty fueled by unstable 
governments from 1989 to 1991 caused capital to flow 
out. Remittances (which are technically part 
of the current account) slowed, non-resident Indians 
began to withdraw money, and external commercial 
borrowings became harder to obtain. One could argue 
that the worsening government deficits, at least partly 
caused the crisis in investor confidence. While that may 
be true, it shows that the government deficit has an 
influence only because investors are primed to believe 
that it is important rather than through any direct 
economic channel. 
6.3.2 / Rating agencies 
While the 2008-09 crisis damaged the worldwide 
credibility of the rating agencies, it did not diminish 
their influence commensurately. In particular, their 
ratings continue to hold sway over policymakers in 
developing countries. The influence of rating agencies 
is crucial because their framework emphasises fiscal 
sustainability and government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
This, in turn, is partly due to the fact that their primary 
concern is inflation and the resulting impact on returns 
to financial investors. The rating agencies' framework 
implicitly informs India's Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management Act (FRBM) and the N.K. Singh 
committee's recommendations for targeting a 60 per 
cent debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, the specter of downgrade 
or negative watch by rating agencies is a major 
impediment to any meaningful fiscal expansion. 
In reality, the rating agency framework is flawed 
and following their prescriptions is likely to be self-
defeating. Jayadev (2017) offers a strong critique of the 
N.K. Singh committee report’s debt targets. Following 
the Reinhart-Rogoff (Cassidy 2013) fiasco, the empirical 
utility of debt targets has been widely questioned. As I 
have argued in the previous section, India has managed 
high debt levels for nearly three decades without 
apparently any impact on economic growth. 
It is also worth noting that in 2004, on the eve of India's 
greatest decade of economic growth, public sector debt 
scaled to GDP was at a record level. More importantly, 
when the private sector is struggling with debt and 
the global economic conditions are not conducive 
for growing exports, trying to tighten fiscal policy is 
counterproductive. It will weaken economic growth, 
aggravate the debt problems in the private sector, 
and increase banking sector problems. These, in turn, 
will cause revenues to weaken and add to the burden 
on the exchequer through the need to recapitalise 
banks. These dynamics played out in Europe in the last 
decade. Even in India, despite keeping a tight leash on 
deficits, the overall debt-to-GDP ratio has declined only 
modestly in the last few years mainly because growth 
has been moderate. Robust economic growth is the best 
way to overcome debt problems. 
Furthermore, empirical research on the drivers of 
capital inflows into emerging markets also calls into 
question the validity of fiscal sustainability metrics. 
The major country-specific factors influencing capital 
inflows appear to be current account deficit, capital 
controls or lack thereof, and exchange rates (Cerutti et 
al. 2015)—debt-to-GDP ratio is conspicuously absent 
as an important factor. Interestingly, the study finds 
that when global financial conditions become less 
conducive, more ‘virtuous’ countries, as in those with 
low public debt, are not any less affected. In other 
words, assuaging rating agencies by curbing the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio will not help a country 
when global financial conditions turn adverse. On the 
other hand, as long as the current account deficit is 
relatively stable, fiscal expansion, by spurring growth, 
will tend to attract capital inflows. India has been 
a sought after destination for international capital 
largely because it is one of the few countries that offer 
prospects of robust growth in a world of low growth.     
While rating agency decisions are likely to have some 
impact on capital inflows into India, the way forward 
is to shift the terms of the debate. Instead of setting 
fiscal policy based on rating agency guidelines, India’s 
policymakers should take the lead in challenging the 
framework, robustly arguing India’s long-term record 
of managing debt, external and internal, while 
fostering strong growth and moderate inflation. At 
any rate, rating agency decisions may have a short-term 
impact, but they are unlikely to alter capital flows in the 
long term. India is one of the few major economies in 
the world that is still growing robustly and has a long 
track record of providing solid returns on portfolio 
and direct investment.  
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6.3.3 / The long-term BOP 
constraint   
The biggest challenge India faces in growing robustly, 
with or without fiscal expansion, is the challenging 
global economic environment and consequent sluggish 
growth in exports. Anemic exports combined with 
strong domestic growth tending to result in higher 
imports, will cause the trade deficit to widen and exert 
pressure on the BOP. Rising trade deficits will need 
to be balanced by higher capital inflows, which will 
increase the vulnerability to unfavorable developments 
in global financial conditions. Alternatively, imports 
have to be lowered. That is, monetary and fiscal policies 
will have to tighten, bringing down domestic growth. 
Escalating trade tensions and a rollback of globalisation 
would only make matters worse. While India needs 
to find ways to grow its exports more rapidly, it is 
important to be realistic about the prospects, given the 
global backdrop. Thus, India's policymakers need to 
craft a proactive, comprehensive policy to overcome 
the BOP constraint on growth.   
After averaging well over double-digit growth in dollar 
terms from 1990 through 2012, India's merchandise 
exports have barely grown in the last five years. In 
real terms, India's exports of goods and services 
are growing at a 5 per cent rate. It is not as if India 
is a laggard. India's export growth, both in the 
dollar and real terms has largely tracked that of the 
broader emerging market group. Thus, India's export 
performance does not reflect India-specific problems 
but global economic weakness and the plateauing of 
the benefits of globalisation.  
Despite tepid export growth, India has managed to 
grow its economy robustly in the past five years. The 
steep decline in oil prices has been a major factor 
in keeping a lid on import growth. Gold imports too 
have been weaker. However, India’s other imports 
have grown strongly, largely the result of increasingly 
skewed income and wealth (Kumar 2018). Upper-
income consumption tends to be much more import-
intensive—foreign education and vacations, high-end 
smartphones, cars, and so forth—and increases the 
import elasticity of growth. Although fiscal expansion 
directed at the bottom of the pyramid will dampen the 
import elasticity of growth, the overall boost to growth 
will still tend to exert pressure on the BOP.
At this juncture, India needs more comprehensive 
import substitution policies that seek to manage the 
BOP situation. Thomas (2019) discusses the continued 
relevance of industrial policy today for job creation. 
Industrial policy and import substitution in the Indian 
context brings back bad memories of planning and 
shortages. We can learn from the past and not make 
the same mistakes, but we do not have the option of 
doing nothing.
6.4 / Policies for 
employment generation
There is great scope for public policy to vastly 
enhance job creation and address India’s myriad needs. 
Broadly, government policies can help: 
1) facilitate private sector job creation while addressing 
the chronic skills shortage, 
2) provide financing to startups that are directed at the 
bottom of the pyramid, 
3) expand MGNREGA to address the country’s 
ecological challenges while finding gainful employment 
for unskilled workers, and 
4) train and deploy workers to conserve heritage 
structures and thereby promote tourism.  
6.4.1 / Facilitating on-the-job 
training
India has a huge youth population, which is supposed 
to deliver the so-called demographic dividend. Yet, 
India also suffers from a chronic and pervasive skills 
shortage. A 2014 report from the OECD found that 
‘employer surveys indicate skills shortages in ICT, 
financial services, tourism, retail, and skill-intensive 
manufacturing: in 2013, 61 per cent of India’s 
employers reported recruitment difficulties. These 
shortages, aggravated by a shortage of qualified 
trainers and the low willingness of employers to pay 
skills premia, have forced graduates into jobs unrelated 
to their training.’ (OECD Report 2014). 
India has a national skills development programme 
under the aegis of the National Skills Development 
Corporation (NSDC), a public-private partnership. 
However, both the design of the programmes and the 
funding leave a lot to be desired. Many of the NSDC 
programmes replicate classroom-type training with 
140
certification issued upon completion. Unsurprisingly, 
NSDC’s performance has been underwhelming, falling 
short of the targets for skilling as well in the job 
finding rates post skilling (Report of the Committee 
for the Rationalization and Optimization of the Sector 
Skill Councils 2016). Moreover, some of the so-called 
training institutes have turned out to be engaging 
in fraudulent practices. While NSDC is an important 
endeavor, much greater effort is needed to bridge the 
employability gap.    
The key to employment generation is to recognise 
that on-the-job training provides one of the best and 
most cost-effective ways of imparting occupational 
skills and enhancing employability. A growing body 
of evidence indicates that work-based learning—such 
as apprenticeships—offers one of the best ways to 
build skills that are valued in the marketplace (Lerman 
2018).  Switzerland and Germany both have extensive 
apprenticeship programmes. In the former, about 
70 per cent of the youth take up an apprenticeship 
and approximately 95 per cent of 25-year olds 
have acquired their degrees while undergoing an 
apprenticeship. Of course, it may not be possible 
to replicate the Swiss and German models in India, 
given the small size of the formal sector in India in 
relation to the size of the workforce. However, there 
are programmes, such as internships that are less 
extensive but can nevertheless be effective (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2014). On-the-job-training is 
a critical mechanism for improving both the supply 
and demand sides of the labour market. Combining 
classroom learning with real-world application 
reinforces each. Moreover, employers are more likely 
to invest and hire when they can rely on the supply of 
skilled labour. 
However, the challenge for apprenticeships and 
internships is that employers worldwide have 
become increasingly reluctant to expend resources on 
training (Taylor 2015), reflecting competitive pressures 
in the era of globalisation. Indian businesses too are 
not immune to such pressures. Hence, substantial 
government support in terms of subsidising on-the-
job training programmes would make it more likely 
that businesses offer such opportunities. With an 
industry partnership, the government can promote 
apprenticeship/internship programmes that help 
students in colleges and vocational courses to obtain 
valuable experience and skills. 
6.4.2 / Incubating start-ups aimed 
at the bottom of the pyramid  
The government of India already has a programme 
called ‘Startup India’ to incubate new and innovative 
businesses. However, the startup landscape in India is 
dominated by applications that are copycats of western 
models—neither innovative nor necessarily addressed 
towards the local needs. The problem is that businesses 
aimed at innovative solutions to local problems are 
likely to be perceived as risky by venture capitalists as 
well as budding entrepreneurs. Yet, such innovations 
are vital both for solving India’s unique problems but 
also fostering labour-intensive development.
In 2015, two young entrepreneurs, struck by the filth 
of the Ganga River and by the copious amounts of 
temple flowers being dumped into the river, wondered 
if the flowers could be recycled. Out of this, the 
venture Helpusgreen was born. The firm collects used 
flowers from temples and converts them into artisanal 
products such as incense sticks and handmade paper 
products. The entire process is labour intensive, from 
collecting the flowers to processing them. The startup 
thus addresses India’s environmental challenge with a 
labour-intensive solution while leveraging technology 
to reach a broad market.  
Given that private capital for such ventures is unlikely 
to be forthcoming, the government has to play a 
bigger role. As venture capitalist William Janeway 
has argued, innovation is either fostered by bubbles, 
monopolies, or the state (Janeway 2012). In the United 
States, the government incubated the computer 
industry for nearly two decades before commercial 
application gained a foothold. Mariana Mazzucato 
expounds on a similar theme in her book (Mazzucato 
2013), ‘The Entrepreneurial State’. If a million 
Helpusgreens bloomed, India would go a long way in 
addressing its multifarious problems while creating 
gainful employment.
Apart from the social impact and other such 
externalities, solutions aimed at the bottom of the 
pyramid are more likely to find applications in other 
developing economies, thereby offering the scalability 
that would make such ventures eventually attractive to 
private sector financiers. 
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6.4.3 / Expanding MGNREGA 
Since its inception in 2006, the MGNREGA programme 
has been heavily criticised. Yet, studies have shown 
that the programme has increased employment, 
directly and indirectly, generated more income for rural 
households, promoted gender parity, and sustainable 
development, and created assets (Freud 2015). A study 
conducted by the Indian Institute of Science found that, 
‘Implementation of MGNREGA works such as water 
conservation and harvesting works, drought proofing, 
irrigation provisioning, and improvement works, and 
renovation of traditional water bodies have contributed 
to improved groundwater levels, increased water 
availability for irrigation, increased area irrigated by 
ground and surface water sources and finally improved 
drinking water availability for humans and livestock.’ 
(Indian Institute of Science 2013).
Despite MGNREGA’s multifarious benefits, the 
programme has been hampered by inadequate funding 
since inception. Moreover, adjusting for inflation, 
the allocations for MGNREGA have declined over the 
years. As such, while the act guarantees 100 working 
days for those seeking work, the average days of 
work provided has been consistently below 50. This is 
hardly surprising given that the current allocation to 
MGNREGA is less than 0.3 per cent of GDP as opposed 
to the 1.7 per cent that the World Bank estimated 
the programme would require to be fully funded. 
MGNREGA can be expanded substantially to create 
more jobs and address ecological challenges on a war-
footing. State of Working India 2019 also proposes an 
urban employment guarantee programme that tries to 
address employment and ecology problems in small 
towns (Basole et al. 2019). Moreover, the spillover 
effects of a substantially enhanced MGNREGA as well as 
a job guarantee programme for urban India, are likely 
to create more jobs indirectly. Although the jobs directly 
created by MGNREGA are not themselves skilled work, 
by boosting the rural economy, the programme fosters 
demand for products and services that can, in turn, 
create skilled jobs in finance, telecommunication, and 
information technology services.
6.4.4 / Preservation of heritage 
structures and promoting 
tourism
India has countless heritage sites and the vast 
majority of them are in a state of disrepair. The proper 
conservation and maintenance of these sites require 
far greater manpower than currently devoted to 
the task. As a result, many historical landmarks and 
structures are encroached upon, defaced, and languish 
in anonymity. The restoration and maintenance 
of these sites can directly provide employment. In 
addition, these sites can become major tourism 
destinations, providing indirect employment. For 
example, the number of visitors to Humayun’s Tomb 
after restoration work has gone up by 1000 per cent.
New York City, with a history of about 300 years, 
has nearly double the protected heritage buildings 
of India, a vast country with millennia of history. 
Documenting and restoring India’s heritage sites 
will require skilled as well as unskilled workers. 
Currently, the Archaeological Survey of India is 
woefully undermanned. An internship/apprenticeship 
programme can draw upon India’s large college-
going population for the skilled labour, thereby also 
providing them work experience. Not only are many 
sites neglected, even the ones that are relatively 
well-maintained lack an adequate appreciation of the 
historical significance. Thus, there is scope for not 
only restoring the sites but also creating awareness 
about the cultural heritage. Training tour guides can 
help cultivate awareness about the heritage, bring in 
tourists, and boost the local communities economically.
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6.5 / Conclusion
While economic growth has allowed India to bring 
down poverty rates dramatically, especially extreme 
poverty, growth has not translated into jobs. Given 
India’s burgeoning youth population, there is an 
urgent need to craft a government policy, adequately 
supported by the budgetary resources, to promote 
robust employment generation. Ultimately, the best 
remedy for alleviating poverty is enough jobs and 
enough high-quality jobs. 
The central government has enough fiscal space to 
adopt a robust employment generation policy. Even 
a doubling in the outlay on MGNREGA would hardly 
be profligate. Moreover, the high potential multiplier 
of such outlays is likely to result in robust growth 
and tax revenues, thereby limiting the deficit. While 
expansionary fiscal consolidation has been debunked 
by global and Indian experience over the past 10 years, 
fiscal consolidation via fiscal expansion has a sound 
basis, especially in the current context.
Endnotes
1. The stark difference between the US and Germany in 
job losses during the 2008-09 crisis—when large wage 
subsidies in Germany muted the employment decline—
shows that fiscal and public policy has an important 
role in employment generation (Jacobs 2012).
2. The combined deficits of the central and state gov-
ernments, departmental enterprises, and public sector 
corporations; for the National Accounts data, I define 
deficits as gross investment less gross saving.
3. This identity is a restatement of the sector financial 
balance identity in section 6.2.2.
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